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The environmental challenges
facing a Chinese oil company in Chad 
The surge in Chinese investments in Africa has brought about a flurry of questions
expressing concern over their ecological impact in the host countries. Still, the principles
and implementation of environmental management by Chinese firms remains largely
unknown.This work, born of a unique partnership between European, Chadian and Chinese
researchers, is an attempt to provide some insight on this subject, based on a  case study
in Chad, on a project that was initiated in 2009 by the leading Chinese petroleum firm,
the CNPC. 
For an understanding of the way in which the firm deals with the environmental challenges
in this country, this book first focuses on the recent progress made in China in the field of
public and private environmental regulation (including the petroleum sector), then describes
how this influences environmental management  as put into effect by the CNPC, in Chad,
during the construction phase. An analysis of the influence of the World Bank- backed
Exxon project sheds light on the interaction between Chinese, Chadian and Western
approaches to environmental issues. The authors have also highlighted the role of impro-
ved communications and transparency between the project proponents and other
stakeholders (local communities, civil society, national media).
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(students at the UIBE) accompanied us during interviews in Beijing. In Chad, Mr Ismaël
Moctar, Director, ISM Consult, provided us with invaluable assistance and was our
guiding spirit right through the design and development of the project. Mr Huang
Mingyuan, Economic and Financial Counsellor at the Embassy of China, explained
the cooperation policies and stakes between China and Chad to us, with much
forbearance and conviction. We are also grateful to Dr Dou Lirong (Chief Executive
Officer, CNPC International Chad) and Engineer Wang Bo and Engineer EuWei (in
charge of the Health, Safety and Environment Department, HSE), as well as their col-
leagues in charge of this CNPC's community relations. We would also like to express
grateful thanks to Mr Scott Miller (General Manager, Esso Exploration and Production,
Chad), Yolla A. Zongre (Public Affairs Manager, Esso Exploration and Production,
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Meunier (representative a.i. of the AFD in Chad), Mr Jean-Marc Pradelle (represen-
tative of the AFD) and Mr Mahamat Assouyouti (AFD, Chad) for their ceaseless
assistance particularly in establishing necessary contact with the Embassy of China.
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(Research Department, AFD) who shouldered the responsibility for this project and
succeeded in mobilising the necessary funding for an unusual and sensitive topic. 
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[ 1 ] The NARMA network encourages dialogue on extractive activities between resource persons in the corporate 
sector, governments, civil society and research.
[ 2 ] The scientific panel was launched by the Mauritanian government with the backing of the Business and 
Biodiversity programme of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and its office in 
Nouakchott (cf. van Vliet et al., 2008, 2009b).
This book is one of the outcomes of the work carried out within the network for
Applied Research on Mining , Oil and Gas Activities (NARMA).[ 1 ] Several members of
this network, including the coordinators of this book, participated between 2007
and 2009 in the work carried out by the independent scientific panel on oil and gas
activities in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. [ 2 ]
Little by little, this panel's work led to the conclusion that our customary references
in environmental oil regulations, borrowed from major Western firms, were inadequate
to deal with Chinese companies. Thus, during discussions with CNPC's representatives
in Mauritania, it became obvious that we knew virtually nothing about the way
Chinese public oil companies managed the environmental aspect of their business,
particularly when working outside China, and especially in Africa. We were therefore
completely unprepared.
It was this awareness that sparked off the research project on the CNPC in Chad, the
main results of which are presented in this book. It was undertaken in partnership
with the CIRAD, UIBE and the GRAMPTC and with help from the CERDI and IDREC.
The research was funded by the AFD. We have sought to present a work that makes up
a consistent whole while also providing for an individual reading of the various chapters.
Geert van Vliet and Géraud Magrin
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This book analyses the factors that influence environmental management by the
CNPC when operating outside of China, in the outer margins of the world oil system,
specifically in Chad, a Least Developed Country (LDC). Within a sector marked
by the regulations inherited from the Exxon project in Doba (launched in 2000 with
initial World Bank support), the 2007 CNPC Rônier project aims to refine part of the
extracted oil locally and export the remainder, most probably through the pipeline
built under the Exxon Doba project. The question of the compatibility between the
frames of reference and practices in both firms thus arises.Through the prism of
social and environmental responsibility (SER), this text analyses the challenges posed
by the interaction between Chinese oil firms, host countries and the major Western
oil firms.
Summary
Ce livre aborde les facteurs qui influencent la gestion environnementale de la CNPC
lorsqu’elle opère à l’étranger, dans les confins du système pétrolier mondial, notamment
dans un pays moins avancé (PMA), le Tchad. Dans un contexte pétrolier marqué par
le projet Exxon à Doba (lancé en 2000 avec l’appui de la Banque mondiale), le projet
chinois Rônier, initié en 2007, vise à raffiner sur place une partie du pétrole extrait et
de transporter le reste via un itinéraire qui empruntera probablement l’oléoduc du
projet Exxon Doba, posant ainsi la question de la compatibilité entre les référentiels et
pratiques des deux firmes. À travers le prisme de la responsabilité sociale et environ-
nementale (RSE), ce texte aborde les enjeux de l’interaction entre firmes pétrolières
chinoises, pays d’accueil et majors occidentales. 
Résumé
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Introduction
Geert van VLIET
This book aims to contribute to the overall understanding of those factors that
influence the way in which Chinese extractive companies comply with environmental
regulations. [ 3 ] It is sourced from research carried out on a project conducted by
CNPC, a Chinese state-owned oil company operating in Chad, which is an African
LDC located on the margins of the global oil system.
An overriding view [ 4 ] holds that lower environmental and social standards constitute
a competitive edge for Chinese companies exploiting African natural resources
compared to their Western competitors, who have the advantage of their earlier
establishment in Africa and their advanced technologies. Our purpose is to verify this
assumption based on a case study of the environmental regulations implemented by
CNPC in Chad. Are the Chinese state-owned oil companies using these less stringent
social and environmental standards as a means of gaining ground on territory so
far occupied by Western majors? Or, on the contrary, is CNPC using the notions of social
and environmental responsibility (SER) to enhance its international competitiveness?
What determines their policy towards host country governments and Western
companies?
Our research lies at the intersection of three different lines of study. The first involves
the debates on China’s growing presence in Africa since the early 2000s (Cole, 2003;
Le Monde diplomatique, 2005; Holslag , 2006, 2007; Alden, 2007; Alden et al., 2008;
Gu et al., 2008; Michel and Beuret, 2008, The Economist, 2008), particularly in the form
of foreign direct investment (FDI) (Jenkins and Edwards, 2006; Cui and Jiang , 2009 [ 5 ] ).
The second line covers the implications of emerging environmental regulations in
China and their effects on changes in corporate managerial practices. (Zeng et al.,
2005). The third line encompasses a wider debate on the “natural resource curse"
and its supposed effects, particularly in LDCs (Rosser, 2006).
©AFD / November 2012 / The environmental challenges facing a Chinese oil company in Chad
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[ 3 ] We understand that environmental regulations refer to the drawing up and implementing of a series of imposed 
or voluntary rules, be these formal (laws, policies, codes) or informal (customs, social pressure), in the private 
or public sphere, with a view to limiting access to natural resources or changing the way these are used.
[ 4 ] Presented, for example, by Soares de Oliveira, 2008.
[ 5 ] According to Cui and Jiang (2009), 12% of Chinese FDI was invested in Africa (very close to the amount of 
Chinese FDI invested in Europe).
Introduction
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China's growing presence in Africa adds to the controversies within African societies
and their ruling classes. Alden (2007) points up three different phases: (i) a period of
intense activity during the liberation struggles and the years following independence
(1960s and 1970s); (ii) followed by a slackening-off in the 1980s (when China concen-
trated on developing the Four Modernisations policy introduced by Chairman Deng
Xiaoping and, in particular, its opening-up to the influx of foreign capital), then (iii)
the phase of rediscovery in the 1990s (Jenkins and Edwards, 2006). This return to
Africa was further strengthened by Chairman Hu Jintao, who exhorted the larger
state-owned companies to invest in overseas operations and engage more actively
in international economic and scientific competition (Finkelstein, 2009). This was part of
the “going-out” strategy aimed at strengthening China’s capacities for more sustainable
and equitable development (ibid, 2009). The Chairman's behest was accompanied by a
raft of incentives, and the financial institutions responsible for managing these were
given an increasingly important role (investment funds, development banks). China's
presence in Africa has developed through various channels: individual migrants,
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and transnational companies (often state-owned)
operating notably in the mining and oil industries (Cole, 2003; Alden, 2007; Chen,
2008; Perrett, 2007; Heinrigs, 2007; Munson and Zheng , 2010).
Again according to Alden (2007), African governments and African people have
differing perceptions of China, regardless of its declared aims or the actual effects
of its actions. It has been variously perceived as a “development partner", “com-
petitor" and sometimes even as a “colonizer". Alden (2007:59) also highlights China's
ability to adapt to the diverse political regimes that its players have to deal with
(illegitime states, weak democracies with economies based essentially on commodities,
or democracies with diversified economies). This adaptability conjures up the image
of a China prepared to go to any lengths in order to gain access to resources, as
illustrated by its extremely rigid adherence to the principle of non-interference (see
the argument developed by Soares de Oliveira, 2008), despite the fact that China’s
presence can only become firmly rooted in a peaceable context (Lee and Shalmon,
2007). For Soares de Oliveira, Chinese firms are impervious to pressure from Western
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and focus above all on demands from the
African elites (to facilitate their entry and continuity in these countries) and from mul-
tilateral organisations, particularly those likely to influence China's integration into
the global market (Soares de Oliveira, 2008). Alden (2007) defends the idea that a
lasting Chinese presence depends on two tightly related factors: on the one hand,
the reaction of the African elites and peoples to China’s presence and, on the other
15
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hand, growing pressure from the Chinese government on Chinese companies
working abroad, particularly in Africa, to change their behaviour. [ 6 ]
Since the 1990s, China has been increasingly involved in global debates and exchanges
and found itself directly facing environmental impacts on its own territory. Whatever
the causes  of  these  impacts , [ 7 ] there is a growing consensus in China that the
environment needs to be better protected. Thus, the People's Congress approved
the Law on Cleaner Production in June 2002 (National People's Congress, 2002a),
which targets a more rational use of energy and raw materials. In October 2002, the
Congress approved a law making environmental impact assessments (EIAs) mandatory
(National People's Congress, 2002b ). [ 8 ] A comparative study reveals the progress
brought about by this law compared to a European Union directive on the same
theme, particularly due to the requirement to undertake a strategic environment
assessment (SEA) and also because it includes policy measures in its scope (Chen et al.
2007). Despite implementation problems, these laws have disseminated the theory
and practice of corporate environmental management. Thus, Peiyuan (2005) studies
environmental management monitoring practices in companies across seven industrial
sectors in China. He concludes that, while environmental reporting may not be totally
accepted, the awareness of environmental impacts has clearly made considerable
headway among company managers. Geng et al. (2008) compared intentions with
the actual implementation of the “circular economy” concept at the regional level
and came to the conclusion that this could be significantly improved if the regions
were more involved in defining what the term “circular economy” meant to each of
them individually. Recent environmental regulations in China are sending out very
clear policy signals, which are further bolstered by dissuasive fiscal measures parti-
cularly for large companies (more exposed to governmental restrictions) wherever
Introduction
[ 6 ] “In order to forestall criticism, the Chinese authorities decided to draw up their own ethical charter on the eve 
of the Beijing Summit in November 2006. This comprises nine new principles applicable to state-owned and 
private Chinese companies working abroad: comply with local legislation, answer tenders with complete trans-
parency, respect the labour code of the local employees, protect the environment, amongst others." (Michel 
and Beuret, 2008:320). The North-South report (Brandt, 1980), although prepared without the involvement of 
Chinese representatives, seems to have taken on a new life.
[ 7 ] While this impact is certainly the consequence of an increase in Chinese production in response to internal 
demand, it is also due to the role that China plays as the world's workshop. Consumers of Chinese products 
abroad suffer job losses as a result of national production being relocated, but at the same time, they enjoy cheaper
imported Chinese products. Moreover, as a result of relocation, adverse environmental impacts and their resolution 
are left to China to deal with.
[ 8 ] The first article of this law refers to the goal of aspiring towards “sustainable development" within a broad 
context that takes account of the need to redistribute the fruits of growth. However, the concept of a “circular 
economy", which is more restricted and focused on engineering , was sometimes preferred in the official 
discourses, which reflects the internal debates in China on these issues. 
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these may be operating (in China or abroad; OECD, 2008). There is thus a growing
number of studies that examine how environmental regulations are implemented
and enforced by Chinese companies within China (Sims, 1999; Mol and Liu, 2005;
Peiyuan, 2005; Shi and Zhang , 2006; Gang , 2009; Tsang and Kolk, 2010).
However, the question of what concrete impact these dynamics have on Chinese
operations abroad is rarely dealt with in the literature (Bosshard, 2008, addresses this
topic). In certain studies, the criteria for assessing Western majors are used to analyse
the behaviour of all companies regardless of their origin (cf. Reiner and Tuson, 2009). In
our view, cross-border environmental management (United Nations, 2004; Christiansen
and Garcia, 2004; Garcia et al., 2009), particularly in the China-Africa context, should be
examined in light of the practice of “double standards", [ 9 ] which is denounced by
the report of the North-South Commission (Brandt, 1980). This notion can in fact
be of use when analysing the behaviour of “Northern" countries operating in a
“Southern" less developed country. Its utility is however more dubious when the
notion is applied to a “Southern" emerging country operating in another less
developed “Southern" country. This is so because, on the one hand, the design and
implementation of norms and standards in China is a relatively recent phenomenon
and enforcing them still poses many huge challenges. And on the other hand, the
LDC – in this case, Chad – already has a history of environmental regulation inherited
from its past oil experience with Western companies. Consequently, the asymmetry
associated with “double standards" may not materialise as expected. Besides, studying
a company in the oil and gas sector further complicates matters as it leads into the
debate on the paradoxical effects of exploiting natural resources.
In the literature, it was notably Rosser (2006) who synthesised the “resource curse"
hypothesis. The debate on this common but controversial subject centres on how
revenues from extractive activities contribute to three sometimes closely interrelated
phenomena: (i) weakened economic performance; (ii) institutional failings (Engerman
and Sokoloff, 2002), worsening situations of “low governability" (Matus, 1987; van Vliet,
1997) and a tendency towards authoritarian regimes (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005a
and 2005b); and (iii) the intensification and prolongation of conflicts (Ross, 1999;
Humphreys, 2005; Rosser, 2006; Guesnet et al., 2008). Drawing on Kloff and Wicks’
research (2005), Magrin and van Vliet (2009) suggest adding a fourth environmental
Introduction
[ 9 ] The notion of “double standards" refers to the practices whereby Northern companies apply less stringent 
standards when operating in southern countries where the legislation is less strict than in their home country. 
These companies take advantage of this differential, at the same time arguing that they are acting in compliance
with the host country's national legislation.
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dimension to the debate on the resource curse. This counterintuitive idea has definite
advantages. It has encouraged a convergence of research work from diverse disciplines
and helped to explain the unexpected effects of sudden windfall revenues gained
from natural resources, particularly in LDCs with already fragile governance.  Yet, the
proponents of the “resource curse” hypothesis are not always convincing.
Studies based on national-level econometric data and models often confuse corre-
lation and causality (Rosser, 2006). The proponents of the hypothesis lay an emphasis
on “trends" and tend to minimise or exclude events and situations that do not fit
(Rosser, 2006). Macro-level studies analyse the extractive system without taking into
account the social dynamics operative between oil companies and local communities
throughout the entire extractive cycle (van Vliet, 1998), even though the “productive"
and “legitimisation” [ 10 ] functions produce differentiated effects over the course of
this cycle (van Vliet and Magrin, 2007). The potential for these dynamics to create a
“critical juncture” opening up alternative pathways (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007) is
ignored by resource curse studies, which tend to focus uniquely on thresholds, points
of departure, pathways and unchanging trajectories (van Vliet and Magrin, 2009).
Similarly, such analyses also tend to sidestep the differences arising from the geographic
location of extractive activities (the conditions and effects of exploitation vary depen-
ding on whether oilfields lie at the centre or on the margins of the global oil system,
in Saudi Arabia or Chad) (Magrin and van Vliet, 2009). Certainly, the “resource curse"
hypothesis has its merits, but new empirical research is required (DAI, 2007) which
would go beyond a focus on a trajectory to include spaces for bifurcation.
We have chosen to focus on a case study in Chad as it sheds light on the possibilities of
bifurcating from a set trajectory. Chad is a newcomer of minor importance compared
to the Middle East’s oil-producing countries – a “simple" case therefore and a far cry
from contexts where different periods of exploitation have left multiple legacies and
an associated entanglement of political configurations, as typified by the situation in
Nigeria. The fact that Chad’s oil experience is recent makes it possible to study the
Introduction
[ 1 0 ] Van Vliet and Magrin (2007) have proposed extending the differentiation between coercion and legitimisation
as defined by Gramsci (Gramsci, 1975) to non-state organisations, in particular to companies. We have thus 
made a distinction between the core functions of production and those of legitimisation. The former vary 
according to the organisation under consideration. For the Government of Chad, these are sovereign functions 
related to security, a monopoly of violence, enforcement of law and order, collection and redistribution of 
resources to ensure the reproduction of these functions. In the case of an oil company, these involve extracting,
transporting and marketing hydrocarbons. The functions of legitimisation also differ. For the Chadian State, 
it is a matter of providing public goods (social and health services, sectoral policies, etc.) and forging ties with 
its citizens through communication and dialogue. When it comes to companies, legitimisation involves 
specialised services for communication, the environment and “community development”.
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initial social dynamics of the oil cycle. The geopolitical context and the history of oil
production in Chad have been researched notably by Magrin (2001, 2003a, 2003b
and 2006), Magrin and van Vliet (2005), Pourtier and Magrin (2005) and Maoundonodji
(2009). While Chad may appear to be a perfect illustration of the resource curse
(Pegg , 2009), a more in-depth study would suggest other interpretations. Improved
access to education and a greater, more diversified opening-up to the outside world
can help to change values, worldviews and behaviour. The emergence of a new elite,
however small in number, with ties to the oil business  also helps to create opportunities
for bifurcation (Magrin and van Vliet, 2009). Contradictory pressures from firms (a
demand for security but also social peace) may also be conducive to the emergence of
a “modern" state that is able to combine its roles of coercion (widely practised) and
legitimisation (an area in which the Chadian regime is taking its first steps). Companies
(including Chinese firms) can play a part in creating spaces for bifurcation (van Vliet
and Magrin, 2009).
The choice of company logically fell on CNPC as it had signed an agreement with
the Government of Chad for the implementation of the Rônier project. The project
covers the construction and then exploitation of oilfields twenty kilometres south
of Bousso, as well as the construction of a pipeline to connect the oilfields to an oil
refinery already under construction in N'Djamena. In future years, this refinery may
also process oil from the Sedigui oilfield located to the north of Lake Chad (via a
second planned pipeline). As a New York Times journalist had already foreseen in
2007, the Chinese project plans to find oil, refine some of it on the spot and ship the
rest through Sudan (New York Times, 2007), or via the Exxon project pipeline. At the
time of writing this book, the second option appears to be the most likely. The choice
of CNPC for our research is thus all the more justified as it fits with our hypothesis
that an operator is most open to dialogue on environmental management at the
beginning of operations, and it is also during this initial phase that the dialogue could
produce the greatest effects.
The possible link-up between the CNPC-Rônier project and the Exxon-Doba project is
extremely interesting. On the one hand, if it were to materialise, the link-up would
be concrete evidence of Sino-American cooperation within a common strategy to
de-politicise both parties’ energy policies (Lee and Shalmon, 2007). [ 11 ] Were China
to pursue a more realistic policy, firms would then be able to enter into new forms
Introduction
[ 1 1 ] According to Lee and Shalmon, politicised competition in energy policy would heighten tensions. As China 
and the USA are on the same side as oil importers, it would be in their interest to come to a common 
understanding when dealing with oil-producing countries (Lee and Shalmon, 2007).
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of alliance (Soares de Oliveira, 2008). On the other hand, this cooperation would
require tough negotiations particularly to ensure compatibility between the respective
environmental norms and standards and monitoring systems; as the Exxon project
complies with very advanced regulations imposed by the World Bank under pressure
from international environmental NGOs and the media.
Our empirical research is based on the following principles: we used Chinese environ-
mental regulation as a reference point; we worked in partnership with Chinese,
Chadian and European researchers; recognising the complexity of our case study, we
adopted a multidisciplinary approach (political science, ecology, political economy,
geography, sociology of macro-organisations). Our results were further enriched by
our experience on the subject of extractive industries and are based on our reading
of the bibliography as well as on our fieldwork in Chad (mostly carried out from 20
June to 10 September). During this period, we undertook an observational phase,
conducted semi-formal interviews and held a few preliminary feedback sessions on
our work. (Van Vliet et al., 2011).
We will argue that CNPC has neither the intention nor the possibility of pushing
down the level of environmental regulation in Chad. Following multiple internal and
external pressures, China now has an extensive system of environmental regulation,
even though enforcement is still uneven. Its oil sector, which is strategically important
for the State, is emblematic of the country’s growing requirements. Environmental
regulation is less advanced in Chad, but the degree of compliance in the oil sector is
high due to the commitments made at the outset of the Exxon-Doba project and to
constant pressure from public opinion and local and international NGOs. Taking the
degree of enforcement of the regulations in both countries into account, local
requirements are at least as high as in CNPC’s home country. The context is thus
favourable to a reversal of the situation depicted by the literature on “double standards”.
In China, CNPC has gradually narrowed the gap between the demand and supply of
environmental regulations. It has pragmatically adapted to the regulatory environment
of the host country and to the institutional legacy of the Exxon-Doba project. Yet,
the company’s lack of dialogue means that it is unable to give visibility to the progress
it has achieved in order to evidence its international competitiveness.
To underpin our arguments, we will describe the evolution of Chinese environmental
regulation, the background to its emergence, the progress made, the limits to its
implementation, as well as the resulting obligations for the oil and gas industries
(Part 1). We will then analyse the regulatory framework in which CNPC has had to
operate since it arrived in Chad, as well as the country’s history of environmental
Introduction
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regulation, bringing out the importance of the institutional legacy left by the Exxon-
Doba project even after the World Bank’s withdrawal from the project (Part 2). We will
then describe the CNPC Rônier project and the economic, social and environmental
challenges it presents for the various stakeholders (Part 3). After analysing the environ-
mental regulatory frames of reference chosen for the CNPC Rônier project, we will
broach the mechanisms and practices of CNPC's environmental management in
Chad as formalised in its HSE approach, [ 12 ] as well as its responses to the initial impacts
of the project. Our analysis focuses particularly on the environmental issues raised
by CNPC’s eventual use of the pipeline managed by the Exxon-led consortium
(Part 4). To conclude, drawing on available secondary data, the last chapter provides a
comparison of CNPC's environmental management in three countries (Sudan, Niger
and Chad) in the Sahel region (Part 5).
Introduction
[ 1 2 ] The environmental policies of extractive companies are normally set out in the approaches, procedures and 
tools  called HSE (“Health, Safety, Environment").
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1. The emergence of 
environmental regulation 
in China: its limits 
and implications 
for the petroleum sector
Weiyong YANG, Geert VAN VLIET, Fan WANG and Guohuang LIANG
1.1. Introduction
This chapter aims to provide an understanding of the context that has shaped the
approach to environmental issues in the Chinese petroleum sector.
Since the launch of Deng Xiaoping’s modernisation reforms in 1978, economic growth
has been remarkable but has nonetheless exerted huge pressures on the environment.
For over thirty years, China’s annual economic growth rate has averaged over 9.5%,
giving rise to rapid industrialisation, improved living standards for citizens, substantial
poverty alleviation and rapid urbanisation (urban population accounted for 46.6%
of total population in 2009) (State Statistics Bureau, 2010). The fast-paced economic
growth, industrialisation and urbanisation rapidly outgrew the existing raft of envi-
ronmental rules of the game, some of which were inherited from the past. Negative
environmental impacts generated enormous economic costs and were soon widely
perceived as one of the main constraints to China´s future development. They also
were one of the main reasons for citizen protests [ 13 ] against the polluters and public
authorities (Economy, 2005). Environmental issues gained even more importance when
the State implemented its “going-out” policy. Abroad, Chinese firms were confronted
with new market demands (from business partners, suppliers and service providers)
and new environmental rules (imposed by foreign public regulatory agencies). Thus,
[ 1 3 ] Thus confirming a trend observed in other countries, in which environmental issues tend to channel demands 
that can find no adequate expression or response elsewhere.
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the problems that were first viewed as simply “Chinese” environmental issues, very soon
turned regional (transboundary air and water issues, sea pollution and desertification)
or global (greenhouse gas emissions, global warming and climate change) (OECD,
2007 ; Gang , 2009). This state of affairs was progressively internalised by national,
regional and local authorities, enterprises, the Chinese Communist Party and citizens,
and responses were thus crafted and implemented in the shape of environmental
regulation. 
Initially, research had helped to establish a diagnosis of environmental problems but
it subsequently broadened out to include analyses of the successive steps taken in
the formulation of new environmental regulations (Cai, 1988; Yuan, 1990, Day, 2005;
Ferris and Zhang , 2005). Once this thrust was underway, research studies gradually
focused on the reasons for the low levels of compliance, specifically in the public
sphere (OECD, 2006; Economy, 2005; Gang , 2009). 
The Chinese petroleum sector is one of the flagships of the national economy.
Across the country, oil exploration, production, transport, refining and distribution
remain under the control of state-owned oil companies. To fuel rapid economic
development and satisfy an increasing energy demand, the petroleum sector ranks
among the top ten priorities of the government’s development strategy. Yet, while
there is an abundant literature on the environmental regulation of oil activities in
Western countries, less is known [ 14 ] about the way in which Chinese oil companies
are environmentally regulated, whether by the State or through the voluntary adoption
of standards, principles and norms. A few authors have nonetheless opened the way:
Guo (2006) discusses the relationship between the government and national oil
companies with respect to their business development; Dong et al. (2006) provide
an initial analysis of environmental laws and their influence on China’s petroleum
industry; and Downs (2007) focuses on what the national oil companies have learnt
during their ventures overseas.
In this chapter, we will try to answer the following questions: beyond the effort
involved in producing environmental regulations, what makes it difficult to govern
environment-related issues in China today? Is the gap between the rules and their
enforcement also to be seen in the petroleum sector?
In order to answer these questions, we will  first analyse the reasons behind the
emergence of overall environmental regulation in China, as well as its main charac-
Part One
[ 1 4 ] This is surprising , because oil exploration and production had already started in China in the late forties.
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teristics. We will then focus on the obstacles to its enforcement and examine three
sets of explanations (player-related factors, rule-related factors and factors inherent to
regulation itself). This will enable us to explore the specific factors leading to the
emergence of environmental rules and what characterises their enforcement in China’s
petroleum industry.
1 . 2 . The emergence of environmental regulation in China
1.2.1. Background
Environmental regulation in China has millenary roots. During the Western Zhou
Dynasty (eleventh century B.C.), the government promulgated rules banning defo-
restation and limiting hunting and logging periods (Yuan, 1990). During the Qin
Dynasty (221–206 B.C.), the Land Law (Tian lu) contained provisions for the protec-
tion of natural resources. In addition to such laws, other forms of regulation also
existed. For instance, Taoism (developed by the philosopher Laozi around 500 B.C.)
emphasised the harmony between humans and nature and, alongside the regulations
issued by the authorities, Chinese people of all nationalities [ 15 ] developed specific
forms of environmental regulation based on their own customs and practices. Over
the following millennia until the end of the last dynasty and the foundation of the
Republic of China in 1911, there was almost no further development of official envi-
ronmental regulation in China. Various environmental laws were enacted by the
nationalist government, including a Fishery Law (1929), a Land Law (1930), a Forestry
Law (1932), a Hunting Law (1932) and a Water Conservancy Law (1942). However,
the drive towards environmental legislation and its implementation was severely
disrupted by recurrent warring and unstable political conditions. Moreover, many of
the regulations were ill suited to address the rapidly changing nature of environmental
issues and their subsequent magnitude.  
With the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China entered into a
planned economy regime in which pollution problems were mainly seen as hygiene
concerns requiring the prevention of occupational diseases. As was the case for all
other questions, environmental issues were guided or regulated by editorials in
the People’s Daily (the Party’s official newspaper),  and major decrees from the
Party’s Central Committee, the State Council or various government departments
(or ministries). For instance, the Health Ministry and the State Construction Committee
Part One
[ 1 5 ] The Chinese population comprises more than fifty "minority nationalities" of which the "Hans" are the largest
in number.
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jointly issued a Provisional Standard for Industry Enterprises Design in 1956. Although
this was vague and non-binding , it is considered as one of the first attempts at
regulation in the area of pollution control. Regarding natural resources, the government
issued several decrees and regulations to protect forest and mineral resources and
to prevent water and soil erosion. Likewise, the different departments of the State
Council promulgated a series of key decrees in response to specific environmental
problems that the country encountered at different points in time (Cai, 1988). The
government’s efforts to protect the environment were interrupted by the onset of
the Cultural Revolution in 1966. During these years, political struggles occupied centre
stage, overshadowing both environmental concerns and economic development issues. 
Central planning left its mark on public policymaking. In 1953, the government intro-
duced the first Five-Year Plan (FYP) to steer the development of the national economy
during the period 1953-1957. Local governments then prepared their own annual
five-year plans that set out their development objectives in line with the FYP of the
government tier immediately above them. (Ferris and Zhang , 2005). 
Environmental decrees and policies were transmitted to the local government level for
execution. Grounded in a control-and-command approach and implemented through
almost military-style campaigns, these policies were remarkably effective under a highly
centralised system of planning , as illustrated by the nation-wide campaign against
contagious diseases in the early 1950s, and the large-scale hygiene campaign to eliminate
“the four pests” (rats, sparrows, flies and mosquitoes) in 1958. By mobilising the entire
population, these campaigns achieved their stated goals. Throughout the pre-reform
period (prior to 1978), the government also relied heavily on mass mobilisation and
campaigns to address economic, political and environmental issues, and this approach
still has a deep influence on the way environmental issues and their regulation are
managed today in China. 
A precursory sign of China’s opening up to external debates on the environment
came in 1972, when the country attended the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment (UNCHE) for the first time. In June of that year, the State Council
established a leading group for the water resource protection of the Guanting Reservoir,
which can be considered as China’s first water pollution control project. In August
1973, the State Council held the first national conference on environmental protection
and promulgated a first raft of environmental regulations on Environmental Protection
and Improvement (a provisional project), thus establishing the fundamental principles
of environmental protection. In May 1974, the State Council set up an inter-ministerial
group for environmental protection, tasked with producing a comprehensive inventory
of China´s environmental problems. At the same time, all local governments were
Part One
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required to establish a “Three Wastes” bureau, which was the first local-level environ-
mental institution and an embryo of the subsequent local Environmental Protection
Bureaus (EPBs) (Economy, 2004).
The year 1978 marked the beginning of a gradual introduction of market mechanisms
into the Chinese economy and a policy of opening up to international trade. During
this transition period, the coexistence of a central planning system and market mecha-
nisms as well as China’s increasing participation in the international community had
a significant impact on the orientation of the State’s environmental policies, the choice
of policy instruments and the strategies adopted by firms and NGOs. 
Given the growing environmental issues and their financial and political consequences,
some of the more perseverant Party members finally gained acceptance for the idea
of introducing a legal system that had comprehensive and detailed environmental rules,
in order to ensure a more environment-friendly development path. In December
1978, the Party’s Central Committee amended the key points of the State Council’s
Environmental Protection Report, which contained precise instructions for the draft
environmental legislation. China’s first environmental law, the Environmental Protection
Law was passed by the Fifth National Congress on 13 September 1979.  Meanwhile,
the Congress had been working on the reform of the Constitution. The revised text,
which formalised environmental protection in three essential articles, [ 16 ] was adopted
in 1982 and set the stage for China´s new venture into environmental regulation.
1.2.2. The main players in environmental regulation after the 1982 
constitutional reform
The role of the State and local authorities in public environmental regulation  
According to the Constitution of the Chinese People´s Republic (1982) currently in force,
the National People's Congress (NPC) is the highest organ of State and exercises the
legislative power. Within the NPC, there are nine specialised advisory committees
Part One
[ 1 6 ] The Constitution explicitly mentions in Article 9: “Mineral resources, waters, forests, mountains, grassland, un-
reclaimed land, beaches and other natural resources are owned by the State, that is, by the whole people, 
with the exception of the forests, mountains, grassland, un-reclaimed land and beaches that are owned by 
collectives in accordance with the law. The State ensures the rational use of natural resources and protects 
rare animals and plants. The appropriation or damage of natural resources by any organisation or individual 
by whatever means is prohibited”. Article 12: “Socialist public property is sacred and inviolable. The State 
protects socialist public property. Appropriation or damage of State or collective property by any organisation 
or individual by whatever means is prohibited”. In Article 26, “the State protects and improves the living 
environment and the ecological environment, and prevents and controls pollution and other public hazards.
The State organises and encourages reforestation and the protection of forests.”
Source: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html, accessed 15 April 2011.
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working under the supervision of a standing committee when Congress is not in
session. Among these advisory committees, the Environmental Protection and Natural
Resources Conservation Committee organises the formulation and review of bills on
environmental and resource protection, oversees their enforcement and can request
amendments (Liu, 2008). The Committee also takes part in exchanges with foreign
parliaments on the subject of environmental and resource conservation (SEPA, 2001;
Jahiel, 1998; Ferris and Zhang, 2005) and approves the Five-Year Plans inherited from
the pre-reform period. In fact, despite the gradual introduction of market-based
mechanisms, the FYP (which is a political but legally binding plan) still constitutes the
cornerstone of government policy. The scope of the FYP has even been extended to
encompass not only economic, but also social and environmental spheres. 
The State Council is the executive authority in the Chinese State system. Under
the State Council, eight agencies [17 ] with ministerial rank have direct or indirect
responsibility in environmental matters. Among them, the National Development
and Reform Committee (NDRC, the planning ministry) plays a key role as the body
responsible for developing and implementing FYPs. In this capacity, the NDRC
integrates environmental issues into China’s overall planning system and into sector-
specific policies (e.g., on energy) and promotes clean production in key industries
(Liu, 2008). The NDRC can issue administrative directives on economic, social and
environmental matters (for example, price control for key natural resources such as
coal, water and oil). It can also launch environmental investigations and intervene in
case of environmental emergencies. 
Under the State Council, the Environmental Protection Committee (EPC) brings
together the highest representatives of those ministries, departments and commissions
that have an influence on environmental issues. [18 ] The EPC is the State Council's
coordination agency for implementing environmental protection actions. The EPC
supervises and verifies the implementation of the environmental protection laws
and regulations by the various departments and local authorities (Liu, 2008). 
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[ 1 7 ] The National Development and Reform Committee (NDRC); the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP); 
the Ministry of Land and Natural Resources; the State Administration of Work Safety (supervising the State 
Administration of Coal Mine Safety); the Ministry of Labour and Social Security; the General Administration 
for Quality Supervision and Inspection and Quarantine; the Ministry of Health and the Public Security 
Department.
[ 1 8 ] The key ministries involved in the implementation of environmental laws and policies are: the Ministry of 
Water Management, the Ministry of Land and Resources; the Ministry of Agriculture; the Ministry of Forestry; 
the Ministry of Health; the Ministry of Construction; the Ministry of Communications; the Ministry of 
Supervision. Other government agencies involved in the implementation of environmental policy include: 
the State Forest Administration; the State Oceanic Administration; the China Meteorology Administration; 
the National Bureau of Statistics (Ferris and Zhang, 2005).
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Overall oversight and administration of the country's environmental protection
actions are carried out by the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), which
was created out of the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) in March
2008. The MEP’s functions include preparing and implementing national policies,
legislation and regulations related to water and air quality, solid waste management,
nature conservation and nuclear/radiation safety. The MEP [ 19 ] is also responsible for
setting environmental quality criteria and pollutant discharge/emission standards
at the national level, organising environmental quality monitoring and initiating enfor-
cement activities together with local environmental authorities. The MEP coordinates
plans for addressing transboundary environmental problems and organising scientific
research and development (Liu, 2008). 
Local people’s congresses play a key role in the implementation of environmental
policy (OECD, 2006). They can discuss and decide on issues related to the protection
of the environment and natural resources and issue local regulations, provided the
latter do not contravene the Constitution, applicable national laws or administrative and
ministerial regulations (Jahiel, 1998; NPC, 2004). Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs)
exist at the following levels of local government: provinces, autonomous regions and
centrally administered municipalities; prefecture-level municipalities; districts, counties,
county-level cities and large townships (OECD, 2006). Economy (2005) pointed out that
the main responsibilities of EPBs include: overseeing environmental impact assessments
(EIAs) and other procedures for new development projects; monitoring polluting
discharges from industries; setting fees for such discharges; initiating legal action against
firms that fail to meet environmental requirements; and environmental reporting ,
environmental education and awareness-raising activities. According to the OECD,
“there are about 2,000 Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs) with approximately
60,000 employees at the provincial, prefecture/municipal, district/counties, and
township administration levels” (OECD, 2006). [20 ]
However, there are also other local agencies that influence environmental protec-
tion (OECD, 2006). Through their coordinating role, the planning commissions at
county level or above can influence the work of the EPBs and other local agencies.
A substantial number of local governments have created industrial bureaus, some of
Part One
[ 1 9 ] The MEP comprises the following offices, bureaus, departments, and committees: administrative office; 
Department of Planning and Finance; Department of Policies, Laws and Regulations; Department of 
Human Resources Management; Department of Pollution Control; Department of Nature Conservation 
and Ecology; Department of Nuclear Safety; Department of EIA Management; Bureau of Environmental 
Supervision, Department of International Cooperation; and the Communist Party Committee (Liu, 2008). 
[ 20 ] EPBs at the provincial level employ, on average, 24 staff, 32 at the city level and 35 at the county level.
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which incorporate Environmental Protection Divisions (EPDs). Local governments have
also created finance bureaus that “manage city revenues and expenditures and play
important roles in the pollution discharge fee system” (OECD, 2006). According
to the Ministry of Environmental Protection, there were over 3,000 environmental
inspection agencies in China with about 50,000 inspectors, including 633 inspectors
at the provincial level, 8,164 inspectors at the prefectural level and 38,356 inspectors
at the county level (MEP, 2008).
The role of enterprises, NGOs and media 
In China, the productive sector consists of state industrial and commercial conglo-
merates; large and medium state-owned enterprises; public utility enterprises at
several levels (national, regional and local) and a fast-growing number of private
enterprises (some are large, but most are medium-sized, small or micro). 
The Chinese government has progressively adopted a positive attitude toward
environmental NGOs. The 9th and 10th FYPs encouraged civil society and its repre-
sentatives to address environmental degradation concerns and promote environmental
education and awareness. The establishment of the NGO, Friends of Nature, in Beijing
in 1994 laid the ground for the emergence of many other environmental groups (Wu,
2009). By the late 1990s, the influence of environmental NGOs became increasingly
visible (Economy, 2004; Ho, 2001; Knup, 1997; Yang , 2005; Wu, 2009). According to
ACEF (2006), by the end of 2006, there were more than 2,700 environmental NGOs
with a total staff of over 20,000 active volunteers. These NGOs can be classified into
four categories: government-organised NGOs, civil NGOs, student environmental
groups and associations and branches of international NGOs (ACEF, 2006).
Over the past decades, there has been a dramatic upsurge in the level of the general
public’s and the media’s interest and involvement in environmental conservation
(OECD, 2006). In many cases, the public acts as a watchdog by submitting complaints
to local officials. According to the OECD (2006), the media are encouraged “to
participate in enforcement campaigns to increase pressure on local enterprises and
officials and inform the public throughout China about SEPA’s efforts and the
results of inspections… In several provinces, environmental telephone ‘hotlines’ exist
that allow citizens to report non-compliance so that government agencies can
undertake quick enforcement actions” (OECD, 2006). Supervision by citizens and
the media is increasingly appreciated by environmental authorities as a means of
reinforcing the capacity for overseeing activities that could cause environmental
damage (OECD, 2006).
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1.2.3. Public environmental regulation
Public rules and standards
In addition to the Constitution, two environmental laws provide the underpinnings for
the state environmental regulation system. [ 21 ] The draft Environmental Protection
Law (EPL) was prepared in 1979 and came into effect in 1989 after a ten-year trial
period. The EPL, which lays out the general principles for environmental protection
and describes the key instruments for environmental management, established the
founding principle for coordinated development between economic construction,
social progress and environmental protection. It defined the rights and duties of all
levels of government, companies and individuals with regard to environmental
protection. Based on the “three synchronisations” (3S) principle, the EPL requires
enterprises that construct facilities emitting pollutants to comply with applicable
environmental standards and to design, build and commission technologies for
the prevention and control of pollution at the same time as the main part of the
construction project. Besides recognising the right of organisations and individuals to
report non-compliances, the EPL specifies the roles of national and local government
levels in the implementation of the environmental policies (OECD, 2006).[ 22 ]
The second overarching law that affects all sectors is the 2002 Environmental Impact
Assessment Law (EIA Law). This Law requires any project with potentially harmful
environmental effects to be validated by an environmental impact assessment prior to
its construction phase, and to put in place all the necessary environmental protection
measures as soon as construction begins. The environmental assessment involves
identifying and analysing possible environmental incidents; it includes measures to
prevent or control the identified impacts, and an assessment of the feasibility and
costs of such measures. This Law is the first to openly invite the public and all project
stakeholders to participate in public hearings on environmental assessment. The State
Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) (restructured as the MEP in 2008) issued the
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[ 2 1 ] Although all authors concur that the cornerstone of the environmental system is the Constitution, the way 
in which they structure, classify and present its complexity is nuanced. According to Lan (2002), the Environ-
mental Protection Law and the Law on Environmental Impact Assessment encompass two groups of laws: 
laws on the prevention of pollution and laws on biodiversity and ecosystem conservation. The first group 
includes laws aimed at preventing the pollution of natural resources (such as the specific law on water and 
air) or laws intended to prevent or reduce pollution by toxic or hazardous materials (such as the Law on Solid 
Wastes). The second group comprises laws designed to protect bioresources (protection of wildlife and 
plants), laws on the protection of human and historic environments (a regulation on the protection of scenic 
sites) and non-bioresources (the Mineral Resources Law). These laws then translate into national and local 
administrative norms and decrees (Lan, 2002). 
[ 2 2 ] For the full English translation of the EPL see: 
http://english.mep.gov.cn/Policies_Regulations/laws/environmental_laws/200710/t20071009_109928.htm
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[ 2 3 ] Decision of the State Council on Implementing the Scientific Concept of Development and Strengthening 
Environmental Protection (State Council, 2005).  
[ 2 4 ] See the official website of the Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection: 
http://english.mep.gov.cn/Policies_Regulations.
“Measures on Public Participation in the Environmental Impact Assessment Process”
(in effect as of March 2006). These measures “clarify the rights and responsibilities
of various parties with an interest in the EIA and the forms of public participation,
including surveys, consultations, seminars, debates and hearings” (OECD, 2006). The
2002 EIA Law has two specific features: it imposes broad Strategic Environmental
Assessments (SEAs), which go further than simple project-level EIAs, and assesses
the policymaking process itself from an environmental point of view. This means
that government authorities at all levels are required to demonstrate that they take
environmental impacts into account for each proposed policy measure. The Law also
exceeds the requirements set forth in the European Union´s directive on environmental
impact evaluation (Chen et al., 2007). 
In addition to these two founding laws, China has elaborated a comprehensive raft
of sector- or issue-specific regulations since 1978, which have been extensively
mapped by the OECD (OECD, 2006). Here, we will mention: the Marine Environmental
Protection Law (1982, amended 1999); the Forestry Law (1984, amended 1998); the
Law of the People's Republic of China on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution
(1984, amended 1996); the Grasslands Law (1985); the Fisheries Law (1986); the Mineral
Resources Law (1986, amended 1996); the Land Administration Law (1986, amended
1998); the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law (1987, amended 1995, 2000);
the Wildlife Protection Law (1988); the Water and Soil Conservation Law (1991); the
Law of the People's Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of Environmental
Pollution by Solid Waste (1995); the Law of the People's Republic of China on
Prevention and Control of Pollution from Environmental Noise (1996); the Flood
Prevention Law (1997); the Energy Conservation Law (1997); the Desertification
Prevention Law (2001); the Water Law (1988, amended 2002); the Clean Production
Promotion Law (2002) and the Radioactive Pollution Prevention and Control Law (2003)
(OECD, 2006). In recent years, to promote a balanced development model based on
the notion of a “harmonious society” and the “scientific concept of development”,
the government has set environmental protection as one of its top priorities [ 23 ]
and adopted a more proactive and systemic management approach covering entire
processes; it thus enacted the Law on Renewable Energy (2005) and the Circular
Economy Promotion Law (2009) [ 24 ] (OECD, 2008).
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A number of non-environment related laws nevertheless contain provisions that are
relevant to environment. China’s General Principles of the Civil Law (1986) and the
Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (2006) establish the civil and penal
liabilities of polluters who are responsible for pollutions with severe human, economic
or environmental damages. Economic laws, such as the Law of the People’s Republic
of China of Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People (1988), the Township
Enterprises Law (1996) and the Agriculture Law (2003) stipulate firms’ responsibilities
in the prevention and control of environmental damages. 
At the state level, the Chinese government has likewise promulgated “more than 30
administrative decrees regarding environmental protection, including Regulations
for the Prevention and Control of Noise Pollution; on Nature Reserves; on the
Prevention of and Protection Against Radiation from Radio Isotopes and Radioactive
Devices; on the Safe Administration of Chemicals and Other Dangerous Materials;
on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution in the Huai River Drainage
Area; on Environmental Protection Administration in Offshore Oil Exploration and
Development; on the Control of Marine Wastes Dumping; for the Implementation
of the Protection of Terrestrial Wildlife; on the Administration of National Parks;
on the Protection of Basic Farmland” (State Council, 1996). 
At local level, people's congresses and people's governments have enacted and
promulgated more than 600 local laws on environmental protection (Ferris and Zhang,
2005). These local laws and regulations not only improve the fit between far-removed
national rules and local circumstances, but also send strong national policy signals to
local regulatory practices (Ferris and Zhang , 2005). 
China's law-making intentions in the area of environment have given rise to envi-
ronmental standards (Lu, 2006) . [ 25 ] They include environmental quality standards,
pollutant discharge or emission standards and basic criteria for measurement, sampling
and methodology. Among the environmental quality standards, the most essential
are: the Standard of Environmental Noise of Urban Area (1993); the Environmental
Quality Standard for Soils (1995); the Ambient Air Quality Standard (1996); the Seawater
Quality Standard (1997); the Indoor Air Quality Standard (2002); the Environmental
Quality Standards for Surface Water (2002). Among the Pollutant Discharge or Emission
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[ 2 5 ] For all recent regulations, policies and standards on environmental protection see: 
http://english.mep.gov.cn/Policies_Regulations ;
http://english.mep.gov.cn/inventory/Catalogue_Standards/Catalogue for Newly-released Environmental 
Regulations and Standards
http://english.mep.gov.cn/inventory/Catalogue_Standards
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Standards we mention: the Effluent Standard for Pollutants (1983); the Effluent
Standard for Pollutants from the Petroleum Refining Industry (1983); the Discharge
Standard of Water Pollutants for the Paper Industry (1992); the Integrated Wastewater
Discharge Standard (1996) and the Standard for Pollution Control on Landfill Sites
for Domestic Waste (1997). Among the criteria and methodologies for measurement
and sampling , the most important are: Emission Standards and Measurement Methods
of Railway Noise on the Boundary alongside Railway Lines (1990); the Standard of
Environmental Noise of Urban Areas (1993); Limits and Measurement Methods
for Emissions of Pollutants from Motor Vehicles (1999) (Lu, 2006). As provided for
under Chinese law, the environmental quality standards and pollutant discharge
standards (state or local) are compulsory standards, and anyone violating them must
bear the consequences (Liu, 2008). This impressive legal arsenal was further reinforced
by China’s adhesion to international conventions and the additional obligations
they created.
China participates actively in the following conventions (State Council ,  2007):
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(8 April, 1981); Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping Wastes
and Other Matter (6 September, 1985); the Vienna Convention for the Protection of
the Ozone Layer (11 September, 1989); the London Amendment to the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (14 June, 1991); the Basel
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and Their Disposal (4 September, 1991); the Ramsar Convention (31 July, 1992); the
Convention on Biological Diversity (7 November, 1992); the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (7 November, 1992); the Convention on Nuclear Safety
(9 April, 1996); the Convention on the Prevention and Control of Desertification
(30 December, 1996); the Amendment of the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (1 May, 2001):
the Kyoto Protocol (1 August, 2002); the Copenhagen Amendment for Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (22 April, 2003); the Stockholm
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (25 June, 2004); the Rotterdam Convention
on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals in Inter-
national Trade (29 December, 2004): the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (17 April,
2005); the Amendment of the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping Wastes and Other Matter (June 29, 2006) (State Council, 2007).  
State, local and international regulations are then integrated into the FYPs, which
form the basis for coordinating public policies and have a binding legal status. The plans
for environmental protection established by the State must be incorporated into
Part One
41
©AFD / November 2012 / The environmental challenges facing a Chinese oil company in Chad
the national economic and social development plans (Article 4, EPL). In line with the
EPL, the Chinese environmental authorities have developed Five-Year Environmental
Plans (FYEPs), which set environmental targets, identify priority areas and establish key
indicators for environmental protection. The current 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010)
sets broad environmental targets such as: reduce energy intensity in 2010 by 20% (as
compared to 2005); reduce water consumption per unit of industrial value-added by
30%; maintain water consumption for irrigation in agriculture at current levels; increase
the recycling of industrial solid wastes by 60%; maintain the utilisable agricultural
area at 120 million hectares; reduce the total discharge of major pollutants by 10%;
reach a forest cover of 20%; and control greenhouse gases to “produce good results”
(State Council, 2007).
These broad goals are then translated into key indicators including: in 2010, a 10%
reduction of CO2 with respect to 2005; SO2 reduction (-10%); a reduction of water
sections under the national monitoring plan failing to meet the Grade V National
Surface Quality Standard (-4.2%); an increase in the number of days during which
the urban air quality in major cities is superior to the Grade II National Air Quality
Standard (+5.6%); etc. (State Council, 2007). Key environment protection investment
projects are then set out in the FYP, such as: capacity building for environmental
supervision; hazardous and medical waste disposal; chromium slag pollution treatment;
urban wastewater treatment; water pollution prevention and control; urban waste
treatment; flue gas desulphurisation in coal mines, demonstration protected areas
and nuclear and radiation safety (State Council, 2007). 
Public instruments for implementation and enforcement
Besides the earlier mentioned instruments that rely on communication and information,
the government also uses more conventional public policy instruments, some of which
have been adapted from Western economic and legal instruments.  
Chinese authorities use a range of market-based instruments to induce enterprises to
comply with regulations. These include pollution discharge permits, fines and taxes as
well as subsidies disbursed under green policies such as green credit, green insurance,
green securities and green trade policy. 
The Discharge Permit System (DPS) is intended to control the aggregate pollution
discharges in a specified area. First, local EPBs calculate the optimal load of pollution
discharges and emissions and then distribute this among the enterprises within their
jurisdiction in the form of discharge permits. The enterprises producing pollution
discharges have to apply for a permit from the EPBs. In order to increase the efficiency
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of the system and take into account the disparities among enterprises in terms of their
pollution abatement capacity, in 1991 SEPA tested the tradable emission permits in
six pilot cities, Baotou, Kaiyuan, Liuzhou, Taiyuan, Pingdingshan and Guiyang (OECD,
2006). 
When non-compliance is confirmed, local EPBs can issue warning letters, then impose
fines or withdraw the permit for a part or the entirety of the facility. Fines or pollution
charges are the most frequently applied measure, accounting for over 60% of
non-compliance responses (OECD, 2006). Originally, only discharges that exceeded
emission/discharge standards were subject to a fee. The regulation on the levy and
management of discharge fees (2002) established a new policy for pollution charges,
with all discharges being subject to fees and additional fines for discharges in excess
of the standard (State Council, 2003). Polluters have a grace period after which the
payments due increase; charges increase with the duration of non-compliance
(OECD, 2006). According to OECD (2006), a substantial part of the levied funds
were returned to enterprises for investment in pollution control and abatement,
while the local EPBs were to retain the remaining funds for environmental protec-
tion activities. In practice, EPBs used the levied funds mainly to cover their operating
expenses. Therefore, recently, it was decided that the revenue from collected charges
would instead be transferred to the Ministry of Finance.  These resources are
redirected to local governments, but earmarked for environmental improvements
(OECD, 2006).
Green tax instruments are used to encourage environment-friendly practices and
penalise high-polluting or energy-consuming activities. Article 88 of Decree No. 512 for
the implementation of the Corporate Income Tax Law (both effective 1 January, 2008)
foresees tax exemptions for enterprises that invest in certified environmental
protection, energy or water conservation projects (utilisation of public refuse, methane,
clean production techniques). Whenever an enterprise does not respect agreements
regarding pollution or consumption, it can be reclassified in a higher corporate income
tax bracket. 
During 2007 and 2008, SEPA, together with the relevant authority in each sector,
engaged in the formulation of several “green policies” (OECD, 2008). For instance,
under the “green credit policy”, commercial bank credit is granted taking environ-
mental criteria into account: the loans may be reduced or cut off if enterprises
contravene environmental laws and regulations (OECD, 2008). A “green insurance
policy” was designed with the aim of establishing an environmental liability insurance
system by 2015: risk-prone enterprises are required to take out insurance against
pollution accidents (OECD, 2008). A “green trade policy” was announced in order to
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“reduce or withdraw the export quota or licence for high-polluting or energy-
consuming enterprises” (OECD, 2008). A “green securities policy” was promulgated
in 2008, requiring an environmental audit and environmental information disclosure
for enterprises in heavily polluting industries as a prerequisite for obtaining refinancing
through the security markets (OECD, 2008).
Inspections are the main legal instrument used at central and local levels to ensure
compliance. According to OECD, “inspections are mainly carried out by the local EPBs.
Private enterprises are inspected by the EPB of the jurisdiction where they are located.
State-owned enterprises which are assigned a special administrative status are ins-
pected by a respectively higher EPB” (OECD, 2006). Inspections are more frequent
for enterprises situated in cities (OECD, 2008). 
A typical inspection is divided into the following steps: “case initiation, investigation
and penalty assessment” (Ferris and Zhang, 2005). According to Ferris and Zhan (2005),
“incriminated enterprises may receive warnings, corrective action orders (with or
without specific deadlines for correction), orders to report or publish specific
company information, orders for victim compensation, fines, withholding of opera-
tional or import licenses, restrictions to prime materials and facility shut-down orders”
(Ferris and Zhang , 2005).
In addition to the administrative penalty process, environmental law violators may
also be prosecuted under civil and criminal law (Ferris and Zhang , 2005). Thus,
Article 6 of the Environmental Protection Law and several provisions in the Civil Law
provide affected parties with opportunities “to take environmental disputes to court
and to take legal action against polluters” (OECD, 2006). Under the Administrative
Law, local governments or local EPBs can be sued for negligence in fulfilling their
environmental duties. For serious offences, China’s Criminal Law stipulates up to three
years imprisonment and/or a fine for individuals involved in i l legally discharging
pollutants. 
1.2.4. Enterprises and voluntarily adopted rules and standards
To complement these potentially very dissuasive market-based and legal measures,
the government also encourages enterprises to voluntarily adopt environmentally
responsible behaviours, such as clean-production methods, resource-saving techno-
logies and international environmental standards. Enterprises may also be incentivised
to adopt environmentally responsible conduct in order to improve their corporate
image and gain access to international markets. 
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China adhered to the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) in 2001 and
is represented by the Standardization Administration of China (SAC). The main function
of the SAC, as authorised by the State Council, is to ensure overall coordination of
standardisation activities in China.[ 26 ]
SAC actively promotes clean-production certificates and environmental labels, as
well as the adoption of process standards such as the ISO 14000 Environmental
Management System certification. As a process standard, ISO 14000 articulates all the
components of an organisation’s environmental management systems.[ 2 7 ] In particular,
it requires organisations to formulate an environmental policy, set objectives and targets,
develop an implementation plan, monitor and measure the system’s effectiveness,
correct problems and conduct reviews to improve the system (Petroni, 2001; Barla,
2007). The Chinese government encourages enterprises to adhere to a variety of other
voluntary standards and norms in all sectors. 
1 . 3 . Effectiveness of environmental regulation in China 
and explanatory factors 
1.3.1. Real progress
The efforts to develop the environmental enforcement framework have yielded results
in China’s environmental management and pollution control.
The “Three Synchronisations” (3S) programme has played an important role in stimula-
ting investment in pollution abatement installations at industrial enterprises, especially
in new factories. In 2004, according to the OECD (2006), out of a total of 127,500
investment projects, 79,500 were subject to the “3S” procedure. In slightly more
than 76,000 cases, the “3S” procedure was approved (OECD, 2006). By 2006, over
5,000 enterprises in the sectors of chemicals, light industry, power-generation, coal,
machine-tools and building materials had met the clean production requirements.
More than 12,000 enterprises across China had received the ISO 14000 Environmental
Management System certification, while over 800 enterprises and over 18,000 products
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[ 2 6 ] Source : ISO, http://www.iso.org/iso/about/iso_members/iso_member_body.htm?member_id=1635, accessed 
22 April 2011.
[ 27 ] The ISO 14000 series provides guidelines for environmental management systems (ISO 14001), auditing 
guidelines (ISO 14010), labelling (ISO 14020), performance evaluations (ISO 14031), life-cycle assessment (ISO 
14040) and product standards (ISO 14060) (Fryxell and Szeto, 2002; Chan, 2008; Nawrock and Parker, 2009; 
Hewitt and Robinson, 1998). A number of studies (Struebing , 2006; Hui et al., 2000; Goodman, 1998; Pouliot, 
1996) have shown that adoption of environmental management systems such as the ISO 14000 series and 
clean-production methods would not necessarily lead to a reduction in a firm’s profitability.  
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of diverse types and specifications had obtained environmental labelling certification
(State Council Information Office, 2006). In June 2007, the MEP (formerly SEPA) decided
to suspend the construction of two projects (project for power generation from the
incineration of waste in the Haidian district of Beijing , PX project in Xiamen) due to
protests by local residents.  
The Annual Report of Environmental Statistics 2008 published by the MEP offered
a range of encouraging statistics on environmental enforcement. In 2008, the envi-
ronmental authorities in China registered 95,000 cases of administrative sanctions for
violation of environmental laws (90,000 cases treated), 178 prosecutions (149 imple-
mented) and 4 criminal cases (2 treated). For the same year, 1,816 clean-production
projects were approved, 167,000 discharge permits were allocated to qualifying
companies, and 22,488 polluting enterprises were closed down. In addition, most of
China's large and medium-sized enterprises have also set up environmental protection
bodies responsible for their own anti-pollution work and the promotion of cleaner
production. China is the world’s leading provider of equipment for solar and wind
energy.
In 2004, Chinese and international enterprises jointly created the China Business Council
for Sustainable Development (CBCSD) to commit themselves to maintaining and
promoting sustainable development. According to OECD (2008), “in December 2007,
the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State
Council (SASAC) issued the Guidance on Fulfilling Social Responsibilities for large
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) under its supervision to: enhance awareness of social
responsibility; establish a division responsible for social responsibility; publish a report
regularly on social responsibility or sustainable development and conduct stakeholder
consultations; and learn from foreign companies’ best practices and experiences on
social responsibilities” (OECD, 2008). 
Multinationals operating in China have exerted a significant influence on local enforce-
ment capacity, either by using state-of-the-art waste management technologies in
their enterprises or by insisting that their Chinese partners (or potential partners)
adhere to a higher standard of environmental practice. For instance, Royal Dutch/
Shell called on an outside environmental consulting firm and the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) in order to conduct a social impact assessment
during its negotiations with the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in
view of completing a consortium agreement on the West-East Gas Pipeline Project
(Day, 2005; Economy, 2005; Shell China, 2006). 
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Remarkably, by April 2011, more than 208 private and public firms [ 2 8 ] (including
CNOOC, Sinopec and PetroChina, a subsidiary of CNPC Group [ 2 9 ] ) had adhered to
the United Nations Global Compact's ten principles in the areas of human rights,
labour, the environment and anti-corruption.[ 30 ]
Environmental NGOs in China have evolved from focusing on environmental education
and biodiversity protection to debating a wide range of environmental issues, including
large-scale infrastructure projects, lack of enforcement of environmental requirements,
and misappropriation of funds by the administration (Wu, 2009). NGOs have likewise
played an important role in legal support to the civil victims. According to the OECD
(2006), “the Centre for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims (at the University of Politics
and Law in Beijing) operates a telephone hotline about environmental legal issues
and has taken more than 30 cases to court on behalf of pollution victims, winning
about half” (OECD, 2006).  In Pingnan County (Fujian Province), villagers won their law-
suit against a large chemical plant with assistance from the Centre (OECD, 2006).
NGOs have organised public education activities, media campaigns against pollution
cases, and advocated alternative policy solutions (Yang , 2010). 
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[ 2 8 ] According to: http://www.unglobalcompact.org/participants, accessed 21 April 2011.
[ 2 9 ] As at the end of 2009, CNPC had an 86.285% stakeholding in PetroChina (source: PetroChina, 2009 Sustain-
ability report).
[ 3 0 ] These principles are: “Human rights 1. Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally
proclaimed human rights; 2. Make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses. Labour 3. Businesses
should uphold the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; 4. 
Elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour; 5. Effective abolition of child labour; 6. Elimination 
of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. Environment 7. Businesses should support a 
precautionary approach to environmental challenges; 8. Undertake initiatives to promote greater environ-
mental responsibility; 9. Encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies. 
Anti-Corruption 10 Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion and bribery.”
Source: http://www.unglobalcompact.org/aboutthegc/thetenprinciples/index.html, accessed on 21 April 2011.
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1.3.2. The gap between regulation and implementation
The nature and scale of the environmental problems facing China would represent
a challenge for any minister of the environment. It is difficult to imagine what the
state of China’s environment would have been without the tremendous efforts already
accomplished. Yet despite these efforts and achievements, the country’s environ-
mental issues remain colossal. 
China’s environmental situation is still a major issue, as demonstrated by the widespread
air and water pollution and the continuous deterioration of natural resources. Since
the 6th FYP, China has incorporated an environmental plan into its national social and
economic development plans, but the environmental targets of the 6th FYP (1981-1985)
through to the 10th FYP (2001-2005) were never fully achieved. According to the State
Council’s analysis, only six of the fourteen environmental targets listed were actually
met in 2005. SO2 emissions rose sharply by 27.8% compared to the 2000 level, while
the main river basin regions of Huaihe, Haihe, Liaohe, Taihu, Chaohu and Dianchi
achieved only 60% of pollution control targets. The emissions of major pollutants
far exceed environmental capacity, producing serious environmental pollution
(State Council, 2007). In 2008, China’s energy consumption per unit of GDP was
seven times higher than Japan’s (World Bank, 2009). For the same year, China’s GDP
was around USD 4.3 trillion, less than 7% of total world GDP, but its consumption of
energy, steel, coal and cement accounted respectively for 15%, 27%, 31% and 54% of
the world total (World Bank, 2009). Environmental protection policies alone would not
Part One
1 and 2Photos Importance of the environmental challenge 
in China
1 / Sorting encouraged in Shangai (January 2009) 2 / Street scenes (Beijing, May 2010)
Photo Credit: Romain Dittgen. Photo Credit: Géraud Magrin.
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suffice to change this high-input, low-output pattern of growth. Despite protection
efforts, the pollution of large sections of China’s river systems still exacerbates water
scarcity (2030 Water Resource Group, 2009) .[ 31 ] Freshwater consumption was 2,156
m3 per capita in 2007 (among the lowest per capita for a major country) and 60%
of China’s 660 cities experienced water shortages. Moreover, water resources are une-
venly distributed across the country: in 2000, southern China accounted for
80.4% of the nation’s naturally available water resources but only 53.3% of the
population, whereas northern China accounted for 19.6% of the water resources
but 46.7% of the population (World Bank, 2009; OECD, 2007). Since a benzene spill by
a chemical plant in 2005 ,[ 32 ] the Chinese media have revealed many water pollution
accidents. The price China pays for water pollution is very high: the World Health
Organisation (WHO) recently estimated that 75% of all disease in China comes from
water pollution, as illustrated by the numerous “cancer villages” along polluted water
sources across the country. WHO estimates the number of Chinese deaths rela-
ted to water at 100,000 a year. [ 33 ]
Thirteen Chinese cities figured on a World Bank list of the twenty most polluted
cities in the world in 2006 (World Bank, 2011). The main source of air pollution is energy
production. In 2009, coal accounted for 77.3% of China’s energy (State Statistics
Bureau, 2010). The coal-fired power plants operate using out-dated technologies,
which results in levels of air contamination by sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, soot
and dust that exceed Chinese standards. The dramatic surge in the number of indi-
vidual cars and cement plants is another major contributor to air pollution and
greenhouse gas emission. By 2010, China may overtake the US as the world's largest
emitter of greenhouse gases.[ 34 ] The consequence of sulphur dioxide emissions is acid
rain: among 477 cities (counties) under monitoring , 252 suffered from acid rain. These
cities are mainly concentrated in the region to the south of the Yangtze River and to the
east in Sichuan and Yunnan, including Zhejiang, Fujian, and Jiangxi, most of Hunan and
Chongqing as well as the Yangtze River delta and Pearl River delta (MEP, 2009).
Part One
[ 3 1 ] The MEP has a classification grid for different levels of water pollution: levels I-III mean that water is safe to drink, 
level IV that water is reserved for industrial use and level V that it is for irrigation purposes only.
[ 3 2 ] Following an explosion at a factory (government-owned Jilin Petrochemical, a subsidiary of PetroChina) in 
north-eastern China in November 2005, one hundred tonnes of benzene and nitrobenzene ran into the 
Songhua River, forming an 80km slick of heavily contaminated water that hit the city of Harbin and left four 
million people without public water services for five days. 
[ 3 3 ] According to http://www.pacificenvironment.org/article.php?id=1878, accessed on 5 May  2011.
[ 34 ] A declaration from the International Energy Agency's chief economist, April 2007.
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The economic cost of air pollution is estimated at 3.55% of annual gross national
product (GNP) with damage to human health accounting for 69% of this cost. [ 35 ]
A WHO report estimates that diseases triggered by indoor and outdoor air pollution
kill 656,000 persons each year (Liu, 2009). According to Chinese government statistics,
300,000 persons die each year due to ambient air pollution, mostly from heart disease
and lung cancer. An additional 110,000 die from illnesses linked to indoor pollution
due to poorly ventilated wood and coal stoves and toxic fumes from sub-standard
construction material (CAEP, 2003). The air pollution death figure is expected to rise
to 380,000 in 2010 and 550,000 in 2020 (DRC, 2004).
China has experienced massive deforestation, degradation of grassland and acceleration
of biodiversity loss, despite a recent renewal of forest cover from 18% in 2003 to 20.4%
in 2008. According to China’s seventh National Forestry Resource Inventory, forest
quality is still poor; arbour stocking volume per hectare is only 78% of the world
average (State Forestry Administration, 2009). Forest expansion has come mainly from
planted forests, which have a lower stocking volume (Petry and Zhang , 2009) and
lower biodiversity levels than the scarce primary forests. By 2006, 1.74 million km2
were affected by desertification and over 90% of natural grasslands were subject to
degradation (State Council, 2007). The pace of desertification seems to have quic-
kened in recent decades in the north-west of the country, from 1,560 km2 a year in
the 1970s to 3,436 km2 at the end of the 1990s, and 13,300–20,000 km2 annually in
recent years (State Forestry Administration, 2005). China, one of the world’s “mega
biodiversity countries”, is home to more than 30,000 vascular plant and 6,300
vertebrate species. This biodiversity, however, faces enormous threats (Lopez-Pujol
et al. 2006). Some 15-20% of China’s animal and plant species are currently endan-
gered (CAS, 2007). In 2006, nearly 3,000 of the plants and animals featured in the
global IUCN Red List of Threatened Species were found in China.[ 36 ]
1.3.3. The search for explanatory factors
Factors associated with the players
In the process of implementation and enforcement of China’s environmental laws
and regulations, the State occupies the dominant position and its organisation and mode
of functioning directly influences the behaviours of enterprises and NGOs. 
Part One
[ 35 ] According to http://factsanddetails.com/china.php?itemid=392&catid=10&subcatid=66, accessed on 
5 May 2011.
[ 3 6 ] According to the Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Bonn, Germany 19-30 
May 2008.
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In 2008, there were 12,215 administrative institutions in charge of environmental
protection, including 42 at national level, 351 at provincial level, 1,865 at municipal
level, 8,432 at county level and 1,525 at township level, with a total of 184,000 staff
employed in environmental administration, monitoring , inspection and control,
statistics collection, scientific research, publicity and education (MEP, 2008). The
involvement of such a large number of agencies in environmental management
certainly reflects the increasing environmental awareness of the Chinese government.
However, certain agencies have been created for purely material reasons (enhancing
their image, access to additional financial resources from central government and
external financing , etc.). This profusion of agencies has contributed to the inextricable
complexity of environmental governance and produced administrative overlaps and
high coordination costs.[ 37 ]
Expectedly, the goals and priorities of these environmental agencies and other
governmental departments often diverge.[ 38 ] Both central and local governments
prioritise economic growth over environmental protection since the performance
of political leaders is mainly evaluated on the criteria of GDP growth, with little
consideration given to environmental performance (Schwartz, 2000; OECD, 2008). [ 39 ]
At local levels, these conflicting interests are even more evident. The local EPBs not
only report to the EPB immediately above them and ultimately to the MEP, but they
are also subordinate to provincial and local governments. The latter are able to exert
a sway over EPB activities, as it is they who control the EPBs’ financial and human
resources, whereas the MEP has only a limited technical influence. Should conflict arise,
this dual supervision and their low-ranking status in the governmental hierarchy mean
that EPBs often submit to the pressures of their local authority. It is not infrequent for
local EPBs to enforce severe sanctions (high fines or a close-down order) against pollu-
ting enterprises, only to see local government intervene to mitigate or even cancel the
sanctions on the pretext of protecting local employment and tax revenues (Wang et al.,
2008; Economy, 2005). This local government bias towards economic growth has been
reinforced by fiscal decentralisation policy as the 1994 fiscal reform has made the
local governments’ tax revenues increasingly dependent on local enterprises in their
jurisdiction (Economy, 2005). 
Part One
[ 37 ] cf. Barrouch, 1989, for a study on fragmented environmental regulation in France.
[ 3 8 ] cf. Chabason and Guignabel, 1995 for a review of the emergence of environmental agencies in France and 
their epic struggles with the Ministries of Transport and Energy, the agencies for infrastructure and the 
nuclear lobbies.
[ 3 9 ] In recent years,  the State Council has chosen to set up an environmentally adjusted accounting system designed
to reduce this bias towards GDP growth when evaluating government officials’ performance. This will not 
however come into operation in the near future. 
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The multiplication of environmental authorities and a certain lack of rigour within
the NPC’s law-making processes lead to overlaps and inconsistencies between laws
and regulations enacted by different government agencies (Gang, 2009). For example,
the Water Resource Law stipulates that “water resources include surface water and
groundwater” and “are managed and supervised by the Water Authority of State
Council”. However, the Mineral Resource Law entrusts management of groundwater
to the Mineral Authority of the State Council. Both these Laws require payment of fees
for the exploitation of groundwater. The overlapping of environmental enforcement
authorities and the lack of a coordinating body may thus lead to inconsistencies in
the enforcement of environmental laws (Schwartz, 2000). They may also lead to lengthy
law-making processes, as illustrated by the Law on the Prevention and Control of Air
Pollution (Alford and Liebman, 2001). The first draft of the Law, prepared in 1987, was
ambiguous and unenforceable. In the middle of the 1990s, SEPA almost abandoned
the bill due to numerous objections from the State Plan Committee, the State Economic
Committee, the Ministry of Coal, the Ministry of Electricity, the provincial governments
of Sichuan and Gansu, and the automobile industry. It took thirteen years to see the
final promulgation of this Law as a result of a long process of negotiation and
consultation among all involved parties (Alford and Liebman, 2001; Economy, 2004).
As the enforcement system is headed by sectoral state departments, the implemen-
tation of environmental laws is less effective, especially since many of the agencies
have not yet internalised environmental conservation (Qiao, 2005). In theory, the MEP
and local EPBs are responsible for ensuring that other agencies enforce environmental
legislation but the same enforcement powers have also been assigned to sectoral
administrative departments (OECD, 2006). As long as the ministries perceive the envi-
ronmental dimension of their activities as being at odds with “the sector´s interests”,
this department-led enforcement system will lead to a weakened application of environ-
mental laws, as each governmental department has an incentive to enforce them less
stringently (Qiao, 2005).   
State-owned companies are embedded in the executive arm of government at national,
regional and local level. The degree of autonomy of their management vis-à-vis the
State or local authorities varies strongly according to the nature of their activity, their
strategic value and the geographical scope of their operations (national or worldwide).
Large state conglomerates naturally have more influence on policymaking than the
smaller specialised state-owned firms, whatever their sector (industrial, commercial,
public utilities). When a dialogue exists, the state agencies discuss policies with
state-owned conglomerates and large state-owned companies, which then operate
as both producers and consumers of policy signals. The interaction between these
large enterprises and policy signals is somewhat paradoxical. In theory, the large
Part One
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enterprises are easier to reach and to negotiate with, which would imply that, once
an agreement has been made, the probability for enforcement should be high and
the impact across large conglomerates huge. However, the embedded relationship
with the executive branch may in fact hinder or delay enforcement, especially when
contradictory policy signals are sent out by different ministries (for instance, growth
versus protection). It is more difficult to reach and negotiate with the widely scattered
smaller and micro private enterprises. These usually operate as consumers rather than
as producers of policy signals. Although small and easily controllable, at least in theory,
their number and geographical dispersion mean that they can always avoid, evade or
obstruct policies. In all cases, the implementation of environmental regulation signals
depends heavily on the enterprises' willingness to comply.
NGOs play an increasingly important role in environmental issues, even though their
windows for action are still limited. All Chinese NGOs need to be registered and to
obtain the government’s approval, which involves meeting various strict requirements
regarding a minimum number of members, financial autonomy, etc. (OECD, 2006;
Economy, 2005). According to OECD (2006), “NGOs still have limited ability to obtain
information… Information on the environment is too often considered as confi-
dential and thus only distributed to high-level government officials” (OECD, 2006).
Indeed, Article 21 of the Law on EIA (2002) foresees the possibility of restricting
access to certain data, but what the legislator had intended as an exception has now
become the rule for the executive authorities. These constraints limit the potential
contribution of NGOs to environmental protection activities (OECD, 2006). 
Rule-related factors 
Despite the huge number of laws, regulations, standards and plans on environmental
protection, China’s environmental legislative system presents several drawbacks. With
respect to the effectiveness of the EIA process, as the OECD (2006) points out, “a total
of 55,000 construction projects underwent the process in 2004, of which 1,190 projects
were found to have failed to satisfy EIA requirements, including 30 big construction
projects (most of them hydro or thermal power plants). A joint investigation by SEPA
and the Ministry of Land and Resources showed that only 30 to 40% of the mining
construction projects went through the required EIA procedures, and the share
was as low as 6 to 7% in certain provinces” (OECD, 2006, based on data provided
by SEPA). Recent data have not been accessed.
Similarly, the “3S” procedures are not always strictly followed. According to the OECD
(2006), “there is evidence that sanctions associated with non-compliance of the 3S
procedure are often not applied by local authorities… Industries usually fail to involve
Part One
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local environmental authorities early in the design phase of the project and ask for
approval only when facilities are about to start operations” (OECD, 2006). [ 40 ]
Despite the huge number of environmental laws and regulations both at central
and local levels, some key environmental issues are not covered by the present legal
framework. Some examples include: the prevention of soil pollution, sustainable mana-
gement of chemical substances, comprehensive waste reduction and management,
environmental permitting , damage compensation and liability for past pollutions
(“environmental legacies”). The most serious vacuum in China’s environmental legal
system is the lack of detailed implementing rules and enforcement procedures
associated with specific environmental laws and regulations (Gang, 2009). For instance,
the EPL (1989) sets the general rules for environmental protection but has no clear
provisions for legal liabilities. Moreover, the Chinese laws relating to pollution (water, air,
etc.) focus mainly on administrative liability, whilst civil and criminal liabilities are only
vaguely defined. Moreover, this production of environmental laws and regulations
puts enormous pressure on the country’s law-making capacities.
In China, most environmental laws and regulations are drafted in a broad and imprecise
manner and ambiguities persist due to the fact that some major laws do not provide
a precise definition of various key terms (Gang , 2009). For instance, the Law of Air
Pollution Prevention and Control (2000) stipulates that “State Council and People’s
government at all levels must undertake measures to prevent air pollution, protect
and improve atmosphere” without, however, making any provision for the concrete
measures and procedures to ensure that the various levels of government fulfil their
environmental responsibility. These ambiguities open the door to different interpre-
tations by different government departments and thus substantially increase the risk of
non-compliance. As pointed out by Alford (2003), some Chinese environmental laws
look more like policy statements and intentions rather than providing clear indications
of what exactly is allowed and what is not.  
Economic instruments are sophisticated and potentially effective governance tools
but they require large amounts of historical data, modelling capacity  and a fair know-
ledge of how the agents they govern behave. They also require a capacity to tune and
then fine-tune an instrument. In ill-prepared organisational settings that do not provide
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[ 4 0 ] According to OECD (2006), “To overcome the implementation problems in some areas, a deposit-refund 
system for “3S” in construction projects has been introduced. Deposits, which are based on the project’s 
total investment cost, can be returned to investors upon approval of the project’s “3S” requirements. 
However, the deposit-refund system still has no adequate legal basis and no clear criteria for evaluation and 
return of the deposits” (OECD, 2006)
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these conditions, such instruments are likely to give rise to counter-productive
results. This means that they are often poorly implemented by the local authorities.
The pollution charges and fines are set too low to induce corporate compliance,
despite recent increases.[ 41 ] Firms often prefer to pay the charges rather than change
their production processes to decrease emissions. In addition, the charge collection
rate is low, estimated on average at less than 50% of the charges imposed (between
10% in western provinces and 80% in coastal areas (State Council Information Office,
2006). Chinese laws contain provisions for the maximal fines charged against polluters.
In many cases, the upper limits are set too low relative to the amount invested in
polluting projects and the environmental damages they cause. For instance, in 2005,
thirty large construction projects (chiefly hydro or thermal power plants representing
investments of over CNY 1 billion) failed to satisfy EIA requirements, while the highest
fine charged by SEPA was no more than CNY 100,000, which has very little dissuasive
effect on the violators. In the words of the OECD: “In many cases, the actual charge
paid by a firm is a result of bargaining between the administration and the firm…
Some surveys show that state-owned enterprises pay lower effective rates than
privately owned ones, and that the rates are positively related to firm profitability”
(OECD, 2006). In such conditions, the cost of operating these economic instruments
may turn out to be higher than the results they deliver. Economic instruments might
also distract from the real issues at stake. In what direction is this governance steering?
What kinds of problems need to be steered?
Process-related factors 
In China, environmental laws and regulations are drafted and promulgated by the
National People’s Congress and various government departments, with the public
or affected stakeholders playing only a minor role in this rule-making process. A
large number of environmental laws and regulations are the result of a “consensus”
reached during closed-door “negotiations and bargaining” between the government
departments concerned and various interest groups. The lack of publicly available
documentation on enforcement practices and procedures increases the uncertainty,
unfairness and difficulty of seeking legal remedies in the area of environmental
law enforcement (Ferris and Zhang , 2005). To improve the transparency of China’s
legislative system, a recently introduced policy innovation is the publication of draft
laws and regulations on government web sites for public comment. However, due
to the limited human resources of the legislative authorities and to time constraints,
public comments are poorly recorded and rarely receive feedback. Many Chinese
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[ 41 ] The rates for SO2 emissions were increased from CNY 0.21/kg to CNY 0.42/kg in 2004 and to CNY 0.63/kg 
in 2005; a new charge of CNY0.6/kg of NOx was introduced in 2004 (State Council Information Office, 2006).
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administrative agencies do not yet have a publicly available official gazette or other
central publication for their administrative laws. Comprehensive, updated and accurate
compilations of the legislation are not easily available (OECD, 2006). Local govern-
ments have substantial discretion in the interpretation and implementation of
environmental laws. Inspectors work under the EPBs and are thus supervised by the
local authorities, which may compromise the stringency of environmental enforcement
(OECD, 2006). [ 42 ]
This inventory of China´s environmental problems and the solutions deployed invites
us to shift from an analysis of what needs regulating to focus more on regulatory
practice itself, especially now that the limits of environmental governance are making
themselves felt (Benko et al., 1995; van Vliet, 1997). Although many of the environ-
mental issues could be characterised as “hard systems”, some of the most persistent
ones are not governable through classic command-and-control approaches or
through technology alone. The recognition of “soft systems” and social responsiveness
may make it necessary to design and test other management approaches based on
dialogue and communication (Ackoff, 1974; Baumgartner, 1986; Checkland, 1984; van
Vliet, 1997). The Chinese development path has produced a specific type of societal
organisation that calls into question many governance approaches, including the way in
which environmental issues are steered. The question then arises as to whether the
very basic principles of cybernetic management (such as the one advocated by
Conant and Ashby, 1970) are still useful or whether they are also challenged by the
Chinese experience. [ 43 ] The question of whether the State’s approaches to regulation
need to be adapted to the new societal configuration created by economic reform is at
the heart of many debates in China.
An analysis of the factors affecting overall state environmental regulation provides
a useful insight. But is this general overview valid for all sectors? The analysis of envi-
ronmental regulation in the petroleum sector may guide us further in our investigation.
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[ 4 2 ] To avoid this, some provinces and centrally administered municipalities such as Henan, Hubei, Beijing and 
Tianjing have set up inspectorates that are separate from the EPBs. In addition, in 2006, five regional 
“enforcement coordination centres” were set up to independently monitor and investigate environmental
issues. The regional centres, which are expected to be under direct control of the Environment Ministry, 
will be operating in the cities of Nanjing (covering east China), Guangzhou (south), Xi'an (northwest), 
Chengdu (southwest) and Shenyang (northeast). The five centres will investigate serious pollution cases, 
help solve transregional environmental disputes and supervise law enforcement in national nature reserves, 
key scenic spots and forest parks (Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2008). 
[ 4 3 ] In their often cited paper, Conant and Ashby (1970) had argued that “every good regulator of a system must 
be a model of that system". Implementing this theorem means that the designers and operators of a regulatory 
systems are faced with difficult choices: should they modify the system to be regulated? Modify the regulating 
system? Modify the actual aim of regulation and redefine what makes good regulation? ...
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1 . 4 . Is the petroleum sector an exception with regard 
to national environmental enforcement? 
1.4.1. Background
Driven by strong economic growth, China’s energy demand increased steadily over the
last decade (State Statistics Bureau, 2009a). In 2009, China’s total energy consumption
reached 2.146 billion tonnes of standard quality oil, ranking second behind the USA
(2.382 billion tonnes).[ 44 ] Coal is the main energy source, accounting for 70.4% of
total energy consumption in 2009, followed by oil (17.9%), natural gas (3.9%) and all
other energies (7.8%) (State Statistics Bureau, 2009a). Oil consumption in China has
increased steadily since the beginning of the century, although there has been a recent
slowdown due to the economic recession that began in 2008. Faced with a severe
energy imbalance induced by skyrocketing demand and dwindling domestic supply,
China has been a net oil importer since 1993 and, in 2009, was the world’s third largest
oil importer behind the USA and Japan, with imports totalling 203.8 million tonnes of
crude (National Energy Administration, 2009). To satisfy the soaring energy demand,
China has sought to expand and transform its energy production capacity, which is
still dominated by coal (State Statistics Bureau, 2009b). In 2009, oil held second place
in the energy production mix with a share of less than 10%, in sharp decline from 17%
in 2000 (State Statistics Bureau, 2009b), which reflects the increasing constraints on
the domestic supply of this resource. The dwindling domestic supply prompted
two policy responses: a drastic re-organisation of the petroleum sector and the
push to invest abroad (long before this became the government’s official going-out
policy, cf. Jiang and Sinton, 2011). 
In the early 1980s, oil and gas production was under the direct control of a Petroleum
Industry Ministry. Business operations were delegated to China National Offshore
Oil Corporation (CNOOC) created in 1982 and China Petroleum and Chemical
Corporation (Sinopec), created in 1983. In 1988, the Petroleum Industry Ministry was
abolished and renamed as China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), responsible
for upstream oilfield management and exploration, while Sinopec was in charge of
downstream operations such as refining and commercialisation. From 1998, both CNPC
and Sinopec were encouraged by the government to develop fully integrated industrial
value chains, combining upstream and downstream operations.[ 45 ] Consequently, in
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[ 4 4 ] According to the website of the US Agency of Energy Information, accessed July 2010.
[ 4 5 ] Source: CNPC, the History of CNPC, http://www.cnpc.com.cn/english/gsgk/lsyds_cnpcls.htm, accessed 24
April 2011.
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2004, with a view to fostering competition among the three state-owned compa-
nies and levelling the playing field, CNPC and Sinopec obtained the right to engage
in offshore exploration and production, while CNOOC was granted the right to
engage in onshore exploration and production (Guo, 2006). CNPC, Sinopec (in 1999)
and CNOOC (in 2001) have thus become the Chinese oil majors. Today, Chinese oil
companies are present in all of the world’s oil-producing regions (Guo, 2006; Lee
and Shalmon, 2007; Houser, 2008) and have been transformed into shareholding
companies in which the State has a majority stake. According to Fortune magazine’s
2010 business rankings, Sinopec and CNPC [ 46 ] hold the seventh and tenth place in
the list of the world’s largest corporations; CNOOC is included in the list of 500
top corporations. In 2009, Sinopec was China’s largest oil company in terms of total
turnover (USD 187.5 billion) (Annual Chinese Oil Company Report, 2009), whilst CNPC
was the most profitable with profits almost double those of Sinopec (Annual Chinese
Oil Company Report, 2009) given that CNPC controls most of the oil and natural gas
resources in China.
In order to ensure national energy security, the government encouraged national oil
companies to set up oil production bases abroad. In 1992, CNPC’s exploration project
in the Canadian Alberta North Twing oilfield marked the beginning of the wave of
overseas investments by Chinese oil companies. Since 1999, with strong backing
from the official “going-out” policy, Chinese oil companies have massively increased
their overseas investments to take control of oil and natural gas resources in Africa,
the Middle East, Central Asia, Oceania, and North and South America. In 2009, China
signed “loans-for-oil” cooperation agreements with a number of countries including
Russia, Brazil, Ecuador, Kazakhstan, with a total contract value exceeding USD 40
billion. From January 2009 to April 2010, the three Chinese national oil companies
spent a total of USD 29 billion on purchases of oil and natural gas resources around
the world (EIA, 2009). In 2009, China’s total oil imports reached 252 million tonnes,
including 204 million tonnes of crude, up 13.4% on the previous year. The ratio of
dependency on foreign oil increased from 51.4% in 2008 to 53.6% in 2009 (National
Energy Administration, 2009). In order to reduce the dependency on Middle-East
oil supply, China has diversified its overseas sources of oil and natural gas supply
(with projects worldwide). China’s increasing presence in Africa is an illustration of
this intent. The oil production by the subsidiaries of the three companies operating
in Africa now accounts for 30% of China’s total oil import (State Statistics Bureau,
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[ 4 6 ] According to the Top 500 ranking of the Financial Times, CNPC is the world’s number one corporation in 
terms of asset value and staff. 
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2009b). By March 2010, African export of oil to China accounted for 13% of the
continent’s total oil exports, and China’s investment accounted for 6% of the total
foreign direct investment (FDI) received by Africa for this sector. As a result of this
overseas expansion, China’s overseas oil production has increased rapidly in recent
years. In 2008, daily overseas production by Chinese oil companies was 900,000
barrels (around 45 million tonnes), accounting for 25% of China’s total oil imports,
23% of domestic oil production and 12.5% of domestic oil consumption. In 2010,
overseas oil production will reach 1,200,000 barrels per day (around 60 million tonnes)
and, in 2020, will likely account for 50% of domestic consumption (FGEG, 2008).
1.4.2. Potential environmental impacts of oil exploration, 
production, processing and transportation
The petroleum industry integrates a whole chain of activities such as prospecting ,
extraction, transportation, refining and commercialisation. Each stage of the process,
individually or cumulatively, can contribute to environmental impacts.
l Groundwater depletion and pollution: the depletion of groundwater may have
far-reaching consequences. It contributes not only to subsidence threatening
nearby buildings and constructions, but also to the drying-up of lakes and
wetlands, which then leads to increasing soil salinity and desertification. This is
particularly true in ecologically sensitive areas such as China’s arid northern
region. At the same time, groundwater may also be contaminated by poorly
managed toxic pollutants produced by oil extraction activities. A toxic chemical
leakage or an accidental oil spill may severely pollute the ecological system,
leading to considerable economic damages to agriculture and fisheries (Dong
and Hao, 2006).
l Pollution of surface water and soil: the exploration and production process
may generate huge amounts of effluents (water and chemical mud) which
could severely pollute the surface waters and soils around the exploration
site. In 2005, total wastewater discharge produced by onshore oil companies
in China amounted to 701.7 million tonnes per year, accounting for 2.1% of
total industrial wastewater discharge (State Oceanic Administration, 2006). 
l Air pollution: oil production may produce natural gas. If natural gas is not process-
ed or re-injected, it is burnt and gas-flaring increases the levels of atmospheric
SO2 and CO2. Frequent movements of trucks and light vehicles in and around
sites also create dust. The evaporation of light oil products during storage or
transportation will pollute the surrounding air. In 2005, the total emission of
waste gases discharged by Chinese onshore oil industry was 471 billion m3,
Part One
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accounting for 3.42% of total domestic waste gas emissions for that year. (State
Oceanic Administration, 2006)
l Biodiversity loss: the construction and operation of oil facilities may destroy
vegetation and disrupt wildlife habitats.  
l Noise and solid waste pollution: the construction and operation of oil facilities
produce noise levels that may disturb the daily life of local residents. Untreated
solid waste may take up scarce land and pollute soils and groundwater reserves.  
The more sensitive the ecosystem likely to be impacted, the higher the associated
environmental and social risks. Some of China’s onshore oilfields are located in the
arid Gobi desert, which is an ecological hotspot and fragile ecosystem. Numerous oil
facilities (including refineries and pipelines) are located close to agricultural land, rivers,
lakes and aquaculture sites, while off-shore drilling sites are situated near sensitive
marine reserves. There is thus a real risk that these impacts will occur. Indeed, some
potential impacts have materialised in a recent series of accidents including the gas
pipeline explosion in Kai County in Chong Qing municipality in 2003, the explosion of
a petrochemical factory on the banks of the Songhua River in Jilin Province in 2005
and an oil spill in the Bohai Sea caused by the explosion of a maritime oil pipeline in
Dalian City in 2010. These events helped to trigger the formulation of state environ-
mental laws and regulations concerning the petroleum sector. 
1.4.3. Environmental regulation of the petroleum sector
In China, the current environmental legislative regime for the petroleum sector is
characterised by a combination of general laws and sector-specific regulations. 
General environmental laws, regulations and decrees applicable 
to the petroleum sector
The petroleum sector is required to comply with all nationwide environmental laws
and regulations, including the EPL (1989), as well as all relevant specific environmental
laws and regulations and administrative decrees. Some of the general laws contain
specific measures for the petroleum sector. The Energy Conservation Law stipulates
that the Energy Conservation Department under the State Council is to decide on
policy relating to energy-saving technologies for the oil-processing and coal-
powered electricity sectors. The EIA Law requires all oil companies to establish an
environmental impact assessment system for each construction project, and the Clean
Production Promotion Law encourages them to adopt clean production technologies.
The Regulation on the Environmental Management of Construction Projects establi-
shes “3S” procedures for all oilfield constructions, while the Regulation on the Levy
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and Management of Pollution Discharge Fees specifies the discharge fees for waste
discharges from petroleum sector. The rules for implementing the Mineral Resource
Law stipulate that extraction causing severe damages to mineral resources will be
fined up to 50% of the total loss value. The State Council Regulation on the Levy and
Management of Mineral Compensation Fees fixes the compensation fees at 1% of
revenues from the sale of oil and natural gas. 
Sector-specific environmental regulations 
The environmental dimension of oil and gas operations is also ruled by sector-specific
regulations. These are promulgated at national level by the State Council or its depart-
ments, or at local level by those provinces that are rich ly endowed with oil and gas. 
The government has promulgated a series of administrative decrees to regulate sector-
specific environmental issues. Two of these regulations [ 47 ] establish the basic principles
and rules for international cooperation in the exploitation of China’s onshore and
offshore oil resources and contain a provision for environmental protection. These
two regulations represent milestones for environmental protection in the Chinese
oil industry inasmuch as they formalise China's adhesion to “international practices”
to protect environmental resources and prevent pollution and damage. [ 48 ]
The Regulation on the Environmental Protection in Offshore Oil Exploration and
Exploitation promulgated by the State Council in 1983 is an administrative decree
entirely devoted to environmental issues in the petroleum sector. The Regulation
defines the competent department in charge of petroleum-related environmental
issues, the scope and the principles of the oil companies’ environmental responsibility;
it establishes emergency procedures in case of maritime pollution caused by the oil
industry, and stipulates the administrative penalties and fines against violators and
polluters. 
Various departments within the State Council have also promulgated a series of
administrative regulations concerning the petroleum sector, including the Circular
Part One
[ 47 ] The Regulation on the Exploitation of Offshore Petroleum Resources in Cooperation with Foreign
Partners (promulgated in 1982 and revised in 2001 by the State Council) and the Regulation on the Exploitation 
of Onshore Petroleum Resources in Cooperation with Foreign Partners (promulgated in 1993 and revised in 
2007 by the State Council).
[ 4 8 ] Article 22 in the two above mentioned regulations specifies: “In carrying out oil operations, the operator 
and contractor shall comply with the laws, regulations and standards of the State concerning environmental
protection and safe operation, and shall follow international practices to protect agricultural land, aquatic 
resources, forest resources and other natural resources and prevent pollution and damage to the atmosphere, 
oceans, rivers, lakes, ground water and other land environment.”
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on the Reinforcement of the Protection of Oil and Natural Gas Pipelines promulgated
by the State Economic and Trade Commission in 1999; the Guidelines on the Safety
Evaluation of Onshore Oil and Natural Gas Extraction (2003); the Regulation on the
Production Safety of Offshore Oil Production promulgated by the State Administration
of Work Safety; the  Circular on the Reinforcement of Environmental Management
over Maritime Waste Discharges and Offshore Oil Prospecting and Exploration (1991)
and the Circular on Several Environmental Protection Issues Relating to Offshore
Oil Prospecting and Exploration (1993) issued by the State Oceanic Administration.
The recent oil spill caused by the explosion of an oil pipeline in Dalian in July 2010
was followed by the new Law on the Protection of Oil and Natural Gas Pipelines,
which came into force 1 October 2010. For the first time, this Law emphasises the
responsibility of polluters to remedy environmental pollution caused by an oil leakage
or oil spill. 
These regulations and decrees have given rise to a series of detailed environmental
technical standards covering oil prospecting , extraction, transportation, refining and
commercialization (see Part Four for more details on standards in the Chinese petro-
leum sector). 
At provincial level,  governments in those provinces endowed with oil and gas
resources have issued local regulations, such as the Rules of Environmental Protection
Management in Onshore Oil Prospecting and Exploration in Hebei Province; the
Regulation on the Environmental Protection in Oil Prospecting and Exploration in
Liaoning Province; the Regulation on the Environmental Protection in Oil and
Natural Gas Prospecting and Exploration in Heilongjiang Province and the Rules of
Environmental Management in Oil Prospecting and Exploration in the Xinjiang
Uygur Autonomous Region.  
1.4.4. Enforcement of environmental regulations in China’s 
petroleum sector 
The general environmental laws are enforced by the environmental authorities at
national and local levels, while the sector-specific regulations are mainly enforced by
the competent departments. 
Petroleum and the multiple bodies involved in environmental regulation 
Several government agencies have regulatory jurisdiction over the domestic petroleum
industry. Upstream oil and gas extraction licences are issued by the Ministry of Land
and Resources. New refineries or chemicals factories of any significant size must be
Part One
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approved by the energy and industry bureaus of the National Development and
Reform Commission (NDRC) and are subject to the MEP’s Environmental Impact
Assessment. The NDRC’s pricing bureau sets gasoline and diesel prices, and the Ministry
of Finance levies a windfall profits tax on upstream oil extraction (and would administer
a fuel consumption tax, if ever one is introduced) (Houser, 2008).
The government departments that oversee the enforcement of environmental
laws and regulations in the petroleum sector vary according to the nature of envi-
ronmental issue involved. The environmental authorities under the MEP and local
environmental protection bureaus have the authority to supervise environmental
management and to enforce the national environmental policies. More precisely, they
have authority to establish national environment protection standards and sector-
specific standards, to oversee the compulsory environmental impact assessment of oil
and natural gas projects, to ensure compliance with the “3S” policy, to deliver discharge
permits, to implement the discharge fee policy and to take administrative sanctions
against violators (Yue and Mu, 2007). 
The State Oceanic Administration and its local agencies are responsible for the
supervision of offshore oil exploration and pollution control. When pollution caused by
oil exploration, refining or transportation affects aquatic production, the State Fishery
Administration and its local agencies intervene to deal with the pollution and fine
the polluters. The use of radioactive substances in oil prospecting is monitored by the
Ministries of Health or Public Security. The administrative departments for construction
matters oversee the implementation of the “3S” policy, enforce environmental
protection measures during the design and construction of oil projects, and monitor
the operation of environmental protection facilities after the completion of the
construction project. Finally, land resource departments and water conservancy
departments may also intervene in the event that soil, groundwater or rivers are
polluted by the oil industry (Yue and Mu, 2007).  
Besides these administrative enforcement mechanisms, the government’s new green
policies such as green tax, green credit, green insurance and green securities also
apply to the petroleum sector. For instance, in February 2008, the MEP and the China
Insurance Regulatory Commission jointly issued a directive on Environmental Pollution
Liability Insurance. The petroleum sector was selected among other polluting industries
to serve as a pilot. Moreover, the green securities policy issued by the MEP in February
2008 requires the petroleum industry to carry out an environmental audit before
any initial public offering or refinancing through the securities market (OECD, 2008).
Finally, the oil companies are encouraged to adopt environment-friendly practices
Part One
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and international environmental standards on a voluntary basis. Since the 1990s,
Chinese oil companies have gradually adopted the ISO 14000 series of standards and
established the Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) management system (cf. Part
Four). 
How effectively are state environmental regulations enforced 
in the petroleum sector?
As discussed above, despite the enormous efforts, overall environmental enforcement
in China is compromised by diverse institutional, economic and political factors such as
overlapping competencies or lack of coordination, the close relationship between
the authorities and managers of public conglomerates, inconsistencies between
general environmental rules and specific regulations, and inconsistencies between
specific regulations. These factors also partly apply to China’s petroleum sector. 
Chinese oil companies are state-owned enterprises. They have a certain level of auto-
nomy in their business operations, but are closely tied to the State Council and its
departments. It took years for the public, and CNPC employees, to perceive the
difference between the CNPC and the former Petroleum Industry Ministry, out of
which it  was created. The managers of large oi l  conglomerates enjoy very high
hierarchical ranking (for instance, the CNPC president holds the rank of vice-minister).
Moreover, the fast-evolving nature of the oil industry and its state-of-the-art techno-
logy require highly qualified and equipped environmental experts who understand the
processes, ask the appropriate questions and are able to conduct the relevant tests
and measurements. As in many Western countries, the MEP and the Ministry of Energy
are not in a position to ensure independent and qualified environmental monitoring
of the oil industry. There are no independent laboratories on which an independent
monitoring system could be based. Although discharge fees or fines can be used to
deter eventual polluters in the petroleum industry, these are set too low to encourage
any compliance. The Regulation on the Environmental Protection in Offshore Oil
Exploration and Exploitation even sets a maximum fine of CNY 100,000 for maritime
pollution caused by an oil company, an amount which is negligible compared to the
amount of the total investment made and the value of the damages to the environ-
ment and to surrounding economic activities. [ 49 ]
Although the enforcement of environmental regulation in the oil industry presents
many common points with what exists in other sectors, there are also striking differences.
Part One
[ 4 9 ] In the recent large-scale oil pollution accident in Bohai Sea (Dalian City), the State Oceanic Administration 
charged a fine of only CNY 300,000 against the involved company.
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Specifics of environmental management in the petroleum sector
Several factors have helped to raise the petroleum sector’s awareness of environmental
issues, and this despite the stated preference of some authorities for economic growth
rather than environmental protection. Environmental issues constitute a subject on
which diverse viewpoints are tolerated. Environmental debates thus serve as channels
for expressing many opinions to which the Chinese leadership is sensitive. On repeated
occasions, the close ties between the oil industry and the Chinese political leadership
have obliged the industry to react promptly to the complaints and outrage expressed
by public opinion, affected residents, the authorities, party members and the media.
Be it in a Chinese or Western company, accidents deeply affect the pride and careers
of its engineers, and a company’s reputation is a key factor in attracting the best
young talents (young professionals, often aware of environmental issues, now have a
choice in the extremely competitive labour market). The Chinese petroleum sector
is one of the industries with the longest-standing tradition for self-regulation through
industrial standard-setting , and the tightening of environmental measures has come
about mostly at the companies’ own initiatives. It is also the most heavily regulated
industrial sector. As oil companies have to operate where the resources are located,
they are used to multiple and repeated negotiations with a large diversity of actors in
and around the industry. In recent years, the national oil companies have progressively
increased their foreign investments, originally at their own initiative and later officially
encouraged by the government’s “going-out” policy. When venturing abroad, oil firms
have had to adapt themselves to the prevailing regulations in the host countries in
order to gain and maintain access to the international market and overseas investment
opportunities. In the following chapters, we will attempt to gain a better understanding
of these learning and adaptation processes.
1.5. Conclusion 
In China, the demand for state environmental rules of the game has generally been
met, spurred by a combination of internal and external factors (a surge in environ-
mental degradation with the related economic and health costs, complaints from
the public and party members, and the market constraints faced overseas as a result
of the “going-out” policy). However, the key environmental indicators show that
overall enforcement of government measures is still lagging.
The complex organisation of environmental regulation has some broad characteristics.
At State Council level, the idea of combining harmonious development with the pre-
servation of the environment remains difficult to put into practice in daily decision-
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making. The MEP has yet to find its place among the better-resourced and more
experienced ministries, which have not always taken on board the environmental
dimension as a core concern for their decision-making criteria and procedures. The
State plays a preponderant role in setting and implementing environmental rules;
their regulation and implementation is mainly carried out by diverse state entities
operating in a certain disorder. Frequently, the same entity not only issues the rule, but
is also in charge of implementing , enforcing and monitoring it. Strong and independent
oversight mechanisms are still few and far between. Non-state countervailing power
mechanisms are still embryonic in the area of environmental regulation, which often
relies on the participation of multiple stakeholders. Although national productive
sectors enjoy a growing autonomy vis-à-vis the State, it still has very close-knit ties
with the state administrations. Despite this, a growing adhesion to voluntary standards
is playing an increasingly positive role in Chinese enterprises. The countervailing power
of the small private sector and NGOs is as yet nascent and their role in the environ-
mental governance model is still not clear. Official and unofficial media are providing
more decisive checks and balances through their influence on public opinion, the Party
and the functioning of the State.
Many of these broad issues are also affecting the Chinese petroleum sector. Confronted
with a sharp rise in energy demand driven by strong economic growth over the last
three decades, China’s petroleum industry has expanded both domestically and
internationally. This expansion has posed severe environmental challenges both in
China and in the rest of the world. Nevertheless, in the Chinese petroleum industry,
the gap between the increasingly complex environmental rules and their enforcement
is narrowing. Firstly, because the oil sector is the industry with the longest-standing
tradition of self-regulation in China. Although deeply embedded in the executive
branch, the national oil  companies have also to meet demands from multiple
stakeholders (public or private partnerships, local communities, markets and even
from company staff asking for better safety conditions). Thus, despite its traditional
command-and-control approach to regulation, the Chinese petroleum industry, as a
social laboratory, is paradoxically consolidating its experience in multi-stakeholder
participation. This seems to be confirmed by CNPC’s first steps in Sudan and Chad,
two contexts that have strongly challenged the company’s capacity to learn and
adapt. Part 2 will look at how these challenges have been addressed.
Part One
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2. The legacy of the 
Exxon-Doba project: 
petroleum-related 
environmental regulations 
in Chad prior 
to CNPC’s arrival 
Géraud MAGRIN, Gilbert MAOUNDONODJI and Antoine DOUDJIDINGAO
2.1. Introduction
Even prior to the arrival of CNPC, Chad was no stranger to environmental regulatory
laws and petroleum development projects. In 2000, a watershed year, the Doba oil
fields exploration project, undertaken by an Exxon-led consortium and supported by
the World Bank, led to the country becoming the largest recipient of private invest-
ment in Africa. The Bank’s involvement had a catalysing effect upon the country’s legal
and institutional regulatory framework for the environment. This framework was
gradually established following the country’s independence in 1960, but had been
encountering numerous difficulties in its enforcement. Doba's legacy therefore forms a
key element in the environmental landscape in which the Rônier oilfield project emerged.
The Doba project has given rise to a great deal of debate, attracting considerable media
attention at the national and international level. Environmental issues form an important
part of the discussions surrounding it. The Doba project stands out because of its
particular location and context, and the identity of the various players involved.
The project started in the mid-1990s at a time of great turmoil: for Africa during this
turbulent period, which coincided with the end of the geopolitical gains of the Cold
War,[ 50 ] economic and political difficulties struck at the heart of structural adjustment
[ 5 0 ] This expression refers to the financial backing that African regimes received from one camp or the other 
in exchange for their allegiance.
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programmes and the onset of democratisation, and provided a fertile ground for the
escalation of all identity-related conflicts (Magrin, 2010). Over the preceding decade,
liberal reforms relating to mining and petroleum codes were promoted by the World
Bank, acting within the scope of structural adjustment programmes and with a view to
attracting investments (Campbell, 2009). Exxon looked to the World Bank for support
in undertaking the project, which was perceived as risky on account of Chad’s long
history of political instability since its independence. The World Bank in turn embraced
the petroleum project as an opportunity to respond to its critics – the first ever
petroleum project with the stated mission of poverty alleviation and sustainable
development (Magrin, 2001; Donner, 2003) through the introduction of numerous
measures that were entirely new for Africa. Construction of the infrastructure began in
October and stretched over three years (Magrin 2003), with start-up of production
in October 2003. In 2005-2006, the Chad government challenged certain provisions
that it thought too constraining , thus triggering an open crisis with the Bank and the
Bank’s withdrawal from the project. From 2006 to 2008, the coalescence of internal
factors and the spread of the Darfur crisis brought about a political and military
crisis, and petroleum money was mainly used to procure weapons (Behrends, 2008;
International Crisis Group – ICG, 2009). The doom-mongers were quick to claim
victory, declaring that the Chadian model had failed miserably (Pegg , 2009).
In order to understand the history of the petroleum legacy that CNPC will have to
deal with, it is essential to examine the environment-related regulatory changes that
have occurred in Chad in recent decades, especially the manner in which the country’s
“rules of the game” have been framed and implemented in the wake of the Doba
project. The project aimed to create an exemplary environmental programme and
governance (Magrin, 2003; Maoundonodji, 2009). Have the Doba environmental
regulations been slowly and steadily whittled down in the course of a decade (2000-
2010), following the slump of the mining sector (van Vliet, 1998; Magrin and van Vliet,
2009), thereby substantiating the views of the proponents of the thesis that “natural
resources are a curse” (Rosser, 2006)? Or on the contrary, can a change be discerned
in the direction taken by the Chadian environmental regulatory system and will the
Doba project’s inherent strength produce a ripple effect on future projects, including
the CNPC project (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007; van Vliet and Magrin, 2009)?
The pessimistic approach subscribes to the “resource curse” thesis, whereby rents
derived from natural resources inevitably produce many negative effects. Many
authors consider that the resulting dysfunctions are likely to occur in the three areas:
macroeconomy, governance and conflict (Rosser, 2006). And to these three we shall
add the environment. The negative impact on the environment tends to worsen with
Part Two
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time. In fact, according to van Vliet (1998), environmental regulations weaken as the
mining cycle advances: infrastructure ages and the company no longer has the incentive
to take mitigating or corrective measures to counter its environmental impacts (it no
longer needs to rely on acceptance by the local milieu as is the case at the start of
the project; the investment has paid off, etc.).
However, huge petroleum projects such as the Doba project have been able to move
away from the already laid-out path of the “curse”. New directions emerge at specific
moments when the key players opt for choices with potentially durable consequences
(Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007). The choice of a given option can open up a new path,
until the next opportunity for bifurcation occurs (ibid.). Van Vliet et al., (2009) have
claimed that such changes in direction can be attributed to the contradictory  demands
for regulation made by the petroleum industry on the Mauritanian and Chadian govern-
ment authorities and on other stakeholders. 
We shall therefore attempt to examine the following hypotheses:
l The setting-up of the petroleum industry has hastened the establishment of
an environmental regulatory framework in Chad.
l Tensions in the petroleum sector have not eased despite high levels of regulation.
l The withdrawal of the World Bank has not led to a break-down of the envi-
ronmental regulatory system inherited from the Doba project.
l Despite the difficulties surrounding this “model project”, Doba constitutes an
essential part of Chad's collective experience and has left its mark on the
CNPC project.
In this study, we have used all the literature available on the Doba project, from its
inception (Magrin, 2001; Magrin, 2003; Petry and Bambe, 2005) through to more recent
times (Maoundonodji, 2009; Pegg , 2009; Magrin, 2009; ICG, 2010). We have also
consulted the monitoring reports of organisations such as the International Advisory
Group (IAG) (see in particular IAG, 2009), the External Compliance Monitoring Group
(ECMG) and GRAMPTC. Apart from these bibliographical sources, interviews were
conducted by the research team in summer 2010 at N'Djamena and the petroleum
site with the Exxon executives from the Health, Safety and Environment depart-
ment , [ 51 ] current and former officials of the Comité Technique National de Suivi et de
Contrôle (CTNSC – the National Committee for Technical Environmental Monitoring
Part Two
[ 5 1 ] In this case, Mr Théophile Pinabeï, Mr Essaïe Rockoulyo and Mr Moustapha Daoud.
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and Supervision),[ 52 ] members of Chadian civil society such as CPPN (Commission
Permanente Pétrole Nationale – National Standing Committe on Oil) the CPPL
(Commission Permanente Pétrole Locale – Local Standing Committee on Oil [ 53 ] ),
GRAMPTC, BELACD Doba and Oxfam, as well as inhabitants of Béro and Ngalaba,
which are villages located at the heart of the Doba project zone.
This chapter is divided into three parts that follow the chronology of environmental
regulations in Chad and its first petroleum development project. We shall start with a
brief presentation [ 54 ] of environmental regulatory issues prior to the advent of the
petroleum era, the slow institutional growth of this regulation and the  difficulties
that came in the way of its implementation. We shall then show the importance of
environmental issues in the implementation of the Doba project (1996-2004), by
presenting the main protagonists and their interests and analysing the project’s exem-
plary measures and the improvements brought about by continuous, informed debate.
Lastly, we shall examine the changes in environmental regulation since the dispute
between the Chadian government and the World Bank (2005-2010), by analysing the
consequences of the fall-out with the Bank over environmental regulation, Exxon’s
practices and their effects on the social situation in the oil project area, as well as the
behaviour of various actors with regard to the development of the oil sector. 
2 . 2 . Issues and limitations of environmental regulations 
in Chad prior to the petroleum era 
2.2.1. Environmental crisis factors in the Sahel region
The challenges of environmental regulation in Chad are indicative of a situation com-
mon to all the countries lying in the Sahel-Sudan region. This area comprises some of
the poorest countries in the world. With a very high demographic growth, the vast
majority of people live in rural areas despite the rapid growth of large urban hubs .[ 55 ]
Agriculture, animal husbandry and fishing , in variable proportions, constitute the
livelihoods of the rural poor, who are dependent on the meager natural resources
provided by a semi-arid climate. After two decades of drought (1970-1980) ,[ 56 ] the
effects of global warming pose a further threat to these resources. 
Part Two
[ 5 2 ] Mr Mahamat Bechir, currently the executive secretary, and Mr Ismaël Moctar, who had been the site supervisor
for many years. 
[ 5 3 ] Based in Moundou.
[ 5 4 ] For further details, refer to Chapter 4 of the study that formed the basis of this book (Doudjidingao, 2010).
[ 5 5 ] According to the 2009 census, Chad’s rate of urbanisation is 22%.
[ 5 6 ] Refer to Toupet, 1992 and Raynault, 1997.
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Since 2000 onwards, the rural population has been exposed to increased rainfall
variations and it is not currently possible to foresee any changes in rainfall patterns
in the region over the coming years. This leads to specific problems that undermine
the environment’s productive potential, exacerbating tensions between communities
and causing biodiversity erosion. Demographic growth and extensive-farming practices
(sustained by the crisis in state agricultural assistance programmes [ 57 ] ) have led to
forest clearances and a decline in forest cover. Increased pressure on resources (hunting,
fishing , animal husbandry and agriculture) has depleted wildlife and fish stocks. The
on-going desertification (i.e. degradation of land into arid zones due to unsustainable
agricultural practices) affects both the land (erosion, salt accumulation in soil, loss in
fertility) and the vegetation (depletion in quantitative and qualitative terms). Moreover,
the urban explosion in a context of poverty worsens environmental problems:
forest trees are hacked down by charcoal burners as timber is the primary source of
energy while wastewater management and disposal in sprawling , new urban areas is
problematic. In general, pressure on resources gives rise to tensions between different
activities and groups, and these tensions are likely to degenerate into conflicts. For
instance, irrigated agriculture practiced in the large valleys is at odds with the receding
flood farming systems or animal husbandry practices (cf. Raison and Magrin, 2009).
Thus, earlier environmental regulations were aimed at protecting natural resources
under pressure, as there were no major industrial stakes at the time. 
2.2.2. Gradual establishment of a regulatory framework in response 
to regional crises and international practices 
Regional crises and growing international concern for environmental issues has led to the
gradual development of the Chadian legal and institutional systems for environmental
management. Chad is one of the “cradles” of environmental awareness and provided
the setting for the first great ecological novel, Les racines du ciel. [ 58 ] In the 1960s,
however, the need for economic development overshadowed environmental concerns.
Continuing the systems set up in the colonial era, the early laws focused on the creation
of public land, through Laws Nos. 23, 24 and 25 of 22 July 1967, which were respectively
entitled “Status of State lands”, “Land ownership and customary land ownership
Part Two
[ 5 7 ] The Government has largely abandoned rural areas since the structural adjustment programme of the 1980s 
(end of subsidies, decrease of technical support), with the result that extensive farming remains the most 
suitable option for farmers to deal with climatic and economic risks.
[ 5 8 ] “Les racines du ciel” (translated in English as “The Roots of Heaven”), a novel by Romain Gary (awarded the Prix 
Goncourt in 1956), describes the quest to save elephants undertaken by a slightly unconventional Frenchman 
living in south-eastern Chad, fighting against poachers and the indifference of the colonial authorities (more 
concerned by other priorities). The country’s independence struggle provides the novel's background.
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regime” and “Restriction of land rights”. The rules for implementing these laws have
explicit environmental implications, such as Decree No. 14/63 of 28 March 1963
regulating hunting and ensuring wildlife protection and the maintenance of natural
parks and reserves.
The droughts that struck in the 1970s and 1980s provided the necessary impetus for
action. Chad joined the Comité inter-États de lutte contre la sécheresse au Sahel (CILSS
– Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel). The Chadian
government reaffirmed its commitment to promulgate laws and create the necessary
institutions, ensuring economic planning along with environmental protection, by issuing
a manifesto on 14 August 1976. In 1989, a Master Plan to combat desertification
(Smake, 1994) was adopted, serving as an international framework for the optimal
and ecologically rational utilisation of natural resources.
The emergence of environmental protection as an issue of international interest, as
evidenced at the Earth Summit held at Rio in 1992, consolidated ecological awareness
and the importance of these issues in Chadian institutions. An Environmental Ministry
and a National High Committee on the Environment were established in Chad three
months after the conclusion of the summit. The 1993 Sovereign National Conference
proposed the setting up of an institutional framework for environmental protection.
Article 48 of the 1996 Constitution, Chad's supreme body of law, lays special emphasis
on environmental protection. A National Agency for implementation of the environ-
mental policy was also set up.
The law defining the general principles of environmental protection (Law No. 014/
PR/98 of 17 August 1998) forms part of this process. The adoption of this law was likely
hastened by more concrete prospects of oil exploitation.The law was supplemented
by a Water Code in 1999. The process of issuing decrees for the implementation of
Law No. 14 slowed down in the following years, as only two decrees relating to petro-
leum matters were published in 2010. 
At the same time, Chad became a member of various international conventions
dedicated to environmental issues: the African Convention on the Conservation of
Nature and Natural Resources (1968), the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES, 1973), the Ramsar Convention
on Wetland Areas (1975), the Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory
Species of Wild Animals (CMS), the Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
Layer, various conventions on the control of hazardous wastes, the Convention on
Biological Diversity (1992), the Climate Change Convention (1992), the Convention
to Combat Desertification (1994), etc.
Part Two
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2.2.3. Difficulties in implementing regulations compounded 
by Chad’s instability
As is the case of all other countries in the Sahel region, enforcing environmental
regulations is difficult; in the case of Chad, the problems are further compounded by
specific factors linked to the country’s troubled history. 
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, in almost all African countries in the
Sudan-Sahel region, the enforcement of environmental regulation has been torn
between two frames of reference, two sources of legitimacy: customary laws and
the legislation of a modern State. Customary laws define the relationship of the local
population to its livelihood resources (land, water, vegetation and animals); they are
based on the initial agreement between the first inhabitants and the local chthonic
forces which granted them customary rights (but never exclusive individual property
rights) and the power to grant similar rights to other newcomers. However, the enfor-
cement of these laws was weakened due to the downgrading of the political institu-
tions which upheld them and the demographic movement of populations towards
resource-rich areas. In destination areas, various migrant groups, all competing for access
to resources, turned towards different customary laws that were seldom compatible.
The absence of a referral authority acceptable to all led to the use of force as a means
of conflict resolution. The laws adopted by the modern State, during the colonial
period and after independence, are at odds with customary laws, which they seek to
replace . [ 59 ] From the very start, administrative measures for environmental protection
(regulations controlling hunting and cutting down of vegetation, creation of protected
areas, etc.) were perceived by rural inhabitants as decisions taken by an unknown and
far-removed authority, hence barely legitimate.
The difficulty of enforcing modern environmental regulations also stemmed from
the means used, which further weakened the legitimacy of the rules in the eyes of rural
populations. The colonial-era policy of environmental coercion, which was also pursued
by the newly independent States throughout the 1960s and 1970s, was as much a
legacy of the French paramilitary Water and Forest administration as a result of
insufficient supervisory manpower. In the 1980s and 1990s, the structural adjust-
ment programmes curbed the States’ regulatory capacities. Thereafter, widespread
corruption also undermined the effective implementation of environmental measures
(Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, 2001).
Part Two
[ 5 9 ] Customary laws sometimes also focus on specific issues, such as land. Everywhere, land ownership lies with the 
State, which has an eminent right over land. Only urban areas and some other zones and private properties 
have to be registered. Land access and management in the rest of the country remains governed by customary law.
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Lastly, in most countries in the Sahel-Sudan region, decentralisation has transferred
authority to local elected bodies, responsible for managing natural resources. This
reform has led to an increase in the number of actors involved in environmental
regulation. Moreover, environmental regulation, whether in terms of the framing of laws
or their enforcement, has been further complicated due to the uncertainty surrounding
the roles assigned to “traditional” authorities, i.e. local elects at different levels in local
authorities and decentralised government departments. The decentralisation process is
provided for by Chad’s 1996 Constitution; however, the country’s successive periods
of political turmoil as well as the government’s ever-changing political priorities have
delayed the process. 
In Chad as elsewhere, environmental regulation has to contend with overlapping
laws emanating from various authorities and overlapping interventions by those in
charge of their enforcement. The government’s weakness thus undermines its role
as a legitimate arbitrator.
Moreover, the government is vulnerable to the erratic policies pursued by inter-
national funding agencies. In view of the structural adjustment programmes and
the heightened international interest in environmental issues, Chad’s environmental
regulation programme is closely dependent upon aid and assistance schemes funded
by external funding agencies. The main funding agencies have been the European
Union and the World Bank – the former financed a Regional Gas Programme in the
1980s while the World Bank supported the creation of a National Domestic Energy
Strategy in the 1990s and 2000s. These programmes were plagued by various problems,
partly attributable to the usual limits of aid programmes (duration of projects, chan-
ging priorities, lack of harmonisation between funding agencies, etc.) and partly due
to the specific local conditions in Chad. 
The conditions specific to Chad are relate to the country’s history, which is marked by
several armed struggles. Whenever conflicts erupt, there is a slackening in the enfor-
cement of regulations: weapons and soldiers abound, national parks turn into traps
for wildlife (which becomes easy prey for poachers), massive population displacement
and the influx of refugees put pressure on resources (especially plant resources), as
was the case recently during the Eastern Chad and Darfur crisis (Bégin-Favre, 2008).
This troubled history is marked by acts of corruption, coercion and violence perpetra-
ted by government officials on rural populations. This not only leads to an escalation
of sectarian tensions, but also a situation where groups that feel close to power
openly disregard laws (customary or modern state laws) in order to gain access to
land or pastoral resources, especially in the southern (Magrin, 2001) and eastern
Part Two
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regions (Bégin-Favre, 2008). Lastly, the slow decentralisation process in Chad has not
made it possible to test – as in other Sahelian countries – the support  mechanisms
in place for decentralised management of the territory and its resources. 
In conclusion, out of the three forms of environmental regulation – command (creation
of protected areas), control (monitoring of villagers by Water and Forest authorities)
and communication (participatory and decentralised natural resources management) –
Chad has maily experienced the first two. This situation can largely be attributed to
the heavy burden of a coercive colonial legacy, marked by post-colonial violence. Even
before the advent of the petroleum era, the complexity of environmental challenges
was already proving too much for regulatory mechanisms. The juxtaposing of “modern”
environmental regulatory systems with “customary” systems left a void which became
a dumping ground for unresolved issues. Pressure on resources, the weakness of the
government and armed conflicts further worsened the situation. 
2.3. The environment in the implementation 
of a “model project” (1996-2004)
2.3.1. Implementation of the project: 
expectations and involvement of actors 
The long-thwarted history of Chad’s oil industry and the players involved partly
explain the importance of the Doba project in popular imagination and the expec-
tations it aroused. They have been the backcloth for environmental regulation of the oil
sector over the past fifteen years. 
Oil exploration started in Chad in the 1950s. The first significant discoveries were
made in 1973 by the American company, CONOCO, in the Doba Basin but the country’s
repeated political upheavals put a brake on any exploitation of its oil deposits. The fall
of President Tombalbaye in 1975, the civil war from 1979 to 1982 and the overthrow
of Hissein Habré by Idriss Déby in 1990 prevented successive, and mainly American,
consortiums from benefiting from the discovery (Maoundonodji, 2009:243-250).
Oil and the dreams of wealth it inspired thus found a singular echo in the collective
imagination of the Chadian people at the time the World Bank-supported project
was taking shape. In fact, the popular imaginary of development as embodied by
this international institution became intertwined with the imaginary surrounding
oil and Exxon (the key resource of the twentieth century's global economic system,
exploited by the world’s leading company and cornerstone of American superpower).
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Expectations soared after thirty long years of waiting followed by three years of site
construction and an announced thirty-year production period.
The project thus owes its originality to the Bank’s involvement and the resulting
interplay of its various actors. After the initial meetings in 1993, Exxon put forward a
request for co-financing to the Bank in 1994. It was acting on behalf of a consortium
then comprising Exxon, Shell (40% each) and Elf (20%) (Maoundonodji, 2009:255).
From 1996 to 2000, when the project was taking shape, a debate arose between its
promoters and its detractors (Magrin, 2001; Magrin, 2003; Petry and Bambe, 2005). 
The project involved developing 300 oil wells [ 60 ] in the savannahs of Chad’s southern
region, near Doba ,[ 61 ] with production (225,000 barrels per day maximum) to be
exported for thirty years through a 1,070 km pipeline stretching to Kribi on the
Cameroon coast. 
Although the project’s main proponents foregrounded its exemplary nature, they
were in fact pursuing different and potentially contradictory objectives. Thus, the Chad
government presented the petroleum era to its citizens as a way out of poverty and
destitution; oil represented a unique opportunity for this poor country to benefit from
substantial resources, and could possibly even enable the government to recover its
autonomy and escape dependency on structural adjustment programmes. 
For the World Bank, the project offered the opportunity to improve its image following
the backlash it had faced over the disappointing results of the structural adjustment
programmes. It was thus willing to take a gamble: use a petroleum development
project in one of the world’s poorest and most unstable countries to further the
goals of fighting poverty and promoting sustainable development. By implementing
the appropriate support measures and setting up a favourable regulatory frame-
work (macroeconomic and environmental), the Chadian State could be redeemed
despite itself. 
For Exxon, it was not simply a matter of economic profitability or the prospect of
consolidating and diversifying its position in the Gulf of Guinea. The project also
provided a learning experience in a difficult geopolitical context,[ 62 ] – the project
Part Two
[ 6 0 ] The use of a base located in Komé led to a heated debate. It housed various facilities – a detailed description 
is given in the EIA (refer, for instance, to Exxon 1999a).
[ 6 1 ] The Komé, Miandoum and Bolobo fields are actually located 30 kilometres or so to the south-west of Doba 
city, the administrative capital of Eastern Logone. The project is often referred to by the name of the closest 
regional capital.
[ 6 2 ] Exxon is the main operator in Equatorial Guinea; oil production soared at the end of the 1990s.
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provided a learning experience in the midst of a difficult geopolitical situation ,[ 63 ] all
more interesting as it was being run under the “umbrella” of the World Bank. The
Bank’s participation was not in fact crucial from a financial viewpoint since its loans
amounted to less than 10% of the project’s cost; more importantly, it guaranteed
the investment by mediating between the operator and a Chadian socio-political
system viewed as unpredictable. [ 64 ]
The main opponents to the Chad petroleum project were mainly from civil society.
International organisations were quick to warn against the dangers of repeating the
Nigeria crisis, presented as the absolute anti-model. The Niger Delta stood as the
archetype of the “resource curse”: at the local level, the fact that the local population
did not benefit from any of the activities in the area and that their environmental
resource bases were destroyed by diverse forms of pollution had led to extreme
violence, so much so that the situation had become ungovernable. (see, for example,
Watts, 2004). The profiles of the protagonists in the Chadian debate (NGOs such as
Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, etc.) played a major role in focusing the debates
on environmental risks. On the other hand, Chad’s civil society mainly highlighted the
political and governance aspects, denouncing the risks of strengthening a dictatorial
and corrupt regime. 
The World Bank's presence made the debate even more heated: by acting as an
indispensable guarantor for Exxon and by virtue of its position as a major player in
development policies in Africa and elsewhere – the 1990s being a high point – the
Bank was a “red flag” for international civil society. The oil-related context seems to
have exacerbated relations of aid-based dependency, in which the asymmetry of
the relationship does not prevent the dominated party from having some degree of
autonomy or actively pursuing outward-looking strategies (Bayart, 2006). The World
Bank’s commitment in June 2000 gave the signal for the implementation of the project. 
Part Two
[ 6 3 ] Up to the mid-1990s, Exxon had not undertaken this type of project (in Least Developed Countries in conflict). 
Its projects were mainly in the United States, the Middle East and offshore oilfields.
[ 6 4 ] The Bank loaned the necessary amounts to the Chad and Cameroon governments so that they could become
shareholders in the companies operating the oil pipeline, Chad Oil Transportation Company (TOTCO) and 
Cameroon Oil Transportation Company (COTCO).
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2.3.2. Clearer ground rules at the national level
Oil project timelines and the fact that the project was spurred on by the World
Bank impelled Chad to modernise and clarify the regime of national environmental
regulation. Two main changes involved the adoption of a general law stipulating
environmental protection principles,  on the one hand, and the updating of the
petroleum code, on the other.
Petroleum activities and the 1998 Environmental Protection Law
The adoption of a law defining the general environmental protection principles
(Law No. 014/PR/98 dated 17 August 1998) helped pave the way for Chad’s entry into
the petroleum era.
The main purpose of this August 1998 Law is to “lay down the principles for the
sustainable management of the environment and its protection against all forms of
degradation so as to safeguard and develop natural resources and improve the
living conditions of the people”. The law incorporates a version of a provision in the
national Constitution that acknowledges everyone’s “right to a safe environment”
(Art. 47). Hence, several constitutional provisions (Art. 48 to 52) make it obligatory
for the State, decentralised local authorities and citizens to protect the environment.
The entire gamut of measures recommended is rooted in three fundamental principles:
“the polluter pays”, “prevention” and “precaution”.
The measures inspired by the principle of prevention primarily involve the prior
authorisation system, particularly prior authorisations or declarations of activities
(Art. 45, 46 and 72, Law No.14/98). [ 65 ] To strengthen these measures, lists of hazardous
substances (Art. 69, Law No .14/98) and lists of animal or plant species requiring special
protection were drawn up (Art. 25, Law No.14/98). Two essential aspects of prevention
concern the obligation for operating companies to undertake EIAs at their cost before
authorisation is granted (Art. 80; Law No. 14/98) and to prepare contingency plans
(emergency and intervention plans). The EIA contents have to include at least (i) a precise
description of the project, (ii) its objectives and justifications, (iii) justifications for the
choice of the site, (iv) the description of its initial state with existing environmental
data, (v) the identification and assessment of possible impacts and, finally, (vi) emergency
measures to be implemented in case of an accident and the recommended compen-
sations recommended (Art. 84, Law No.14/98). 
Part Two
[ 6 5 ] For details, see Maoundonodji (2010).
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The curative measures, which drew inspiration from the “polluter pays" principle,
seek to correct and/or contain damage to the environment. Consequently, “without
prejudice to the application of criminal sanctions…,[ 66 ] the authorities responsible for
the environment may require the restoration of the environment wherever possible
from any perpetrator of an offence resulting in its degradation” (Art. 101, Law No.14/98).
In the same way, the environment’s restoration is charged to any operator “practicing
an activity that may lead to the degradation of the environment, even if it is not the
result of a violation of the stipulations in the present law and its application texts”
(Art. 101, Law No.14/98).
Furthermore, incentives are also offered. For example, the law recommends envi-
ronmental education, initial and continuing training “at all levels so as to give rise to
responsible behavior as far as the environment at the service of sustainable development
is concerned” (Art. 9, Law No.14/98).
The provisions of the 1998 Law No. 14 have been extended by an entire gamut of other
texts that also govern the petroleum sector. Consequently, Law No. 011/PR/95 of 25
July 1995 on the “mining code” includes environmental provisions some of which
are applicable to petroleum companies. The law specifies that the holder of a mining
rights or the beneficiary of an authorisation by virtue of the mining code must use
techniques that allow for the effective protection and management of the environment
(Art. 66, para. 1 and 2, Law No. 11/95). The opening up of quarries and the extraction
of material for the construction of petroleum infrastructure clearly enters into its
scope of application. This is also true for Law No.14-60 of 2 November 1960, which
seeks to protect monuments and archeological sites, Law No. 014/PR/95 of 13 July
1995 pertaining to the “Protection of Plants”, Law No. 016/PR/99 of 18 August 1999 on
the “Water Code” and Law No. 014/PR/2008 on the “Forest, Fauna and Halieutic
Resources Regime”. These different laws are supplemented by implementing texts.
Chad is also party to regional and international legal instruments mentioned above,
pertaining to environmental protection, which supplement national environmental
laws .[ 67 ] Although they are not all formally incorporated in the legal system, they
complement or strengthen the national legislation applicable to the petroleum indus-
try in the environmental sphere.
Part Two
[ 6 6 ] Although dating back to the early independence years, the 9 June 1967 Criminal Code punishes damage to 
the environment. It stipulates that “whosoever deliberately pollutes aquatic environments by pouring toxic 
products likely to destroy fish or other animals or facilitate their capture shall be punished” (Art. 346, Law 
No.14/98). 
[ 67 ] For more information, see Maoundonodji (2010) and the summary of environmental regulatory texts in Chad, 
given in the annex of the study coordinated by van Vliet and Magrin (2010). 
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Finally, an examination of the law defining the general environmental protection
principles has shown that a number of implementing texts (about twenty) are required
to make the legal arsenal operational. More than ten years after this law’s adoption and
promulgation, only two implementing decrees have been published. The first has to do
with the regulation of environmental degradation and pollution (Decree No. 904 of 6
August 2009), while the second pertains to EIA regulation (Decree No. 630 of 4 August
2010). They were published after the implementation of the Doba project, but also
after the signing of agreements between the Chadian government and the China
National Petroleum Corporation International (CNPCIC) for the Rônier project (see
Part 4).
The slow maturing of the Petroleum Code
The Petroleum Code also underwent major modifications in two stages that corres-
pond to the advancement of the two petroleum projects successively implemented
in Chad (Doba-Exxon in 1997, Rônier-CNPCIC in 2007). 
In Chad, over a period of four decades,  it  was Ordinance No. 7/PC-TP-MH of
3 February 1962 that regulated hydrocarbon exploration, production and pipeline
transportation, thereby establishing the tax regime for such activities. The ordinance,
with its implementing decree of 10 May 1967, constitutes the Petroleum Code. Within
the framework of the Doba project, the Consortium managed to have this Petroleum
Code modified through Law No. 04/PR/97 of 23 July 1997. The different exploitation
and production permits and the first agreements signed with petroleum companies
nonetheless continued to be governed by the 1967 Petroleum Code. These were the
1988 and 2004 agreements on hydrocarbon exploration, production and pipeline
transportation concluded with the Consortium (Exxon, Chevron and Petronas), as
well as the 1999 agreement with the Cliveden Petroleum Ltd Consortium and the
OPIC/Africa and Republic of Chad Consortium, taken over by CNPCIC in 2006-2007.
In February 2007, Law No. 006/PR/07 pertaining to hydrocarbons repealed the
1962 Ordinance and made significant innovations. The main purpose of the new law
was to define the legal and fiscal system for the prospecting , exploration, production,
pipeline transportation, hydrocarbon processing , marketing , storage, refining and
distribution of petroleum products, as well as the works and installations needed to
undertake all these activities on the territory of the Republic of Chad. New environ-
mental rules were also defined.
Thus, it was made mandatory for any petroleum contract holder to protect the
environment in accordance with the precautionary method (Art. 10, 21) during all
petroleum cycle phases.
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During the prospecting phase, the permit holder must send an EIA, as defined in the
present law and in accordance with the legislation in force in Chad (Art. 26.4, Law
No.06/07), within six months of obtaining the said permit for approval to the
Ministry of Hydrocarbons and the Ministry of Environment. If the contracting party
does not comply with the terms of the present law, the Ministry of Hydrocarbons
may withdraw its permit (Art. 28.1, Law No. 06/07).
When exploration is conclusive, i.e. an oilfield that has been discovered can be com-
mercially exploited and the permit holder wishes to move on to the production
phase, the application for a production permit must be supported by a detailed
development plan, including , in particular,  an EIA along with an Environment
Management Plan (EMP) and emergency plans as defined by Law No. 014/PR/98 of 17
August 1998, as well as possible mitigation, compensation and re-installation measures,
and a prior approval from the Ministry of Environment (Art. 29.4, Law No. 06/07).
The production permit may be renewed for an additional duration of ten years,
provided that the contracting party fulfils all its obligations – particularly financial,
technical and environmental – in accordance with the present law, the petroleum
contract and the Chadian legislation in force (Art. 31.2, Law No.06/07).
In addition, the authorisation for related pipeline transportation and construction is
subject to obtaining an agreement from the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry
of Petroleum. The application for a construction permit must include the EIA, the
EMP and emergency plans, among other items. Consequently, the permit holder
must comply with environmental laws, in line with the precautionary principle, so as
to prevent the risks and dangers associated with hydrocarbon spillage (Art. 32.3, Law
No.06/07). Although the pipeline operator may have to allow for the transportation
of a third party’s production, authorisation requires compliance by compliance by
such third parties with the usual environmental and socio-economic conditions (Art
34.1, Law No.06/07). These provisions are especially significant since they concern
the  prospect of a connection between CNPCIC wells and the Chad-Cameroon oil
pipeline (see Part 4).
The environmental protection requirements are an integral part of the contracting
party’s and its sub-contractors’ obligations. The operator must repair, at its own costs,
any damage to the wells, property or environment caused while carrying out its
petroleum activities (Art. 52.2, Law No.06/07). In the absence of applicable specific
regulations, it has to act at all times in accordance with the precautionary principle
and criteria of sound practices recognised in the petroleum industry (Art. 52.3, Law
No.06/07). It is bound to restore upturned surfaces or abandoned production sites
Part Two
93
©AFD / November 2012 / The environmental challenges facing a Chinese oil company in Chad
to their original state so that there is no short- or long-term adverse effect on the safety
of third parties, the environment and resources (Art. 52.4, Law No. 06/07).
Consequently, Chad’s legislative and regulatory framework for environmental protec-
tion was gradually clarified during the first phase of its petroleum adventure, from the
period preceding the implementation of the Doba project (late 1990s) until the years
following the World Bank’s withdrawal (2008-2010). The regulations and institutions
set up alongside the Doba project and, even more importantly, the people who were
trained and the discussions held undoubtedly contributed to this overall evolution.
2.3.3. The arrangements put in place by the World Bank
The exemplary nature of the Doba project lies in the regulatory framework set up
under the aegis of the World Bank and applicable to all areas of governance and
environment (which will be our focus here [ 68 ] ). The conditionalities included in the
1999 loan agreement between the World Bank and Chad underline two main aspects:
governance and the environment (Maoundonodji, 2009:255), which were to be accom-
panied by different measures. For governance, the flagship measure was the 1999
Petroleum Revenue Management Law (Law No. 001/PR/99), which sets the framework
for the utilisation of oil rents using a pre-defined distribution mechanism benefitting
poverty elimination priorities. It has been abundantly described and commented upon
in the literature (Massuyeau and Dorbeau-Falchier, 2005; Maoundonodji, 2009:291).
In the area of the environment, the World Bank required the Chadian Parliament to vote
in a law tailored to the new context as a precondition for its intervention – Law No.14/
PR/98 of 17 August 1998 on general environmental protection principles. However, this
law was little more than a first step towards setting up a modernised legal framework,
firstly because was incomplete (for instance, no provision was made for accidental
spillage of hydrocarbons [ 69 ] ) and also because the related implementing decrees were
only published as of 2009. Thus, the loan agreement that endorsed the World Bank’s
investment provided a number of additional measures in the environmental field.
The 29 March 2001 loan agreement between the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (IBRD), on behalf of the World Bank Group, and the Republic of Chad
clearly specifies the norms and standards applicable to the project (see Maoundonodji,
Part Two
[ 6 8 ] We have limited our references to the mechanism set up in Chad, as the situation in Cameroon has hardly any 
influence on the Rônier project.
[ 6 9 ] Interview with Alyom Djerambete, former Director of the Fonds d’action concerté d’initiatives locales (FACIL –
Local Initiatives Social Fund). 
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2009:288; and Maoundonodji, 2010): the technical norms are those applicable to
US industry ; [ 70 ] the standards related to the environment, human rights, resettlement
and cultural heritage are those of the World Bank Group. A whole raft of international
texts were also applicable: the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Waste and their Disposal, provisions of the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (Marpol 73/78) and those of
the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (Solas) published by the
International Maritime Organisation. The EIA specifies all the rules to be followed in the
area of health, safety and the environment, referred to as the Operations Integrity
Management System (OIMS). Although developed independently by Exxon, the OIMS
used complies with the 1996 ISO 14001 standards on environmental management
(Exxon, 1999a).
Compliance with these norms was an integral part of Chad’s and Exxon’s commitments
vis-à-vis the World Bank. Classified as Category “A” in the World Bank Group's
project nomenclature, the Doba petroleum project required that an EIA and EMP
be done beforehand. The Operational Directive (OD) 4.01 specified that “where
applicable, EAs should address [issues] which are subject to the bank’s policies and
guidelines”, particularly issues related to the disclosure of information, the protection of
cultural property and the environment, and the resettlement and compensation of
population groups affected by projects funded by the World Bank (Maoundonodji,
2009). The EMP stipulated the application of impact mitigation measures so as to avoid
adverse impacts or bring them down to acceptable levels. It contained information
on environmental management as well as on the organisation responsible for envi-
ronmental surveillance and the responsibilities of participants in the project, including
the Chadian government. It recommended a whole series of measures concerning
atmospheric emission control, waste and dangerous substances management, manage-
ment of cultural sites, accident prevention, etc. Monitoring and control measures also
contributed to the project’s originality. In the sphere of governance, the Collège de
contrôle et de surveillance des revenus pétroliers (CCSRP – Petroleum Revenue
Oversight and Control Committe), in which Chad's civil society was duly represented,
was responsible for verifying that the use of petroleum funds complied with the 1999
Law No. 001.
In the environmental field, alongside the ICG's activities, a three-pronged mechanism
was set up: the operator had its own monitoring system, Exxon Environmental
Part Two
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Institute (ANSI), the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), the American Petroleum Institute (API) and 
the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM). 
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Management Plan (EMP), whose functioning has been described in Moynihan et al.,
2004. The World Bank supported the creation of an inter-ministerial body responsible
for monitoring the project’s environmental aspects on behalf of the Chadian State:
the CTNSC. Between 2000 and 2007, it comprised twenty-one persons, including
twelve at executive level. Finally, the ECMG carried out external monitoring specific
to environmental issues. Appointed by the International Finance Corporation (IFC),
one of the World Bank’s subsidiaries involved in the project, it undertook one to two
visits per year to verify the compliance of practices with the EMP’s specifications.
An IAG was set up by the World Bank in 2001 to carry out bi-annual follow-up missions
to oversee the entire project. This was a group of independent experts consisting
of five members. It was given the mandate to supervise implementation of the
Chad-Cameroon project and to advise the lending bodies, the host governments
and the World Bank on any possible problems. Its mission covered capacity building ,
environmental monitoring , regional and local development, management of the oil
revenue and good governance. The IAG reported directly to the World Bank
Chairman. It was funded by the World Bank and European lending bodies
(Maoundonodji, 2009). At the end of its term in June 2009, the ICG had produced
about twenty field mission reports.
Finally, the World Bank set up supporting measures. Two loans by the International
Development Association (IDA) to Chad helped fund a project to manage the
petroleum economy and a petroleum sector management capacity-building project
(Maoundonodji, 2009: 274). The latter made it possible to fund the CTNSC as well
as emergency measures for mitigating the anticipated impact of the petroleum site
– which was likely to create considerable migratory flows towards work site areas, as
well as exert unsustainable pressure on the existing infrastructure and the environment
(Magrin, 2009). The FACIL (Local Initiatives Social Fund) was implemented to address
these issues and obtained mixed results (Magrin, 2003).
2.3.4. Constant debates that sometimes moved the project forward
The debates surrounding the design and then implementation of the project between
1996 and 2003 helped to raise environmental regulation standards and improve impact
compensation measures.
The actions of international NGOs undertaken between late 1997 and early 1998
were intended to block implementation of the project and, above all, prevent it
from receiving IDA funds (Maoundonodji, 2009: 265-266). One such action was the
campaign “Banque mondiale, pompe l'A'fric des compagnies pétrolières” ("World
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Bank, the oil firms’ money pump in Africa”) run by the NGOs, Agir Ici (see Agir Ici,
Survie, 1999) and Les Amis de la Terre. In addition, certain German political circles
that were sensitive to the arguments advanced by the NGOs carried the debate into
the World Bank itself (ibid.).
In Chad, the first few EIA documents to circulate in 1997 were initially unavailable to
the general public. With the help of international civil society organisations from the
home countries of the consortium’s members (US, Europe), Chadian NGOs mobilised
against what was perceived as a lack of documentation. At a seminar held in Donia
in January 1998, national civil society demands were structured around governance and
environmental themes. As a result, certain points in the EIA study and the formulation
of the EMP were reviewed. The debates on the EIA – which lasted over two years –
thus helped to improve the quality of the assessment and facilitated the acceptance
of its final version and its implementation by the stakeholders. In total, the Doba
project's environmental documentation comprises nineteen volumes covering all of
the aspects required by the World Bank Group’s contractual agreement, safety policies
and operational directives (Exxon, 1999a). Six of these volumes specifically relate to
the EMP.
In April 1999, a second major civil society seminar was held in Bébédja. These two
high points of civil society mobilisation helped to set up NGO networks to monitor
petroleum operations, and various specialist organisations. The CPPN networks in
N'Djamena, the CPPL in Moundou, the Réseau de suivi des activités pétrolières (RESAP
– Petroleum activities monitoring network) in Sarh, the Entente des populations de
la zone pétrolière (EPOZOP – Network of Community-based Organisations) in the
oil-producing cantons were all created in this context (Maoundonodji, 2009: 267).
Shortly after, in December 2001, the GRAMPTC (Group for Alternative Research and
Monitoring of the Chad-Cameroon Oil Project) was created in N'Djamena with the
objective of helping civil  society to develop more relevant technical arguments
regarding the impacts of oil-related activities.
The major controversies focused on a limited number of subjects. In Cameroon, the
debate addressed the future of the Pygmies, biodiversity and the coastal fragility of
the Kribi site. In Chad, discussions first focused on governance: the setting up of the
IAG was inseparably linked to the 1997-1998 international civil society campaigns
and, likewise, the composition of the CCSRP was modified following the Bébédja
seminar so as to be more inclusive of civil society. Then, as the start of construction
work drew closer and the initial impacts were felt, demands shifted to environmental
issues: the EIA came under criticism and was subsequently revised.
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Despite all the measures put in place, the construction work led to various tensions in
the petroleum zone (see Magrin, 2003). The local communities and NGOs denounced
inflation, the lack of jobs compared to expectations (and unfair competition from
non-natives or foreigners) and the problems raised by compensation.
Compensation issues crystallised much of the discontent: the neo-traditional chiefs
engaged in corrupt practices, often taking 10% of the amount paid; individual com-
pensation roused jealousies within hitherto egalitarian social structures; and group
compensation was often poorly adapted (the choice of the community facilities was
limited and the quality questionable) and the rates were often unfair. The case of mango
trees is emblematic of what civil society mobilisation was able to achieve: after a trial
of strength with the consortium and an appeal to the World Bank, civil society managed
to have the compensation rates re-assessed for each mango tree felled under the
project, with the amount paid for a mature tree being raised from CFAF 3,000 to
550,000 (Petry and Bambé, 2005:83-87).
The loan agreement provided for a Regional Development Plan (RDP) to respond to
the additional pressure placed on infrastructure and natural resources by the influx
of worksite migrants. Yet, the drafting of the Plan only began after much delay, when
the construction work was almost finished (2003). Furthermore, the methodology
used did not involve civil society, who thus blocked the process. Similarly, despite the
enforcement of stringent Exxon and World Bank standards, a number of non-
compliance cases (with regard to the EMP) on the work site were reported
(GRAMPTC, 2003; GRAMPTC, 2004; also see ECMG or IAG reports).
Of particular note during the 1996-2004 period are the endless debates, which
mainly focussed on environmental issues both before and during the construction
of the oil facilities and which brought about some improvements. Moreover, it can
be seen that the enforcement of strict environmental standards and substantive
supporting measures (FACIL, compensation) gave rise to the usual environmental
impacts, but these were factors that heightened social tensions. The national capacity
building projects (run by the World Bank for the Chadian State and by international
civil society for Chad's civil society) were not up to challenging the persistently high
level of asymmetry between the actors. The situation thus sparked off recurrent
protest movements in the oil zone and social disturbances that would continue into
the following phase of operations.
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2.4. A model tested by time (2005-2010): 
towards a slackening of regulation?
2.4.1. The crisis with the World Bank and environmental regulation
The crisis between the government of Chad and the World Bank modified the
environmental regulatory framework of the Doba project without seriously calling
it into question.
Indeed, at the end of 2005, the government decided to change the 1999 Law No. 001.
A new law was adopted that abolished the Fund for Future Generations, increased
the share of revenue that could be used for the State’s current expenditures and
lengthened the list of priority sectors (particularly security and justice). This change
acted as a catalyst for the tensions simmering between Chad and the World Bank.
After two years of strained relations marked by successive tensions and provisional
agreements,[ 71 ] the crisis was settled in August 2008 with Chad’s early repayment of
the World Bank project loan (for details, see Pegg , 2009).
The environmental monitoring system was the first to bear the brunt of the crisis. In
2006, the Coordination nationale du projet pétrole (CNPP – National Coordination
on the Petroleum Project) was dissolved. This structure had headed all the World
Bank operations that had supported the oil project. The CTNSC, which had been
attached to the CNPP, no longer had any resources to hand. The various ministries had
disapproved of an ad hoc body capturing all environmental monitoring resources, and
thus welcomed the disgrace that fell on this senior-level committee – which moreover
was suspected of being too direct an emanation of the World Bank. Likewise, the
support programmes run by the CTNSC and thus perceived as being under World
Bank influence were blocked, as the Chad government now balked at funding their
operations. This was the case, for example, for FACIL and the RDP, whose activities had
resumed in 2004-2005 but were again interrupted.
The environmental monitoring of oil activities thus remained adrift for a while,
being shared by the Ministry of Petroleum, the Société des hydrocarbures du Chad
(SHT – Chad Hydrocarbons Company) and the Ministry of Environment. Both of
these ministries had responsibilities in the area of environment and/or petroleum,
Part Two
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but no department was specifically in charge of monitoring the oil industry environ-
ment. The ministries were called on to manage situations on a case-by-case basis –
for instance, when the first oil leak occurred in August 2008 (see below). However,
it was clear that the demise of the CTNSC had weakened the Chad government’s
institutional abiliy to address oil-related environmental challenges. In April 2009,
after two years of interruption, the CTNSC was “revived” (SHT, 2009), staffed with
only two executives and based in the Ministry of Environment, as the CNPP and
CTNSC premises were already occupied by the CCSRP and the SHT, a new national
company created in 2006. The new CTNSC was given a very limited budget of CFAF
30 million. It was given the coordinating role of mobilising technicians from different
technical departments in line with the task to be undertaken. A much more ambi-
tious budget in 2011 (a government allocation of CFAF 600 million) seemed to signal
the institution’s return to grace: the implementation of the CNPC-managed Rônier
project most likely made national leaders more aware of the importance of having such
a body. [ 72 ] This signal was confirmed when the funds were effectively mobilised.
The continuity of the project’s external monitoring was partly ensured. The IAG
completed its assigned task – to accompany the project for six years after the com-
missioning of the pipeline – and submitted its final report in June 2009. [ 73 ] However,
the ECMG continued its monitoring work under the terms of the IFC loan granted to
Chadian State to finance its participation in the pipeline’s management company. It thus
remained a thorn in the government’s side given that any notice of non-compliance
would be likely to interrupt the marketing of crude oil.
As far as international civil society was concerned, developments in environmental
monitoring were also ambivalent. The international civil society organisations that
had benefitted most from media coverage now showed waning interest in Doba. At
the same time, the World Bank – which the media had waved as a “red flag” – was
no longer in the picture, and the spotlight had shifted from the Chad project to
other subjects, such as the start-up of production in Ghana at the end of 2010
under a project that was meant to provide a new model of oil governance. However,
some organisations did continue to fund the civil society players engaged in advocacy
or monitoring work in Chad, as for example Oxfam, Swissaid, Cordaid, etc.
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[ 72 ] Interview with Mahamat Bechir, CTNSC’s Executive Secretary, Ndjamena, August 2010. 
[ 73 ] The IAG reports confirm the serious efforts of this body, which had been able to sustain a long-term balanced 
dialogue with all the stakeholders. Regretfully, the website on which all its reports had been uploaded was shut 
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The results obtained by Chad's civil society were also mixed. Although the networks
and organisations monitoring the oil industry had managed to pursue their work
and thus acquired some degree of competence (CPPN, CPPL, GRAMPTC), their
effectiveness in environmental monitoring was curbed by various constraints. Not
only did they enjoy less international support, but some organisations also lost their
independence, if not their credibility, by working for Exxon on farm projects rolled
out as part of the compensation programme. This was the case, for instance, of
Assaild, Africare, World Vision and even the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ). [ 74 ] These organisations were also weakened by the departure
of the World Bank, which they had relied on extensively rather than trying to construct
a dialogue with the State. [ 75 ] Finally, Chad's civil society proved to be much more at ease
dealing with human rights or compensation issues than with environmental monitoring
strictly speaking , as it had neither the specialised technical skills nor the necessary
resources (to undertake countermeasures, among other things).
The crisis between the World Bank and Chad thus altered the landscape of Chad’s
environmental regulation. Thereafter, the State’s monitoring capacities declined
somewhat and the positions of civil society became more fragile. With the delivery
of the social closure certificate to the consortium by ECMG in 2005, the World
Bank’s withdrawal in 2008 and the end of the IAG’s mandate in 2009, external
supervision of the Doba project’s environmental aspects eased off considerably. It
was mainly limited to the ECMG’s activities, which continued on account of the IFC
loan. However, the operator itself – Exxon – seemed to be complying rigorously
with the regulations.
Part Two
[ 74 ] GTZ is not a NGO and its involvement in this type of programme is even more astonishing. 
[ 75 ] Interview with Naji Nelembaye (CPPL, Moundou) and Soumaine Adour (Intermon Oxfam, Ndjamena), August 
2010. 
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2.4.2. The petroleum industry and under-development: 
an uneasy co-existence nonetheless
Part Two
Source: Design: G. Magrin, Production: G. Decroix, based on Exxon data.
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Environmental regulation of the world’s leading company in the face 
of the project’s developments
The bulk of environmental regulation therefore rested on Exxon. The world’s leading
oil company complied with the sector’s best practices as far as ethics and the envi-
ronment were concerned; Exxon's standards are even more demanding than those of
the World Bank and its safety statistics among the best in the petroleum world [ 76 ]
(see also Moynihan et al., 2004). 
Different sources have vouched for the quality of the environmental regulation
implemented for the Doba project. The IAG noted in its final report that the pro-
ject’s main infrastructure construction, which had begun in October 2000, was
completed in July 2003 without any major incidents in terms of serious environ-
mental or social impacts (IAG, 2009). Based on its field trips, the ECMG certified
that all non-compliance situations had been managed in line with the EMP. Based on
this, a completion certificate was issued to the Consortium on 24 October 2009
(ECMG, 2005).
The publication of Exxon’s annual reports on the project provided information on
the effectiveness of the HSE system. The 2009 annual report showed, for instance, the
good results obtained in the field of health thanks to the fight against malaria among
the employees (2002-2009); in the sphere of safety, the incident rate was half the
average for the US petroleum industry (Exxon, 2009a). [ 77 ]
In the area of the application of environmental regulations, Exxon has made signifi-
cant efforts in recent years. Hence, between 2006 and 2009, the monthly number of
non-compliance situations [ 78 ] in relation to the EMP was six times lower as compared
to the number of such cases recorded in 2005 – i.e. down from 4 in 2005 to 0.7 in the
first semester of 2009. According to the operator, this improvement was achieved
despite the fact that the total number of hours worked, used as a measure of the
project’s activities, remained quite high (Exxon, 2009a).
A presentation given by Exxon in 2010 in Moundou to civil society organisations
from southern Chad (see Exxon, 2010) provides a concrete insight into the different
Part Two
[ 76 ] Interview with Scott Miller, Director of Exxon Chad, Ndjamena, June 2010. 
[ 7 7 ] For a more detailed analysis, see Maoundonodji, 2010. 
[ 78 ] A classification of non-compliance situations made it possible to ensure that they were well monitored and that 
appropriate solutions were provided: level 1 (quick alert, no significant impact on an identified resource, but not 
in compliance with EMP); level 2 (immediate action required; could lead to serious impact on an identified 
sensitive resource); level 3 (serious; impact on an identified sensitive resource). 
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approaches of environmental management almost ten years after the project’s start.
Exxon Chad had put in place an improved waste management system, including the
distribution of 3,000-4,000 tonnes per year of used material (wood, metals, etc.) to
the “communities”, [ 79 ] which was one of one of their demands. A watch was kept on
air quality; the asphalting of the main project roads was taken up in response to the
health problems caused by dust. Exxon’s ambition was to limit flaring , which has gone
down significantly since 2008 , [ 80 ] to less than 1 million cubic feet per day. Surface and
ground water were monitored through several test wells and the impact of activities on
the water table seemed to be low. A watch was kept on spillage from valve 3; and
improvement objectives have been proposed for 2011. 
In the socio-economic field, 164 public consultations involved 9,400 participants in
2009. Since the start of the project, individual compensation benefited about
10,000 persons, from 314 villages, for a total amount of CFAF 7.4 billion. Since the
end of construction in 2002, generally only 30-50 villages per year have been invol-
ved. The households that were the most impacted and had to be resettled were
given training in improved farming techniques (156 in 2008; 70 in 2009) or in
other fields and, in nine cases out of ten, their former living standards were re-
established or improved (Exxon, 2010).
As often happens in extractive industries, the project implemented between 2004 and
2010 did not correspond exactly to what had been initially planned. In fact, to maintain
the desired production curve despite unfavourable geological conditions, the
consortium had to deploy a “spoke-and-wheel" network system (Maoundonodji,
2009: 270) connecting Kobé to the satellite oil fields of Moundouli, Nya (2005-2006),
M’Bikou, Belanga and Mangara. It also had to densify the well network in the three main
oil fields of Komé, Miandoum and Bolobo, where the number of wells gradually
went up from 300 to 800.
As each new oil field came on stream, it was accompanied by an update of the EMP.
The project tried to limit land acquisition as much as possible – as of 2005, this remained
more or less stable at a level of 2,500 ha, of which 1,000 was for permanent facilities
and 1,500 for temporary occupation. One thousand hectares have been restored
and returned to the “communities” since 2005 (Exxon, 2010).
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A new compensation approach had to be instituted to deal with the fresh problem
posed by villages located within the oilfields development area, where a significant
portion of the land and households were likely to be impacted. In 2006, an indepen-
dent commission appointed by the World Bank and Exxon issued a report on the
challenges related to new land requirements for the project. A survey conducted in the
15 most affected villages covered 3,000 households and mapped 16,000 fields using
a Geographical Information System (GIS). This provided an embryonic land registry
system for the oil development area.  The survey basically made it possible to show
that farmers were defrauding the compensation system. It revealed that only 12% of
households were affected and 7% were considered to be in major difficulties on the
basis of the EMP standards – according to which each household member had to
have one-third of a hectare – although many of the households could be considered to
be highly vulnerable even before the project.
In response to the survey, the Land Use Mitigation Action Plan (LUMAP) project was
set up in 2007 (see Exxon, 2009b and Environ, 2010). All those who were impacted
by the project and left with less than one-third of a hectare that could be cultivated
were eligible for resettlement. This “land-against-land” compensation did not
exclude payment in cash, but it offered the additional option of resettlement to
those who were eligible, so as to prevent some of them ending up with no land or
resources after having used up their compensation unproductively. Within this
framework, some people were trained in lowland farming practices with the support
of the Africa Rice Center (ARC), the Institut tchadien de recherches agronomiques
pour le développement (ITRAD – Chadian Institute of Agronomic Research for
Development) and the Office national de développement rural (ONDR – National
Office for Rural Development). This marked a revolutionary change in Chad's savannah
regions where, until recently, flood-risk areas were barely developed (Magrin, 2001).
Others received off-farm training if they did not have land and wished to change
occupation. The fifteen most affected villages received a second community compen-
sation, which somewhat gainsays the idea developed in the 2006 study according to
which petroleum activities had no real impact on these villages. However, since the
start of the project, all the measures implemented have seemed ineffectual in the
face of the confusion and distress reigning in the petroleum development area.
Part Two
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Part Two
Rigorous environmental management by the world’s leading company, the multi-level
monitoring system and the dialogue encouraged by the World Bank made it possible
to mitigate the project’s impacts (Photo 3). But these efforts did not prevent recurrent
criticism about technological choices, such as that of flaring production gases (until
2010; Photo 4). Despite accompanying measures, the densification of the network of
oil wells made some local residents' lives more precarious and fostered social malaise
in the production area itself (Photo 5).
1Box The Doba project’s environmental regulations, 
or the limits of the example it set
Photo credit: Géraud Magrin.
3Photo
4Photo
Spreading of molasses to limit dust emissions 
on a village road
(Doba oil zone, June 2004)
Production gas flaring in Komé (May 2005)
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Pending issues and growing distress 
A number of problems have fuelled constant protest in the oil zone despite the measures
implemented. In our view, after ten years of exploration and production, these problems
are indicative of the almost inevitable asymmetries and stark contrasts that arise
when such facilities are set up. They also show what happens when vulnerable societies
come face to face with an ultramodern industry that, in the popular imagination,
embodies immense power and wealth and transforms their environments.
Thus, inflation-led tensions (especially during the construction phase) and those
related to local employment (always insufficient) were compounded by tensions
around corruption (money taken by chiefs or other intermediaries from compensation
payments). Despite the measures taken by Exxon, corruption proved difficult to
eradicate in a context where it was common practice. Compensation payments raised
a host of problems: whether it be in-kind or community compensation, the options
offered were too limited; likewise, the community facilities provided were considered
to be of poor quality and thus barely used. A further difficulty involved how the notion
of land tenure was dealt with by the compensation system. For instance, compensation
Part Two
Photo credit: Géraud Magrin.
5Photo Aerial view of the Komé oil-well network 
(May 2005)
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was based on land use rights as they stood at the time of the survey, which led to
frequent disputes between right-holders and “owners”. [ 81 ] Furthermore, in milieus
characterised by both poverty and egalitarian societal structures, Exxon failed to
train people to manage sums of money as large as the compensation payments,
which meant that some soon had no land or compensation money left. Villagers also
complained about security pressures, as policemen used the risk of theft and sabotage
as an excuse to impose what virtually amounted to a 6 pm curfew in some villages
such as Ngaraba. [ 82 ] Apparently, none of a complaints made were dealt with.
Also, a number of more or less serious cases of non-compliance were observed
(see reports by GRAMPTC 2004 and 2010, IAG and ECMG). These concerned waste
material (cars, computers) that was prized by the villagers yet, much to their annoyance,
buried; sometimes the restoration of land and quarries (death of children and animals);
and oil spills.
The measures taken over ten years bear no comparison, for instance, with those
implemented in the Niger Delta, which has been increasingly scarred by decades of
extremely weak environmental regulation. Yet despite this, all the discussions with
villagers from the oil zone revealed their disappointment and distress. The dreams stir-
red up by the World Bank and Exxon teams were seen as lies: the World Bank’s Vice-
President had allegedly told the affected villagers that they were going to witness
the dawn of a “second America”; [ 83 ] Ellen Brown, the anthropologist in charge of
Exxon’s community relations, did not seemingly keep all her promises concerning
the improved living conditions and facilities that the villages should have enjoyed.
The oil company was involved in endless debates in a situation of extreme asymmetry.
Quite often, the villagers or NGO officials would complain, for instance, about the
reduction in millet yields (ears of millet seemed to be shrinking), which they blamed
on petroleum activities. Could the lower cereal output rationally be blamed on the
project (dust, seismic reasons, electrical fields, change in biodiversity, etc.), or was it
only a consequence of “normal” land depletion, which, as elsewhere in the Sudanese
savannahs, resulted from extensive farming systems in which land saturation linked
to demographic growth forced a shortening of fallow periods? In this case, what
part did land acquisition by the petroleum project play in these land dynamics? The
Part Two
[ 8 1 ] Interview with Moustaphe Daoud and Essaïe Rockoulyo (Exxon), Doba, August 2010. 
[ 82 ] This kind of curfew was not acknowledged by the administrative authorities, but the inhabitants we met 
believed that one was being enforced. 
[ 8 3 ] Interview in the form of a focus group with Ngalaba and Béro villagers, August 2010. 
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absence of expertise outside of Exxon did not help objectify the cases raised, because
neither the State nor the NGOs were in a position to argue with any precision on
this type of issue. 
An assessment of the Doba project’s environmental regulation thus reveals the
operator’s professional practices, with intermittent multi-layer monitoring – because
of the crisis between Chad and the World Bank – , persistent asymmetries and a deep-
seated feeling of distress among the petroleum zone's inhabitants. The impression
gained during a visit to the petroleum zone in 2010 was not too far from the conclusions
of a study conducted at the end of the construction period (Cogels and Koppert,
2004), according to which living conditions were materially better near to the oil
derricks, but the local residents were in disarray.[ 84 ]
2.4.3. Effects of the oil cycle and the potential for changing trajectories
At this point, we will examine the first two or three phases of the Doba project oil
cycle (construction phase; production start-up; mid-way production and oilfield
expansion) through the prism of the mining-cycle model. According to this model
(van Vliet, 1998; Magrin and van Vliet, 2005), as the cycle advances, the propensity
of companies to grant compensation and their willingness to negotiate wanes, whereas
the environmental impact of ageing facilities becomes increasingly visible and the
turnover of operators and sub-contractors causes standards to lower. At the same time,
civil society and local residents become increasingly able to formulate their demands.
The intersection of these two opposite trends creates heightened tensions.
Yet the use of this model runs counter to the dynamic nature of production: Exxon
rightly considered that the strongest impacts would occur during the construction
phase (2000-2003) and would be compensated accordingly. However, the densification
of the oilfields after 2004 and the development of satellite fields prolonged this
construction phase. The question is then whether the LUMAP is to be seen as a sign of
the companies’ initial willingness to compensate those affected? Or, on the contrary,
should the geomatic monitoring methods that were used following LUMAP’s imple-
mentation be interpreted as a signal of closure in step with the progression of the
project cycle?
Part Two
[ 8 4 ] Studies were conducted in villages affected by the construction work and in other non-affected villages, before 
and after the construction period. They reveal that socio-economic indicators were higher in the former, but 
that conflicts, tensions and symptoms of crisis were also more widespread.
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The consortium's subsequent openness to negotiations undoubtedly took different
forms compared to the situation observed at the start of the project. In fact, while
the company emphasised that community consultation was to continue, several
of our interlocutors [ 85 ] deplored the fact that communication was poorer once
the production phase began. The former regular meetings gave way to occasional
meetings associated with specific problems. The waning of international interest
and the World Bank's withdrawal may also perhaps explain why communication was
now directed more towards the “communities” than towards civil society and its
intermediaries within village authorities. Finally, the Interior Ministry’s ban on a work-
shop planned for March 2010 to address the util isation of the 5% of oil royalties
intended for the oil-producing region also seemed to confirm a hardening of the
government’s stance, although purely conjunctural political interpretations are not
to be excluded.
The first hydrocarbon spills were reported in 2008. On 25 August, a spill of 35 bar-
rels was discovered between the villages of Dobara and Béto II, near Thio Pond (SHT,
2008:17).  NGOs criticised the malfunctioning of the surveillance system, which
Exxon had nonetheless vaunted in the initial negotiations as being state-of-the-art.
However, the leak did not occur along the main oil pipeline – indeed equipped with
sensitive detection systems – but from unequipped secondary conduits. The leak
was discovered by village patrol teams recruited by Exxon to monitor the above-
ground pipeline sections. In fact, the guidelines recommended aerial surveys along
with one or two annual inspections. The use of these teams improved surveillance,
as they were able to spot trees with deep roots, land subsidence at vehicle crossing
points or at makeshift quarries dug out by villagers in search of clay, all of which are
anomalies difficult for planes to detect. [ 86 ] This practice, which originated on the
Cameroonian side of the pipeline, employed about a hundred people in Chad and
covered eight to ten pipeline sections. This apparently rudimentary approach in fact
resulted in a higher level of surveillance than that required by the standards. The
occurrence of a leak may have been a sign of ageing equipment, but the manner in
which Exxon responded – setting up an innovative surveillance system, as well as
measures to monitor the polluted valve-3 site – does not seem to indicate a weakening
of environmental regulation.
The progression of the mining cycle has also made it possible to learn many different
lessons in addition to improving the capacity of the residents in the oilfield develop-
Part Two
[ 8 5 ] In particular, the head of the Béro and Nadji Nelembaye canton and CPPL, whom we met in August 2010. 
[ 86 ] Interview with Théophile Pinabeï, Exxon HSE, 23 June 2010. 
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ment area to formulate their demands. Whether at the individual or institutional level,
these lessons influenced the context in which CNPC was set up in Chad. 
Over ten years, Chadian managers have been trained in oil-industry skills, particularly in
the area of environmental regulation. National staff from Encana [ 87 ] – a Canadian
company that had conducted intensive exploration surveys between 2000 and 2006
before selling its stakeholding to CNPC in 2006 – are now sometimes employed by
CNPC as consultants to carry out impact studies, or by its HSE department. In
Exxon, locals have been increasingly appointed to managerial positions particularly
in the area of HSE. At the government level,  although the CTNSC’s institutional
capacities stil l  need reinforcing , the individual experiences acquired therein are
sometimes put to use elsewhere through the services of engineering consulting
firms, some of which, such as ISM Consult, have worked for CNPC (and sometimes
also for Exxon). Likewise, despite the difficulties mentioned above, the major civil society
organisations (CPPN, CPPL and GRAMPTC) have managed to set their monitoring
activities on a long-term footing and consolidate their experiences. The enhanced
dialogue with the State – as shown by field trips jointly conducted by NGOs and
government officials – has demonstrated that, in the absence of the World Bank,
new types of relationships have been forged.
Part Two
[ 87 ] Sometimes initially trained in Exxon at the peak recruitment period during the construction phase. 
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2.5. Conclusion
The Doba project was coincident wit a progressive improvement of the environ-
mental regulation system in Chad. Without any doubt, the presence of the World
Bank has helped (or spurred) the design and implemention of environmental and
social rules of the game for the petroleum sector and beyond. These regulations
were the result of important, substantial and continued debates between the World
Bank, the State, civil society and the consortium, allowing for an improvement of
the quality of the environmental regulations and easing their implementation and
enforcement.
However, we cannot demonstrate that the World Bank-supported project was the
sole catalyst for these developments. They are, in fact, part of a slow and gradual
densification of Chad’s regulatory and institutional framework for environmental
protection, which had begun before the Doba project and continued even after the
crisis between Chadian State and the World Bank. This is evidenced by the adoption
of the new Petroleum Code, the 2007 Hydrocarbon Law and the implementing
decrees for the 1998 Environmental Protection Principles published in 2010.
The crisis of the World Bank system in 2006 affected above all the environmental
monitoring capacities of the two stakeholders that had received most support from
the Bank – the State and, to a lesser degree, civil society. Nonetheless, the crisis seems
to have had little impact on the actual content of environmental regulation, which
still depends for the most part on the operator's (Exxon) own responsibility. In the
longer term, however, this situation is fraught with risk.
In fact, despite all the support and compensation measures implemented, the oil
activities seem to have had a socially disruptive impact on a few most affected cantons.
The rejection of the “oil implant” by some of the region’s residents has again raised the
issue of how legal norms, as enforced by the operator, relate to social norms, which are
a wellspring of legitimacy.
Over and above the crisis with the World Bank, it is around the Doba project that
national individual and institutional capacities have been strengthened in the area of
environmental regulation. Today, these certainly influence the context in which
CNPC project operates.  It is also true to say that the disappointment of the villagers
living in the vicinity of the Doba project has not dampened the expectations of
villagers from Koud Alwa – the closest village to the Rônier project base – who
hope to receive “as much as Doba's villagers”.
Part Two
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3. The Rônier project 
for China and for Chad: 
the challenges of a new 
petroleum adventure
Géraud MAGRIN and Gilbert MAOUNDONODJI
3.1. Introduction
Work on the Rônier and Mimosa oil production sites started up on 1 July 2009 in
Chad’s centre-south region, under the partnership agreement between CNPCIC and
the Chadian government. From the long-run perspective of Africa’s economic history,
the so-called Rônier project is indeed a novel venture. The continent’s integration into
the global economy has been primarily through its export of unprocessed primary
commodities. Whereas the investments that have driven the rapid expansion of oil
exploitation since the 1950s and 1960s initially targeted the export of crude, in a few
cases these have subsequently aimed to develop the use of hydrocarbons for Chad's
national needs. But this type of activity is still limited.
CNPCIC, however, launched its operations in Chad by connecting its oilfields to a
refinery where production is directed at internal markets, both in Chad and regionally.
Nonetheless ,  the Rônier project remains in step with China’s sometimes
controversial investment strategy in Africa, whereby the overarching political thrust to
secure China’s raw materials supply has set bilateral political relations centre stage,
much to the detriment of environmental protection and the interests of national
stakeholders (Alden and Alves, 2009; Munson and Zheng , 2010). Thus, what we will
examine here is whether the Rônier project and the possible outcomes – as perceived
through the prism of its initial construction phase (2009-2011) – present a high level of
risk for the host environment or, on the contrary, whether they are likely to create
a turning point in Chad’s development by providing energy and stimulating industria-
lisation.
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There is as yet no scientific literature or even grey literature on the Rônier project,
apart from one monitoring report (GRAMPTC, 2010). The national press has barely
covered anything other than official work site inauguration ceremonies, while the
international media have totally ignored the subject. This silence is in strong contrast
to the media hype that surrounded the World Bank’s support for the Exxon-Doba
project. In Chad, the rare texts referring to negotiations to guarantee local utilisation
of the energy derived from oil exploitation are about the Doba project: certainly,
since it began and until recent times, gas-flaring in the Komé production fields has
been criticised by NGOs; the government also wished to obtain additional electricity
supply from Komé's power plants [ 88 ] to feed into the national grid (see Petry and
Bambé, 2005). However, when this question is mentioned in the successive IAG reports
(see Part 2), it is clear that satisfying such demands is a difficult issue. Moreover, the
mainstream literature on Chinese investment projects in Africa, particularly in the
extractive sector, presents a rather negative view of their environmental impacts, for
several reasons:
l The strategic dimension of these investments gives them a political dimension
that relegates environmental concerns to second place.
l These investments are made in sectors with a high environmental impact (oil,
mining , energy and related infrastructure) and in the vulnerable national settings
of LDCs with low regulatory capacities.
l Finally, the use of environmental standards that are less stringent than those
followed by Western majors could constitute one of the competitive advantages
of Chinese firms (Bosshard, 2008; Soares de Oliveira, 2008; Alden and Alves,
2009).
In this chapter, two hypotheses will be tested:
l At the local level, the impacts and risks seem manageable, since the milieu does
not have a very high degree of sensitivity (ecologically and geopolitically) and the
foreseen activities produce impacts generally found for this kind of investment.
l The refinery enhances Chad's prospects for economic development.
Part Three
[ 8 8 ] Komé's generators run on gas and crude oil. They are used to operate the oil export system. The use of part 
of the energy produced for regional needs seems technically possible – for instance, one turbine (of the four 
currently installed) could meet almost all the energy needs of the Sudanian zone, which is home to about 45% 
of the country's population. The question of the conditions under which the energy could be transported 
is an underlying problem that needs to be resolved first.
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This chapter brings together information on China, Chad, and the Rônier project
itself. For reference, we thus recall the findings of the general scientific literature on
China's presence in Africa, particularly in the field of hydrocarbons. To this, we have
added information based on a discussion held in June 2010 with Mr Huang Mingyuan,
the Economic and Commercial Counsellor at the Chinese Embassy in Chad. For the
project itself and the challenges it raises for the host areas in Chad, in addition to the
meagre openly available documentation, we have mainly drawn on the SHT Magazine,
the press and the provisional EIA documents accessible to us. 
To begin with, we will describe the geographic setting of the Rônier project in Chad
and the project itself. We will go on to present the stakes involved from China’s and
then Chad’s perspective.
3.2. The Rônier project in context
The Rônier project marks a third phase in the history of oil in Chad, after the period of
missed opportunities (1973-2000) and then the implementation of the Doba project
(since 2000). From an environmental and socio-political standpoint, the areas involved
are moderately sensitive. However, the outlines of the project as we now know them
will undoubtedly change.  
3.2.1. The origins: from the legacy of Encana to the shadow of Doba
In the history of Chad’s oil industry, the oil deposits linked to the Rônier project
were upstaged by the Doba deposits, which were discovered earlier and are more
extensive. Oil exploration in Chad had begun in the 1950s with the Doba, Doséo and
Salamat oil basins and was not extended to the Bongor and Lake Chad Basins until
the 1960s-1970s. Exploratory operations were launched by variously configured and
predominantly American consortiums, initially dominated by CONOCO. The first major
discovery came in 1973 in the Doba Basin. Shortly afterwards, an exploitable but
relatively small deposit was found in Sédigui, close to Rig Rig , about 100 km to the north
of Lake Chad. 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, exploration activities slowed down considerably due to
the civil war (1979-1984) and the ensuing political and military instability. It was the
operations in Doba that spurred the revival of the oil industry in Chad in the second
half of the 1990s (see Part 2). The recent history of the Bongor oilfield really began
with the exploration, development and transportation agreement of 23 February 1999
between Chad and the Cliveden Petroleum Company. Although the oil consortium
underwent occasional restructuring , this agreement underpinned the exploration
Part Three
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surveys conducted during the 2000s in the centre-west of Chad (Lake and Bongor
Basin). [ 89 ] Under this agreement, exploitation rights were granted to Cliveden on
16 March 2001. Cliveden then sold a 50% stake to the Canadian firm, Encana Inter-
national Chad Ltd, on 26 February 2002. In 2003, CNPC entered into a partnership with
Encana. In 2006, it bought out Cliveden’s stake (which owned 50% of the consortium)
and went on to purchase Encana’s shares in December 2006.  On 12 January 2007,
it acquired all of the permit H concession, giving birth to CNPCIC (Maoundonodji,
2009:417; SHT, 2009b).  
Geographically, the areas covered by the said permit H were divided into three zones
(see Map 3): the North (Erdis), Lake Chad, and a somewhat fragmented southern
zone to the north and west of Exxon's Doba concession (Madiago, Bongor to the north;
Western Chari to the west). The zones cover about 22 million hectares.
Along with the Encana permit, CNPCIC inherited the results of the recent exploration
surveys, as well as the information produced within the framework of the EIAs
systematically undertaken by Encana during its exploratory drilling [ 90 ] (see, for instance,
Rémuzat, 2004; ENCANA, 2006). As a result of these processes, the inhabitants in
the affected areas became used to receiving information and compensation. During
the two years of joint work, CNPC was able to familiarise itself with Encana's envi-
ronmental approaches, and also took over most of the latter's HSE personnel in 2007.
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[ 8 9 ] The Erdis Basin, on the Libyan border, also fell under the same permit, but does not seem to have been subject 
to any substantial exploration, undoubtedly due to its distance from the centre of Chad and its high geopolitical 
sensitivity (it is close to the Aouzou strip – the theatre of the Chad-Libya wars in the 1980s).
[ 9 0 ] Which Exxon did not do.
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Source: Petroleum Ministry, Chad (2008).
©Geneviève Decroix, UMR 8586 PRODIG, CNRS.
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3.2.2. Contours of the Rônier project
Rônier is an innovative oil project but comparatively modest in size producing  20,000
to 60,000 barrels a day to supply a small refinery located to the north of N'Djamena
via an oil pipeline about 300 km long.  
The Rônier project  was set up within the framework of a global cooperation agree-
ment between Chad and China, dating back to January 2007, and further defined
in September 2007 with regard to the refinery. Chad, through the SHT, is a 40%
shareholder of the Société de raffinage de N'Djamena (SRN – N'Djamena Refining
Corporation) – established to manage the refinery – with the remaining 60% held
by CNPCIC. It is the latter that provides the entire investment necessary for the
development of the oilfields and the construction of the oil pipeline. The project's
cost is currently estimated at USD 1 billion, of which half is for the construction of
the refinery and the other half for the development of the oilfields and transportation
system. On 18 July 2008, an electricity purchase contract was signed between the
Ministry of Mining and Energy and CNPCIC, then on 4 December, the memorandum
of understanding was signed allowing the SHT entry into the  permit H concession
for the exploration and development of the Bongor basin, and 10% of the consortium's
shares. 
The project thus has three components: [ 91 ] the oilfields, the oil pipeline and the
refinery. The aim, initially, is to develop about 80 oil wells in the Rônier 1, Rônier 4,
Rônier C1 and Mimosa 4 oilfields – close to the village of Koud Alwa, about 20 km
as the crow flies to the south of the small town of Bousso. 
According to Huang Youg Zhang, the CNPCIC Vice President, the Rônier and Mimosa
oilfields can supply 1 mill ion tonnes per year during the first production phase,
but this could rise to about 3 million tonnes per year in the second phase . [ 92 ] The
refinery is designed to process 2.5 million tonnes of crude oil per year. Phase I of the
project [ 93 ] has an annual refining capacity of 1 million tonnes of crude oil. In addition
Part Three
[ 9 1 ] Regarding institutional financing and structures, a distinction must be made between the oilfields and pipeline 
on one hand, managed by CNPCIC from its own funds, and on the other, the refinery, managed by the 
SRN, with Eximbank funding. 
[ 9 2 ] The Republic of Chad's presidential office's website, consulted on 11 November 2010.
[ 9 3 ] The project was presented very plausibly as a development opportunity for Chad. In fact, the refinery was 
intended to facilitate the integration of inexpensive finished goods into the local market, to promote the 
domestic consumption of butane and electricity at tariffs that would make them substitutes for firewood 
(excessive use of firewood was exacerbating desertification), and also to substantially reduce KWh prices. Its 
delivery, planned for June 2011, was to allow Chad to eventually ensure its energy autonomy and possibly 
export finished goods.
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to meeting the refinery's oil energy needs, the autonomous power station (with a
20 megawatt capacity) will supply electricity to the city of N'Djamena. 
In order to do this, an operation centre, pumping and collection stations, a landing
strip, access roads, a permanent living base, provisional camps for the construction
phase, as well as a storage area and a power supply system had to be developed (ISM
Consult, 2009b). Next, the deposits had to be connected to the refinery by a 311 km
oil pipeline running in a south-east/north-west direction, crossing the River Chari and
then following its right bank, which has no major relief features, until it reaches the
flood plains bordering N'Djamena to the north. The pipeline's construction called
for the occupation of 1,000 hectares of land, of which 90% were to be later returned
to their occupants once the works were finished and the oil pipeline buried (ibid.).
The Djermaya refinery [ 94 ] will produce various oil products [ 95 ] to supply an industrial
zone whose size and activities are not yet known. 
3.2.3. The host environment: a Chadian transit zone 
The various components of the Rônier project cover natural and human environments
that are fairly representative of Chad's geographic diversity; they are not however
the most environmentally and socio-politically sensitive areas.  
From the oilfields to the refinery, the project infrastructure crosses four types of
milieu (ISM Consult, 2009a; see Maps 4 and 6 and Photos 6, 7 and 8): the oilfields
are located in the Chari-Logone interfluve, a North Sudanian wooded savannah region
still relatively sparsely populated. The pipeline then crosses the Chari Valley – the
Baguirmi Kingdom's old geopolitical border – which, since the 1970s droughts, has
become a point of convergence for a diversity of populations (farmers and fishermen)
and an area of transhumance for Peul and Arab herders. Biodiversity is relatively rich
around the Chari and its tributaries and streams (fish, hippopotami, birds, etc.). The
route then crosses the forests of western Baguirmi, with vegetation cover gradually
thinning out towards the north. The region’s human settlement is uneven, but overall
moderately populated. Settlement patterns differ and reflect the depth of the aquifer
and the accessibility of water, with clusters of large villages between the Chari's banks
Part Three
[ 9 4 ] Equipped with a central power plant, a public works system, the refinery comprises units for atmospheric 
distillation, heavy oil catalysis, catalytic reforming , hydrofining , gas fractionation, propylene recovery, poly-
propylene production and product purification. 
[ 9 5 ] During the first phase, the refinery is due to produce 700,000 tonnes of gasoline and diesel, 20,000 tonnes 
of kerosene, 25,000 tonnes of polypropylene, 60,000 tonnes of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and 40,000 
tonnes of fuel oil.
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and small scattered hamlets in the areas more to the north. The route taken by the
pipeline avoids most of the larger villages. The dense, sparsely populated forests of
southwest Baguirmi, around the River Bahr Erguig , are still rich in Sahelo-Sudanian
wildlife (antelopes, elephants). More to the north, west of Dourbali, the impact of
N'Djamena can be seen in the degradation of the vegetation cover. Vast acacia (gum
tree) plantations are also found. Finally, to the north of Yarwa Baktaba, the pipeline
approaches a moderately populated floodplain, where clay soils and sparse vegetation
cover favour the cultivation of sorghum (bérbéré) transplants during the dry season.   
Part Three
Source: CNPC.
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In the Chadian setting , the areas traversed by the pipeline seem to be moderately
sensitive from an ecological, socio-economic and political standpoint. There are no
protected areas or extremely vulnerable areas carrying a very high environmental
value, as would be the case for Lake Chad, for instance. The pipeline does however
cross the River Chari, which is a major tributary of the Lake. The Chari valley's water
resources and aquifers mean that many population settlements are downstream
from the pipeline's crossing point (including N'Djamena, the capital, with about one
million inhabitants); any major pollution incident at this point would thus have
considerable consequences. Likewise, the northern floodplains, around the
Djermaya refinery seem relatively vulnerable to pollution, as floods are likely to
transport the various substances contained in possible spills. Finally, the west Baguirmi
forests also harbour a wealth of wildlife, which, although now a pale reflection of what
it used to be (having been greatly damaged by the armed conflicts), is still sufficiently
abundant to pose an environmental management issue for an industrial venture such
as the Rônier project.
The areas concerned by the Rônier project again appear to be moderately fragile
from the point of view of the rural economy. This is dominated by extensive farming
and herding , with fishing along the Chari valley. The vulnerability of the Sahelian
areas to rainfall variability inevitably creates a precarious situation for food security,
depending on the year and social group concerned. Yet, on the whole, thanks to the
fertile soils, the possibility of diversifying sources of income (fishing and market
gardening along the Chari, gum trees to the west of Dourbali, or berbéré in the
floodplain) and the proximity of the urban market in N'Djamena, these areas seem
relatively advantaged compared to the rest of Chad’s Sahelian region.  
Finally, from the geopolitical standpoint, the Rônier project's host area seems more
like a transition zone in which cosmopolitan populations converge than an area of
identity-related tensions – unlike the Doba project's host area, for instance. [ 96 ] The
Rônier project development area has no coherent political identity on the national
scene. At the local level, competition for land resources and the coexistence of
farming and herding do lead to some conflict, but this has so far been fairly well
regulated by the customary authorities. Nevertheless, this does not preclude possible
tensions in connection with the project.  
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[ 9 6 ] Doba's oilfields lie at the heart of one of the areas affected by the "Southern" rebellions of the 1980s-1990s 
(see Magrin, 2001). Ngarledji Yorongar, one of the government’s most vehement political opponents and 
the MP for the small town of Bébédja, located close to the deposits, was often dubbed by the national press 
as "the 301-well MP".  
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6, 7 and 8Photos The Rônier project's host area: 
a Sudano-Sahelian transect 
6 / The Chari riverbanks at the pipeline crossing point
7 / Shrub savannah (Acacia seyal gum trees) close to Yarwa Baktaba
8 / Berbéré floodplain not far from Djermaya
Photo credit: Géraud Magrin
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Prospecting around the Rônier oilfields has familiarised the inhabitants with  petro-
leum-related activities (Photo 9), but a strong asymmetry remains between rural
Sahelian societies and the world's fifth-largest oil company (Photo10). This gap is
all the more visible since civil society in the Rônier project area is still not very well
structured (Photo 11).
2Box Local populations still not very organised regarding
petroleum issues
Photo credit: Géraud Magrin, April 2009.
Photo credit: Géraud Magrin, November 2008.
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Moreover, the project name chosen by Chadian government at the end of 2009
indicates a degree of caution. The choice fell on the name given to most of the first
exploratory oil wells to go on stream (Rônier 1, Rônier 4, Rônier C1… and Mimosa 4), [ 97 ]
and not that of a city or region. The Exxon project had been identified with the closest
administrative centre, Doba. The government seems to have wanted to proceed dif-
ferently in this case and avoid a name like “the Bongor project" or "the Bousso pro-
ject", for instance, which could instigate regionalist claims by inhabitants wishing to
profit from the use of “their" oil.  
In fact, in socio-political terms, the most sensitive areas for the Rônier and Doba
projects are at different points. For Doba, it was the source of oil – in other words,
the oil well zone and the smaller towns close to Doba and Bébédja – that crystallised
tensions. The reason for this is that the oil deposits were situated in a geopolitically
Part Three
Photo credit: Romain Dittgen, July 2010.
11Photo Board of the CROSCAP, one of the main 
organisations in Bousso
[ 97 ] The exploratory wells drilled by Encana all bear the names of Sahelo-Sudanian trees (Baobab, Mimosa, Acacia 
and Ronier palm). In addition, the ronier palm (Borassus aethiopum) is doubtless one of the most emblematic 
trees in the Chari-Logone interfluve, a legacy of the former role this area played in providing refuge along one 
of the edges of the slave-trading Baguirmi Kingdom (see Seignobos, 1989).
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[ 9 8 ] Alarming though still isolated accounts of resource persons native to this area deserve more in-depth inves-
tigation.
sensitive area, which also had high population densities and thus a potentially large
number of people likely to be “impacted" by the project. In the case of Rônier, the
greatest risk of tension lies at the other end of the pipeline in the vicinity of the
Djermaya refinery, and this for several reasons. Not only are the impacts in this area
potentially greater (in terms of land taken over by the project, vehicle movements
and industrial activities), but also Djermaya, a small town on the edge of Greater
N'Djamena’s urban sprawl, has been earmarked as a future economic hub. As a result,
it now seems to have become an arena where actors with considerable political
clout and close to the seats of power are strategically positioning themselves to
seize land opportunities. These strategies may well threaten the residents’ land
rights, particularly those of the “autochthonous” Arabs. [ 9 8 ]
3.3. The Rônier project in China's and CNPC's strategy
The Rônier project evidences the pragmatism governing the implementation of
China's investment strategy in Africa in the natural resources sector.
3.3.1. China's interest in African oil
The Rônier project fits into the pattern of Sino-African relations, which fall into two
main phases.  
Between the 1960s and 1990s when the different African nations’ were fighting for
independence, it was the political dimension that predominated (Alden and Alves,
2009). In the Cold War context, the People's Republic of China first gave its support
to these struggles. Its African policy was then partly influenced by the rivalry with
Taiwan, within the framework of “pocketbook diplomacy", whereby economic support
was the price to be paid for political recognition. The 2000s marked a turning point
characterised by the exceptional economic growth of continental China, which led
it to reconsider its international relations.  Taiwan, now recognised only by a small
number of African States, became a secondary issue in China's African strategy.  
In 2002, China's President Hu Jintao launched the country's “going-out" policy,
which was aimed at encouraging Chinese businesses to invest abroad. The objective
was to put the liquidities accumulated through record exports to good use and to
find employment for available human resources, but also to accelerate learning and,
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finally, to secure the supply of raw materials for national needs. Africa's natural
resources, particularly oil, played an key role in this strategy – although oil still accounted
for only a small part of China's investments in Africa. [ 99 ]
China's oil policy in Africa is marked by its mercantile perspective and by the com-
petitive push to establish a presence in one of the last-remaining playing fields in
the international oil game (Copinschi and Christmas, 2005:30). Until 1994, China was
a net oil exporter. In 2004, it became the world's second largest oil importer (Soares
de Oliveira, 2008:88), and caught up with the United States in 2010. From the end of
the 1990s, the Chinese government has ensured the development of the national oil
companies, which are responsible for the entire oil chain from exploration to distribu-
tion, including production, transportation and processing (see Part 1 and Soares de
Oliveira, 2008:85). China's mercantile approach to the oil sector is grounded in its mis-
trust of markets and market instability (economic and geopolitical). As a safeguard,
China avoids sourcing a large part of its supplies on international markets and pre-
fers to control resources through its own national oil companies. To this end, it has
invested in strong , friendly bilateral relations with oil-producing countries (ibid.:89).  
Access to Africa's oil resources has been achieved through the original strategy of
investing in regions left vacant by the Western majors. From 1995 in Sudan, CNPC
has been the key operator of the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company, in a
consortium with Talisman and Petronas, taking advantage of the embargo that kept
international majors away. Sudan has served as the testing ground for a strategy that
was later implemented in several countries (Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, etc.).
The strategy basically involves signing comprehensive agreements (package deals)
that place oil contracts within a broader cooperation framework that includes aid,
lines of credit and funding for various infrastructure projects such as roads, railways,
ports, stadiums, refineries, etc. (Soares de Oliveira, 2008:96; see also Foster et al., 2009). 
3.3.2. Oil and China in Chad
Today, oil plays a key role in Sino-Chadian relations.  
In 2006, after a period of strained relations, China and Chad restored their diplomatic
ties.[ 100 ] Shortly after, CNPC acquired a stake in the Encana-led consortium, before
going on to purchase all its shares the following year. While consolidating its position
Part Three
[ 9 9 ] Seven per cent, according to Mr Huang Mingyuan, Economic and Commercial Counsellor at the Embassy 
of China in Chad.
[ 1 0 0 ] Chad recognised the People's Republic of China in 1972, then the Republic of China (Taiwan) between 1997 
and 2006.
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in Sudanese oil production, China simultaneously implemented two similar oil
projects in Chad and Niger (see Part 5). This has reinforced its presence in oil-bearing
Central Africa – which seems like a new province – still on a small scale but with
considerable development potential. This contrasts with the Gulf of Guinea where
the first-comers have established strong positions that are hard to challenge (Shell
in Nigeria, Total in Gabon and Congo, Exxon in Equatorial Guinea, etc.).  
In Chad, the Chinese oil project holds a flagship position – with the construction of
a cement factory in Pala – in an overall strategy in line with the model developed in
Sudan and elsewhere offering debt relief, grants and food donations, urban roadway
funding and loans from the China Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) to finance Chad's
participation in the refinery project, as well as a series of cooperation measures in
other fields (biofuels, solar energy, farming , etc.). [ 101 ] This package was estimated to
be worth USD 80 million in 2007 (Reuters, 2007). [ 102 ] In April 2011, discussions were
held between the China Eximbank and the Chad government on the financing of an
international airport in Djermaya close to the refinery and a railway line between North
Cameroon and Sudan crossing through Chad (Xinhuanet, 2011). [ 103 ]
The medium and long-term intentions of China and CPNC in Chad are not formu-
lated in any detail; at least, no mention is made of them in the documents presen-
ting the Rônier project (SHT, 2009a,b,c ), which only give a description of the initial
project phase. Nonetheless, several hypothesis can be made about the project in its
current form: (i) it may be an end in itself or, in other words, a commercial venture
with expectations of profit; (ii) it may be simply a preliminary phase, pending further
developments in the exploitation of Chad’s oil; or (iii) it may also be part of a more
general strategy, in which oil is just one resource among others likely to be of inte-
rest to China, as for example, the uranium from Mayo-Kebbi.[ 104 ]
Although the third possibility cannot be completely excluded, the second seems by
far the most probable today. Certainly, the refinery will not be equipped to process
all of planned production and this could well experience a sudden increase if the
necessary transport infrastructure is built to bring on stream the other oil wells
explored in the Bongor Basin (Mimosa, Baobab, etc.) and nearby basins. The Embassy
of China made itself quite clear: the project is presented as part of a “win-win" logic,
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[ 1 0 1 ] Meeting with Mr Huang Mingyuan, Ndjamena, June 2010.
[ 1 0 2 ] By way of comparison, official development assistance from the traditional Western funding agencies to 
Chad was estimated at CFAF 70 billion annually in 2009, i.e. USD 140 million.
[ 1 0 3 ] The railway line would link up the existing networks between Ngaoundéré (Cameroon) and Nyala (Sudan), 
passing through Moundou, Ndjamena and Abéché.
[ 1 0 4 ] Where exploratory studies have been carried out over a few months by a South African subsidiary of Areva.
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whereby Chad gains the opportunity to reinforce its economic and industrial system
(refinery, industrial zone), while China gains additional resources, which of course
means exporting them.[ 105 ] In the first half of 2010, CNPCIC's senior managers went
to the Doba site several times to visit the facilities. Talks were engaged with Exxon
Chad management with a view to CNPCIC’s acquisition of the (Doba) satellite fields,
Krim Krim and Mangara, which produce around 20,000 barrels a day and are already
linked to the Doba pipeline. An extension could connect the Rônier oilfields to the
Doba pipeline via Krim Krim, in which case only a 50-100 km pipeline would be
necessary (depending on the route selected). CNPCIC would thus have a relatively
inexpensive means of exporting the production from its Chadian oil wells, while
Exxon would be able to amortise its investment more rapidly, as currently only half
of the capacity is being used due to a fall-off in the Doba oil production.[ 106 ] An
eventual connection between the Doba pipeline and the Bongor Basin to allow oil
export had apparently been envisaged by the World Bank and Exxon when the
project was originally sized. The possibility of the Rônier oil wells being operated by a
Chinese company had in fact been mentioned by the New York Times at the time
the Sino-Chadian agreement was signed in January 2007. Apart from the financial terms,
any such connection will mean that agreement must be reached on how the different
systems of norms standards are to converge (see Part 4).  
Chad's oil prospects thus hinge on future discoveries, the possibility of exporting
production, and negotiations between the players in the oil game (Chadian government,
CNPCIC and Exxon). Connecting the Rônier oil wells to the Doba pipeline seems both
highly probable and feasible in a not too distant future. Alternatively, or additionally
(if Chad's production were to increase beyond the Doba pipeline carrying capacity),
the option of a pipeline between Chad and Sudan could also be envisaged. This infra-
structure would facilitate exports to China via Port Sudan but would be rather costly,
since the pipeline would need to cover about 1,400 km to reach the pipelines crossing
Sudan’s Kordofan region. It would also remain contingent on political developments
in Sudan, where the creation of two separate States following the South’s referendum
on self-determination (January 2011) has failed to address all the uncertainties. Further-
more, the chequered history of relations between Sudan and Chad since the 1960s [ 107 ]
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[ 1 0 5 ] Discussion with Mr Huang Mingyuan, Ndjamena, June 2010.
[ 1 0 6 ] This corresponds to the production profile initially planned.  
[ 1 0 7 ] The first major rebel movement in Chad, the Front de libération nationale du Tchad (FROLINAT – Chad 
National Liberation Front), was founded in Sudan in 1965. In 1990, Idriss Déby crossed from Sudan to chase 
Hissein Habré from power. During the 2000s, Chadian rebel movements supported by Khartoum were based 
in Darfur, from where two attacks were launched on Ndjamena in April 2006 and February 2008.
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does not portend well for this route. Lastly, CNPC’s oil project in eastern Niger, in
prolongation of the Lake Chad deposits, seems to open up the possibility of a link to
the southwest (see Part 5). The challenges involved are similar to those in Chad: a small
refinery located 50 km from Zinder will be fed by a pipeline some 300 km long. It will
absorb only part of the production and the surplus will have to be exported. But how?
Through Nigeria? Benin? Chad? The first route would be shorter, but transiting
through Nigeria would raise many problems. The second would be the safest, but
also very long (Zinder is about 1,400 km from the Benin coast). The third route
would potentially be the most cost-effective as the distance to be covered by the
pipeline would be the shortest: 500-600 km as far as Djermaya, then 150-200 km
from the Koud Alwa oilfields to the Doba pipeline. However, this would have major
implications for production rules and would entail dovetailing standards with those
of the Exxon pipeline (see Part 4).
Discussions between Chad and Eximbank for a railway line through Chad to link
Ngaoundéré to Nyala echo the old dreams of using rail to disenclave the Chadian Basin,
which had failed to materialise in the late 1950s (see Sautter, 1958). The economic
underpinnings of such a project remain unclear as it is difficult to see what flows
could ensure the cost-effectiveness of this type of infrastructure. But then it was
perhaps no coincidence that these talks coincided with the negotiations on a possible
connection between the CNPCIC's oilfields and the Chad-Cameroon pipeline:
highly utopian projects to open up this landlocked country often resurface in such
situations, as if their purpose was to bring down bidding prices by showing that
other options (besides the ones being fiercely negotiated) are possible.[ 108]
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[ 1 0 8 ] Previously, during the negotiations between Chad and Cameroon on the Doba project, comparable chains of 
events could be seen – with the press reporting secret talks on a Congolese route as an alternative to the one 
running through Cameroon (Tulipe, 2004).
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Moreover, the option of CNPCIC purchasing the Doba permit along with the related
facilities is not to be excluded in a somewhat nebulous medium-term perspective.
Exxon could indeed decide to withdraw from a project that has more than paid for
itself and made higher-than-expected profits, while the end of the project cycle is
likely to bring environmental management problems. For the CNPCIC, the acquisition
could prove worthwhile both in terms of access to resources and as a technological
learning experience.  
Whatever happens, for informed observers, [ 109 ] CNPCIC today appears as a long-term
oil partner for Chad not only because substantially larger oil reserves are likely to be
developed, but also because the array of support actions implemented matches the
country’s priority needs. 
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[ 1 0 9 ] Meeting with Soumaine Adour, Oxfam, Ndjamena, July 2010.
Design: G. Magrin and R. Dittgen; Production: JF Cuenot.
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3.4. Importance of the Rônier project for Chad
The Rônier project represents important stakes for Chad as it can help to expand
the country’s margin of manoeuvre vis-à-vis its traditional Western partners and to
boost and diversify its economy, while enabling national stakeholders to deepen
their learning experiences.
3.4.1. Greater room for manoeuvre
Geopolitical contingencies have influenced the current situation: the entanglement
of the Sudanese and Chadian politico-military crises in the mid-2000s and Sudan's
backing of Chadian rebellions seem to have been the driving force in the renewal of
diplomatic relations between Chad and the People's Republic of China. In fact, the
good relations between China and Sudan had helped to strengthen Khartoum, which
posed a danger for Chad.[ 110 ] As a result, three months after an armed rebel column
from Sudan had failed to seize power in N'Djamena, Chad renewed its relations with
China (Maoundonodji, 2009:404). This new alliance was all the more important as
Chad's relations with the World Bank and the oil consortium had come under strain
(Pegg , 2009).  
The Rônier project thus has relational implications for Chad: China's presence reinforces
Chad's negotiating positions, be it with Western donors (World Bank among others;
IAG, 2010) or with the Exxon-led consortium. For example, the thrust of the talks on
Exxon’s gas-flaring in Doba seems to have changed in recent months and the practice
of gas flaring has changed. Chad has been making repeated demands with respect to
gas-flaring since operations began and, in recent months, it seems that more gas is
being used to generate electricity, while the volumes burnt have decreased. Yet,
more importantly, the Chinese presence appears to have coincided with greater
openness on this issue on the part the Doba consortium.[ 111 ]
3.4.2. Diversifying the economy with hydrocarbons?
The Rônier project could impact Chad's national economy in two ways: its first phase
could boost development by creating links between the petroleum sector and other
areas of activity, which, ultimately, should also increase the State's oil rent.  
Part Three
[ 1 1 0 ] The issue of the Darfur conflict within this diplomatic rapprochement, and France's role in facilitating it, were
confirmed by Mr Bruno Foucher, Ambassador of France to Chad (meeting in Ndjamena, December 2010).
[ 1 1 1 ] Discussion with a top-ranking official from Chad's Ministry of Mines and Energy, August 2010.
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The energy burden has long been one of the major obstacles blocking Chad’s develop-
ment path. Due to the country’s landlocked position, to the setbacks experienced by
the Nigerian refineries and to the difficulties in managing the energy sector, Chad’s
energy is not only among the costliest in the world but also among the least available
(only four or five cities [ 112 ] have a relatively regular power supply, albeit with very
frequent outages). Occasional interruptions in fuel supplies also disrupt the economy.
The structural energy shortage has a deeply negative impact on productive activities –
on the country's embryonic industrial fabric [ 113 ] as well as its craft industry (see
Magrin, 2001 and 2007). Squeezed by deficits and debt, the Société tchadienne d’eau
et d’électricité (STEE – Chad's Water and Electricity Company) has for years been
unable to make the investments crucially needed to meet the growing energy demands.
Yet, its privatisation has always been avoided, given that it is the seat of highly sensitive
vested interests that could not survive a change in management methods.[ 114 ] Chad's
leaders have long been trying to find a way around this constraint. The idea of building
a refinery to process light oil from a small deposit in the Kanem region (Sédigui) had
thus taken root as far back as the late 1970s (Maoundonodji, 2009:246). At the end
of the 1990s, the Chadian government and the World Bank succeeded in imposing
the idea of coupling the Doba and Sédigui projects. The production in the south
was earmarked for export, while the Sédigui production would go to a small-scale
refinery, to be built in Farcha in N'Djamena's inner suburbs, and feed into the domestic
market. However, when Elf and Shell withdrew from the consortium in 1999, the plan
was compromised: given the government’s fears of seeing the oil dream vanish yet
again (cf. Part 2), the new consortium created shortly after (Exxon-Chevron-Petronas)
found itself in a strong enough position to obtain the separation of the two projects,
and it subsequently abandoned its interest in the Lake oil reserves. The Sédigui project
was then awarded to a Sudanese company, CONCORP, whose senior management
had long-standing ties with various Chadian officials. However, the company had no
experience in the oil sector and the pipeline under construction [ 115] had so many
defects that works had to be abandoned (Tulipe, 2004). The company manager was
Part Three
[ 1 1 2 ] In addition to the capital Ndjamena, Moundou, Sarh and Abéché have also had access to local power grids for 
many years, but their production capacity is far from sufficient given rising demands. Faya Largeau, Bongor and 
Doba have recently been equipped with power plants, but electricity supply there is very rare. The grids are not
interconnected.
[ 1 1 3 ] In particular, the Société tchadienne des textiles (STT – Chadian Textile Company), which operated in Sarh from
the 1970s to the end of the 1990s, fell victim to energy prices, as Nigerian imports were far more competitive 
(Magrin, 2001).
[ 1 1 4 ] In May 2010, the STEE's water and electricity businesses were separated, giving birth to the Société tchadienne 
des eaux (STE – Chadian Water Corporation) and the Société nationale d’électricité (SNE – National Electricity
Company). But this change did not have an immediate effect on the malfunctions of the departments concerned.
[ 1 1 5 ] The non-buried pipes are still visible on the sands of the Tourba Massakory or Ngouri Bol tracks.  
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murdered shortly after. Although the Doba project was implemented within a very
short timeframe, the ambition of producing oil to meet the needs of the domestic
market again seemed out of reach.  
The Rônier project has thus revived the prospect of directly using oil resources [ 116 ]
to further national economic development. The spinoffs from the initial construc-
tion phase were to be limited compared to the spinoffs generated by the construc-
tion of the Doba facilities. In the producing region,[ 117 ] as well as in N'Djamena, the
Doba project had had its strongest direct impact on the national economy during
its initial phase. Yet, these had failed to deter local resentment (from businesses and
job applicants) as the Chadian context was still largely dominated by an informal
economy and low-skilled labour and the consortium had thus had to mobilise mainly
foreign, international or regional skilled human resources (sub-contractors, skilled
personnel; Magrin, 2003). The Rônier project's more modest scale, along with the
partners’ determination (Government of Chad and CNPCIC) to complete it within
a very tight deadline, have thus necessitated recourse to Chinese subcontractors for
the most part. Local job and business opportunities exist, but they are narrow (see
Part 4). Finally, the Djouman-Gam-Rônier road, built for delivery of supplies to the
construction works, will partially open up the areas it traverses, through to the Koud
Alwa oil well zone.  
In this case, the results of production start-up could lead to more positive effects for
the national economy. At the macroeconomic level, the refinery should help to cut
foreign currency spending on product imports and increase energy independence.
To this end, the crude will supply a thermal power plant producing 40 MWh, half of
which is for the refinery's operation and the other half (20 MWh) for the STEE on
terms still to be defined. This will not be enough to resolve the structural problems of
supplying energy to a capital city with current consumption of around 100 MWh,
but will nonetheless serve to ease a saturated electricity grid until longer-term solutions
are found. If the industrial activities based on the refinery are successful, Chad's
economy would be enhanced by a wide range of oil products. The development of
gas should also contribute to the fight against desertification (SHT, 2008) as it can
replace wood or coal consumption in urban areas. Eventually, petroleum products
will hopefully be available on a more regular basis and at more attractive prices than at
present, thus reducing the current dependency on Nigerian imports, which are liable to
Part Three
[ 1 1 6 ] The Doba project provides the State with rent linked to the export of a raw material, which, like any other rent, 
has the disadvantage of being disconnected from the national economy's productive sectors (Magrin and van 
Vliet, 2009).
[ 1 17 ] In a broader sense, as under the terms of the loan agreement with the World Bank, this in fact covers the 
former geographic region of Logone (West and East Logone, Tandjilé and Mandoul regions). 
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disruptions and price variations – and this could promote more stable economic and
environmental policies 
The profile of the activities in the planned industrial zone adjacent to the refinery is
crucially important. Mention has been made of petrochemical activities (manufac-
turing of plastic objects), as well as gas-conditioning units, though no details have been
provided so far. The zone’s development requires in-depth dialogue with national
stakeholders (for example, through the N'Djamena Chamber of Commerce and
Industry) to ensure that the choices made are economically viable and produce the
most beneficial ripple effects for Chadian operators. In Chad, as elsewhere in Africa,
transforming skilled tradespeople into modern industrialists is one of the major
challenges of the development enigma (Grégoire and Labazée, 1993). Moreover, the
setting up of this embryonic industrial zone around the refinery could usefully serve to
explore the ways in which Chad can engage on the path towards the energy transitions
that are likely to occur in the twenty-first century: the oil economy could help the
country escape of supremacy of fossil fuels. International cooperation, whether Chinese
or European, could for example be asked to provide expertise and help set up a solar
panel factory.  
3.4.3. Continuing along the learning path
The Rônier project also gives Chadian actors the opportunity to continue the learning
experiences that first began under the Doba project.  
This involves the public sector, where SHT's institutional and technical capacities need
to be increased, relations with the Ministry of Petroleum clarified and the State's
environmental monitoring functions strengthened, particularly via the CTNSC (see
Part 2). In the upcoming phases of the current Rônier project, the oil rent will increase
due to the export of crude. To what extent remains an unknown. But the challenges
now are to improve governance so as to stave off any adverse effects on institutions
and the economy (Rosser, 2006). With the CCSRP, Chad has shown itself to be a pio-
neer in the field of oil transparency. Certainly, to foster development, transparency
must not only cover upstream functioning , with publication of the amounts paid by
oil companies to the States concerned (a key focus for the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiatives (EITI) and the Publish What You Pay network; [ 118 ] see Magrin
Part Three
[ 1 1 8 ] EITI, launched by the British government in 2003, seeks transparency commitments from States and extractive 
companies, in particular the commitment to disclose the amounts the companies pay to the governments for 
the permits to exploit natural resources. Publish What You Pay is a civil society network that, in each member 
country, federates an NGO coalition around very similar objectives. See http://publishwhatyoupay.org./fr/
about/propos-de-pcqvp.
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and van Vliet, 2009); it must also cover downstream aspects or, in other words, how the
oil rent is distributed and managed by the State. Despite the difficulties encountered
(Pegg , 2009; ICG, 2010), the constant discussions that have taken place in Chad on
this question over the last ten years seem to signal a space for bifurcation (van Vliet
and Magrin, 2009), which could usefully serve as an opportunity to consolidate what
was achieved during the previous period.  
But it also involves the other stakeholders, and notably those from civil society. The
national organisations that have specialised in monitoring oil activities and advocacy
work since the Doba project start-up – mainly GRAMPTC and the CPPN and CPPL
networks – must now learn to evolve in a landscape very different from the one that
existed when they were set up. With the World Bank's withdrawal, international media
coverage of Chad’s oil sector waned and a new balance now needs to be found between
the old forms of advocacy and a deeper dialogue with the State and the oil company.
This will be a difficult but nonetheless crucial task if they are to capitalise on what
has been learnt through the Doba experience, with a view to enhancing governance
– which is the only way of skirting round the pitfalls of the resource curse (Magrin
and van Vliet, 2009).  
In the areas involved in the Rônier project, local civil society has a long road ahead
of it. The local organisations were fewer and less effective than their counterparts in
the Sudanian zone of the Doba project. They also received no support from the
World Bank or, indirectly, from the main international NGOs who were spurred by the
involvement of this major international institution. The national NGOs and networks
that grew out of the Doba experience are helping them to create their own networks,
for example, through the Collectif des réseaux et organisations de la société civile
(Collective of Civil Society Networks and Organisations), which is supporting the
Loug Chari local communities (CROSCAP LC). The issues will be the now standard
ones: defending the interests of local inhabitants and the environment against the
impacts of industrial activities (compensation for loss of land, accidents, pollution, etc.).  
One important question is still unclear: how will the various regional impacts of the
oil activities be compensated? The impacts go beyond those in the areas alongside
the facilities, for which compensation is granted on either an individual basis (com-
pensation in cash or kind for the loss of land, trees, houses, etc.) or a community basis
(small-scale amenities for villages). They typically include phenomena such as inflation,
increased traffic flows that damage roads, lead to accidents and disturb domestic or
wild animals, etc. For Doba, the 1999 Petroleum Revenue Management Law had
resolved this question by allocating 5% of the receipts to the oil-producing region of
Part Three
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East Logone. The representatives of the residents of affected areas (traditional chiefs,
members of parliament, NGOs and sometimes government officials) are demanding a
similar mechanism for the new project. But this raises new problems (ISM, 2009b):
five per cent of what, since the oil will not be exported – at least, not initially? At the
outset, two regions will be involved, [ 119 ] but the expansion of the oil fields and their
possible connection with the Doba export facilities will widen this geographic area to
Tandjilé in East Mayo-Kebbi and to West Logone. The uncertainties hovering over the
decentralisation process [ 120 ] heighten the complexity of this problem. The challenge
is to avoid the kind of negative fallouts seen in the Niger Delta, where the absence
of positive spinoffs at regional level first created strong tensions and then, the remedial
measures taken triggered a territorial fragmentation against a backdrop of a race for
oil rents (Sébille-Lopez, 2009), rendering the national territory ungovernable.  
3.5. Conclusion
The Rônier project reflects the meeting point between two national strategies:
China’s drive to diversify its oil supply sources in Africa, and Chad’s ambition to expand
its partnerships, particularly in the sector that has become central to its economy. The
Rônier project, as currently operated, appears to carry manageable environmental risks:
it is comparatively limited in size and the host environment presents only moderate
levels of ecological, economical and geopolitical vulnerability. Its positive and negative
local impacts are likely to be much weaker than Doba's – because the project, less
publicised by the media, gives rise to fewer hopes and less migration, but it also creates
fewer jobs and business opportunities.  
Once on stream, the Rônier project will supply a small amount of energy to N'Djamena
but, above all, it will encourage a more diversified national economy through the
manufacture of petroleum products. In a second phase, it could support the creation
of a petrochemical sector in the industrial zone planned near the Djermaya refinery
and boost national oil rent, if oil production in the Bongor Basin can be stepped up
by connecting the fields to Doba's export infrastructure.  
Part Three
[ 1 1 9 ] The Chari Baguirmi region hosts the Rônier oilfields and most of the pipeline route; the end of the pipeline 
and the refinery are located in the Hadjer Lamis region. 
[ 1 2 0 ] The 1996 Constitution established Chad as a unitary decentralised republic. Mainly due to the politico-military 
unrest experienced by the country during the 1990s and 2000s, no local elections have as yet been held. Since 
1999, several waves of territorial demarcation have taken place (new departments, sub-prefectures, etc.). 
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For CNPC and Chad alike, this is a second step in the contemporary African petroleum
experience. For both partners, the project carries important stakes, for instance, in
terms of increasing resources (oil for China, financial resources for Chad) but also
strengthening their learning curve. For CNPCIC, this involves capitalising on its Sudanese
experience as well as the Encana or Exxon legacies in order to develop a composite
oil project (combining exports and local processing) that complies with international
standards in the setting of an African LDC. For Chad's government and civil society,
the challenge is to consolidate what was achieved in the previous period with respect
to institutional and financial management, environmental regulation and a dialogue
between civil society and the State.  
The most challenging questions relate to how the refinery and the projects planned
downstream (industrial zone) will be developed. Without a feasibility study, their
economic viability still has to be demonstrated and future environmental risks could
exceed those that already perceptible depending on the type of activities in the
industrial zone, the expansion of the oilfields and the route taken by the pipeline.
The future of these developments and of oil revenue management will depend on
the choices made by the Chadian public authorities. They may choose to deepen
the experiences of dialogue started ten years ago around the Doba project, or else
choose closure and continue to distribute and use the oil rent in ways that do not
drive development (Magrin, 2011). The seeming pragmatism of CNPCIC’s relations
with the host country, especially in the area of environmental regulation, appears to
indicate that the company would be equally satisfied with either option.  
Part Three
144
©AFD / November 2012 / The environmental challenges facing a Chinese oil company in Chad
Bibliography
ALDEN C. and C. ALVES (2009), “China and Africa’s Natural Resources: the Challenges
and Implications for Development and Governance”, SAIIA Occasional Paper, No. 41,
SAIIA, Johannesburg. 
ALDEN C., D. LARGE and R. SOARES DE OLIVEIRA (Eds.) (2008), China Returns to Africa.
A rising Power and a Continent Embrace, Hurst, London. 
BOSSHARD, P. (2008), “China’s Environmental Footprint in Africa", China in Africa Project,
Working Paper, No. 3, South African Institute for International Affairs, Johannesburg.
CHINA PETROLEUM ENGINEERING CO. LTD (2009), Provision of General Engineering Services
for Surface Facilities Development of Ronier and Surroundings OilFields, Bongor Basin,
Permit H, First Stage. Conceptual Design. General Description, CNPCIC, Beijing.
COPINSCHI P. and P. NOËL (2005), « L’Afrique dans la géopolitique mondiale du pétrole »,
Afrique contemporaine, 216, (2005-4), 29-42, De Boeck, Paris. 
ENCANA (2006), “Socio-Economic and Environmental Site Specific Baseline Assessment.
Ronier Exploration Well”,  document NO. :  EHSS SSBA (ENV) TCH, 29 p. ,  Calgary,
N'Djamena.
FOSTER V., W. BUTTERFIELD, C. CHEN and N. PUSHAK (2009), “Building Bridges: China’s
Growing Role as Infrastructure Financier for Sub-Saharan Africa”, Trends and Policy
Options No. 5, World Bank, PPIAF (Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility),
Washington, D.C.
GRAMPTC (2010), Projet pétrole « Rônier » et la raffinerie de Djermaya : préoccupations
environnementales et violations des droits des populations riveraines, Monitoring
Report, 11, May, N'Djamena.
GREGOIRE E. and P. LABAZEE (dir.) (1993), Grands commerçants d’Afrique de l’Ouest.
Logiques et pratiques d’un groupe d’hommes d’affaires contemporains, Karthala-
ORSTOM, Paris.
IAG (2009), Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project, Assessment
Report, Montreal.
145
©AFD / November 2012 / The environmental challenges facing a Chinese oil company in Chad
ICG (2010), « Tchad. La victoire facile d’un État fragile contre les institutions internationales »,
On the African Peacebuilding Agenda, T. Vircoulon, Nairobi.
ISM CONSULT (2009a), Projet Rônier. Étude d’impact environnemental. Rapport no 1.
Ressources naturelles et milieu humain : état des lieux, May 2009 version, CNPC-IC,
N'Djamena.
ISM CONSULT (2009b), Projet Rônier. Étude d’impact environnemental. Rapport n o 2.
Impacts, atténuation, compensation et réinstallation, May 2009 version, CNPC-IC,
N'Djamena.
MAGRIN, G. (2001), Le sud du Tchad en mutation. Des champs de coton aux sirènes de
l’or noir, Sépia-CIRAD, Paris.
MAGRIN, G. (2003), « Les enjeux d’un enrichissement pétrolier en Afrique centrale.
Le cas du Tchad », Mémoires et documents collection of UMR Prodig , Graphigéo,
22, Paris.
MAGRIN, G. (2007), « L’Afrique subsaharienne face aux famines énergétiques », Echogéo,
December 2007-February 2008, http://echogeo.revues.org/index1976.html (accessed
on 10 April 2011).
MAGRIN, G. (2011), Des rentes aux territoires. Contribution pour une géographie
du développement en Afrique, Habilitation à diriger des recherches (géographie),
University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Volume 3 (essay).
MAGRIN, G. and G. VAN VLIET (2009), “The Use of Oil Revenues in Africa" in Governance
of Oil in Africa: Unfinished Business (J. LESOURNE, ed.), Les Études Ifri, Gouvernance
européenne et géopolitique de l'énergie, 6, 103-163, Ifri, Paris. 
MAOUNDONODJI, G. (2009), « Les enjeux géopolitiques et géostratégiques de l’exploita-
tion du pétrole au Tchad », doctoral thesis in political and social sciences, Catholic
University of Leuven.
MUNSON P. and R. ZHENG (2010), “Feeding the Dragon: Managing Chinese Resource
Acquisition in Africa", Research Paper, Partnership for Environmental Law, Vermont
Law School and USAID, Burlington.
PEGG, S. (2009), “Chronicle of a Death Foretold: the Collapse of the Chad-Cameroon
Pipeline Project”, African Affairs, 108(432), 311-320, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Bibliography
146
©AFD / November 2012 / The environmental challenges facing a Chinese oil company in Chad
PETRY M. and N. BAMBE (2005), Le pétrole du Tchad. Rêve ou cauchemar pour les
populations ?, Karthala (Brot für die Welt, Cordaid, Oxfam, Mesereor, Swissaid), Paris. 
REMUZAT, C. (2004), Mission d’appui dans la région du Chari Baguirmi. Identification
des villages à proximité du Lead 6, ENCANA Tchad, JMN Consultant, 39 p., N'Djamena.
ROSSER, A. (2006), “The Political Economy of the Resource Curse: A Literature Survey ",
IDS Working Paper, 268, Centre for the Future State, Brighton.
SAUTTER, G. (1958), Le chemin de fer Bangui-Tchad dans son contexte économique
régional. Étude géographique de l’économie des transports au Tchad et dans le nord
de l’Oubangui, SCECFBT, Bangui, University of Strasbourg.
SEBILLE-LOPEZ, PH. (2009), « Géopolitique des hydrocarbures au Nigeria du plan mon-
dial au plan local : pétrole, gaz, fédéralisme et minorités ethniques dans la région du
Delta du Niger », thesis, Institut français de géopolitique, Paris.
SEIGNOBOS, C. (1989), « Les parades à la razzia dans la zone soudanienne au XIXe siècle :
la domestication de la cueillette » in M. ELDIN, and P. MILLEVILLE (ed.), « Le risque en agri-
culture », collection À travers champs, 353-371, ORSTOM, Paris. 
SHT (2009a), « La STEE sera bientôt connectée à la raffinerie de Djermaya », SHT
magazine, no 2, N'Djamena.
SHT (2009b), « La SHT et la CNPCI constituent un consortium », SHT Magazine, no 2,
N'Djamena.
SHT (2009c), « Le Tchad ouvre son 2e site pétrolier », SHT Magazine, no 3, N'Djamena.
SHT (2008), « Extrait du discours du ministre du Pétrole Mahamat Nasser Hassane »,
SHT Magazine, no 1, N'Djamena.
SOARES DE OLIVEIRA, R. (2008), “Making Sense of Chinese Oil Investment in Africa”,
in C. ALDEN, D. LARGE et R. SOARES DE OLIVEIRA (ed.) China Returns to Africa. A Rising
Power and a Continent Embrace, 83-109, Hurst & Company, London.
TULIPE, S. (2004), « Le bassin tchadien à l’épreuve de l’or noir : réflexions sur la nouvelle
donne pétro-politique en Afrique centrale », Politique africaine, no 94, 59-81, Karthala,
Paris.
Bibliography
147
©AFD / November 2012 / The environmental challenges facing a Chinese oil company in Chad
VLIET (VAN), G. and G. MAGRIN (2009), “Public Steering in the Hydro-Fuel Sector:
Conditions For Trajectory Bifurcation in Chad and Mauritania”, in 21st World Congress
of Political Science, Panel: Oil Governance in the Current Energy Crisis, 12-16 July
2009, Santiago de Chile.
PRESS ARTICLES 
REUTERS (2007), “China Signs Deals Worth $80 Mln with New Ally Chad", 5 January,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/01/05/china-chad-idUSL0557853220070105
XINHUANET (2011), « Le Tchad et Eximbank Chine en discussion sur le financement
de la construction d’un chemin de fer et d’un aéroport », 6 April, 
http://www.chine-informations.com/actualite/le-tchad-et-eximbank-chine-en-
discussion-sur-le-financement-de-la-cons_28866.html 
Bibliography

Pa
rt
Fo
ur

151
©AFD / November 2012 / The environmental challenges facing a Chinese oil company in Chad
4.1. Introduction
The CNPC group was created in 1988 following the restructuring of the Ministry of
Petroleum of the People’s Republic of China. Prior to this reorganisation, there had
been strict guidelines governing how the oil sector’s upstream and downstream
activities as well as the geographies (east or north, China or overseas) were allocated
among the state-owned oil companies. The 1988 reform swept away these rigidities
and introduced the principle of competition between public corporations in order
to boost oil production and meet the rising demands of the national economy.
Against this background, CNPC gradually expanded its oil exploration activities to
include oil refining , technical services and equipment manufacturing. Faced with
declining national production, it also ventured beyond the nation’s frontiers to
engage in global expansion (Jiang and Sinton, 2011), a move backed by the Chinese
government’s “going-out” policy and by preferential access to credit. The company has
thus become China’s leading investor overseas. In 2009, CNPC was ranked fifth among
the world’s top oil companies (CNPC, 2009a). It had set up 81 oil and gas projects across
more than 29 countries worldwide (ibid.), contributing to an external oil production
of 70 million tonnes, equivalent to 37% of China’s crude oil imports in 2009 (ibid.).
In overseas operations, CNPC has gradually established its dominance over the other
two Chinese state-owned companies, the Sinopec Group and the CNOC Group, at
times engaging in direct competition with them (see Liou, 2009). In 2009, the company
accounted for 49% of the country's overseas oil production and 67% of overseas
gas production (CNPC, 2009a; Liang et al., 2010).
4. CNPC’s HSE system 
put to the test in Chad
Yiran LIN, Geert VAN VLIET, Marie-Adeline TAVARES, 
Antoine DOUDJIDINGAO, Fan WANG, Weiyong YANG 
and Gilbert MAOUNDONODJI
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Since 1997, when the first HSE system was designed , [ 121 ] the CNPC has been
constantly revising it to bring it up to international standards (Du, 2005). However, the
rapid expansion of its operations has been marred by a series of accidents, causing
heavy human and material losses and/or environmental disasters (Liang et al., 2010).
These accidents, listed in Box 3 (non-exhaustive list) have tarnished the image of  CNPC,
its subsidiaries and sub-contractor companies.
Part Four
[ 1 2 1 ] The environmental policy of extractive firms is usually formulated in an approach and tools called “HSE" 
(Health, Safety, Environment).
[ 1 2 2 ] Acting within the framework of a joint initiative with the State Forestry Agency and the China Green 
Foundation, CNPC has contributed towards the creation of a Green Carbon Fund, with a capital endowment 
of RMB 300 million (i.e. EUR 31.8 million ), aimed at encouraging protection and reforestation activities.
December 2003: 243 dead following a gas pipeline explosion in Kai County
(Chongqing municipality).
November 2005: Explosion of a petrochemical plant, managed by a CNPC subsidiary
company in Jilin province, that killed 8 people and severely contaminated and polluted
Songhua River and its drinking water, affecting millions of users in China and Russia. 
December 2009: An oil spill from the CNPC oil pipeline at Chishui (Shaanxi province)
polluted the Yellow River.
January 2010: Petrochemical plant explosion near the town of Lanzhou (Gansu province).
July 2010: The explosion of an oil pipeline run by the CNPC near the town of Dalian
(Liaoning province) caused a massive fire and a large oil spill in the Bohai Sea.
September 2010: CNPC oil refinery fire near the town of Fushun (Liaoning province).
3Box Examples of accidents on sites managed
by CNPC or its subsidiaries (2003-2010)
Source: Liang et al., 2010.
These accidents have added to the constant pressure on CNPC, both in China as well
as overseas, especially with regard to HSE issues. In order to restore its image in
China and to ensure the continuation of its exploratory and production operations
worldwide, CNPC has gradually developed an HSE system in-house. In 1997, it adopted
the ISO 14001 standard for environmental management. It also provides many training
opportunities with Western companies or with external HSE consultants as well as
in-house training programmes. It has developed cleaner production procedures,
adopted compensation mechanisms , [ 122 ] demanded higher quality from equipment
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suppliers and, finally, complied with increasingly strict standards (for emissions, waste,
effluents, etc.). In 2007, the group's 217 member companies had obtained ISO 14001
(CNPC, 2009) certification. According to CNPC, the cleaner production approach
prescribed at the national level has led to the development of new equipment and
cleaner drilling procedures; it has promoted stricter compliance with environmental
standards during oil pipeline installation, recycling of refinery effluents and waste
matter, and the reduction of greenhouse gases. In 2008, more than 2,780 cleaner
production sites were successfully completed (CNPC, 2007) and contamination levels
were significantly lowered, especially sulphur dioxide emission levels (CNPC, 2009).
Security guidelines have been put into place. In order to meet with HSE requirements
in the Bohai Sea, CNPC has built an offshore emergency response and rescue centre
for accidents at sea, which includes rescue systems, a fire-fighting plan, and the pre-
vention and handling of oil spills. With regard to health issues, CNPC has adopted
measures to reduce occupational accidents and diseases and improve working
conditions in compliance with the Code of Occupational Disease Prevention. This
strong commitment to set up HSE regulations and systems [ 123 ] leads to the question
of whether these measures are being enforced on the ground. 
Although China’s recent changes in environmental management have been the subject
of numerous published reports, very few of them have focused on oil companies.
Studies specifically dedicated to CNPC and its environmental management strategy
overseas, especially in Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are even rarer. However,
many studies have shed light on the behaviour of multinational Chinese companies
operating overseas (Alden and Davies, 2006), the environmental footprint of Chinese
investments particularly in Africa (Bosshard, 2008), and the specificities of SER
approaches used by Chinese companies (Xu and yang , 2010). In addition, a study on
HSE management in China's petroleum sector (Du, 2005) examines the history and
development of the HSE system used by Chinese oil companies operating in China
and overseas. Another study focusing on CNPC’s HSE management system used in
its operations overseas suggests that an independent management system should
be set up to enable stricter environmental monitoring (Qi, 2007).[ 124 ] The author’s
description of environmental management in CNODC (an overseas subsidiary of CNPC)
is particularly relevant to the present chapter, as Qi shows that the “going-out” policy
has increasingly exposed Chinese companies to the norms and standards of their host
Part Four
[ 1 2 3 ] CNPCInt/CNODC, meeting with the engineers Tian Wenhui and Zhao Qihzhi, Beijing , May 2010.
[ 1 2 4 ] Mr Qi Jinli has been the vice-manager of CNODC’s HSE department since 2003. The report cited was 
written during the course of his Masters studies at UIBE in Beijing. He has (co)authored many articles on 
HSE management in oil companies in China. 
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countries (ibid). Ever since the petroleum sector opened up to foreign investments,
CNPC has forged ties with Western oil companies. It has operated both as the lead
company and associate partner in consortia and acted as a services and goods
subcontractor or a user of third-party-managed petroleum infrastructure, as is likely
to be the case with the Exxon pipeline project in Chad.  
CNPC’s Chad operations centre on the permit H, [ 125 ] for which it has been the sole
operator since it acquired the stakes of the Canadian group, Encana, on 12 January
2007. The permit covers geographically scattered basins, such as the Bongor Basin,
which come under the Rônier project (Reuters, 2007). In July 2009, CNPC started
the three-year construction phase for the petroleum infrastructure, which includes
three types of facilities: production facilities on the four oilfields (Rônier 1, Rônier 4,
Rônier C 1 and Mimosa 4), a 311 km pipeline and a refinery at Djermaya (a village 40
km north of N'Djamena).
In 2010, 100 wells were drilled. The Djouman-Gam-Rônier road built by CNPC is
used to carry supplies to the oilfield sites and intended to partly open up isolated
project areas. Surface engineering work at Rônier and on the pipeline was started in
July 2009 (CNPC, 2009b). Horizontal drilling operations underneath the Chari River
were carried out in December 2009 (CNPC, 2009c). Pumping and transport to the
refinery began in June 2011. 
The project’s initial financial arrangements have implications for enviromental regulation.
Under the Chinese cooperation programme, the refinery was to be built through a
joint venture between CNPC (60%) and SHT (40%), with the SHT contribution to be
funded through an Eximbank loan. In the case of the Rônier oilfields and pipeline,
CNPC was the sole investor. The influence of environmental conditions linked to the
Eximbank loan would be worth examining.
The production outlook forecasts a surplus of crude oil compared to the refining
capacity. The surplus would thus be exported, raising the question of the various trans-
port options (see Part 3). The different options need to be fully weighed (the most
likely option being transport via the Exxon-managed pipeline) as the choices made
will have a decisive influence on the choice of reference environmental standards.
In fact, on its arrival in Chad, CNPC had to deal with with various expectations regarding
environmental management. The company had not only to comply with Chinese envi-
Part Four
[ 1 2 5 ] This permit covers a surface area of 220,000 km2 and covers part of the Lake Chad Basin, the Madiago Basin, 
the Bongor Basin, part of the basin bordering the Central African Republic and all of the Salamat Basin.
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ronmental regulations and standards (see Part 1) [ 126 ] but also keep its environmental
management in line with the ISO 14000 international standard. While environmental
regulation is certainly more developed in China than in Chad, Chad had acquired a
singular experience in the oil sector through the Exxon-Doba project. Backed by the
World Bank in its early stages, this project had instituted a series of environmental
procedures and standards – some highly sophisticated, [ 127 ] others pragmatic and
innovative – that were most often enforced and regularly monitored. For Chad, this
project had been a ground-breaking experience (see Part 2).
In this chapter, we will address the following specific questions: what environmental
norms and standards regulate CNPC’s operations in Chad within the Rônier project?
Are these clearly stated and complied with in practice? How are the impacts, notably
cumulative ones, anticipated and dealt with? What are CNPC’s major challenges regar-
ding its interactions with the host environment in Chad and its future interactions
with the Exxon-Doba project?
To answer these questions, the following hypotheses need to be tested:
l The reference standards followed by CNPC for environmental regulation com-
prises norms and standards from diverse sources (China, international level, host
country). 
l Eximbank’s involvement in the co-financing of the “refinery” component helps
to ensure compliance with Chinese regulatory norms on EIA.
l Although present impacts are moderate, cumulative impacts (especially when
future activities are taken into account) may constitute major issues that are
currently underestimated.
l In Chad, CNPC’s lack of capacity to engage in dialogue with stakeholders
from outside the company can be explained by the situation prevailing in its
home country (in China, the State decides on environmental matters), but above
all by the fact that the company’s HSE procedures and technical specifications
do not provide for dialogue. 
Part Four
[ 1 26 ] Environmental Impact Assessment Law of China adopted on 28 October 2002.
[ 1 27 ] Law No. 6/PR/007 of 2 February 2007 relating to hydrocarbons; refer to CEFOD, 2006
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These hypotheses will be examined from several angles, starting with the frame of
reference chosen by CNPC and the Chadian government. We will show the composite
nature of this reference (section 4.2), then review the environmental commitments
made by CNPC and show how these form an integrated HSE system. We will explore
the consequences of the legal grey area created by the reference to the Chinese EIA Law.
We will also try to understand the reasons why the refinery is dealt with separately
from the oilfield and pipeline in the EIA report (section 4.3). The way in which the
first impacts have been managed will be studied (section 4.4), as will the challenges
posed by future cumulative impacts that were inadequately taken into account in initial
EIA reports (section 4.5). The possible access to the Exxon-run Chad-Cameroon
pipeline raises the question of compatibility between the different HSE approaches.
Drawing on a comparative study between the CNPC and Exxon HSE systems, we will
return to the lack of dialogue characteristic of CNPC’s approach. Finally we will com-
pare the Exxon and CNPC HSE systems in order to analyse the challenges raised by
their possible interconnection (section 4.6).
These studies draw upon our knowledge and field experience, a survey of the literature
(more particularly the draft version of the EIA on the pipeline and oilfield, authored
by ISM Consult), discussions and summaries of the work carried out with the stake-
holders of Chad’s petroleum sector, as well as our observations during the field trips
to Doba, Rônier and Djermaya between June and September 2010.
4.2. A composite frame of reference for environmental
standards
The usual practice in petroleum contracts is for signatories to agree on the reference
norms and standards to be applied during project execution, whether these relate
to technical, environmental or other domains.[ 128 ] According to the resource people
we interviewed and the available data,[ 129 ] the contract signed between CNPC, the
Chinese government and the Chadian government stipulates that Chinese legislation
and industrial standards will serve as the frame of reference for the technical and
environmental norms and standards. Following the overall presentation in Part 1 of
how environmental regulation developed in China, Part 4 will give a more detailed
description of the reference norms and standards applicable to CNPC (irrespective
of whether they have been issued by the State or by production-related entities). 
Part Four
[ 1 2 8 ] For instance, relating to social or fiscal matters, which are not dealt with here.
[ 1 2 9 ] The terms of the contract were not disclosed to the public.
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In China, environmental norms and standards are produced by various administrations
or industrial conglomerates, after validation by the government. [ 130 ] They involve cross-
sector governmental standards, sector-specific standards and standards regulating
technical or environmental aspects. Their scope may be national, regional and even
provincial or municipal. Industrial norms and standards are set by the state-owned
oil companies themselves. They can cover the quality of materials and products,
production methods and procedures (for instance, cleaner production) and all areas
of HSE management, which is our focus here. 
At the national level, the state standardisation administration (SAC) issues a set of
standards, termed Guo Biao (GB) , [ 131 ] which are technical standards applicable country-
wide. Emission standards are part of GB standards. In the 1980s , [ 132 ] emission standards
were issued specifically for the petroleum industry. However during the 1990s, these
standards were replaced by overall emission standards. These set integrated emission
limits on pollutants industry-wide [ 133 ] or by sector. Until now, no new emission standards
specifically intended for the petroleum industry have been issued. The SAC issued ISO
standard equivalents for HSE management systems. For instance, the GB/T 24001
standard on “Environmental management systems – Requirements with guidance
for use”, published in 2004, is the Chinese equivalent of ISO standard 14001-2004
(SAC, 2004).
The SEPA, and then the MEP which replaced it, also issue technical standards called
Huan Jing (HJ). [ 134 ] For example, EIA’s technical guidelines (HJ/T2.1-2.3-1993; HJ/
T2.4-1995 HJ/T19-1997) and EIA’s technical guideline for construction projects (HJ/
T169-2004) were issued (SEPA, 2004) in order to implement the EIA Law of the People’s
Republic of China (2002) and the Regulation on the Environmental Management of
Construction Projects (State Council, 1998). Two of these standards are specifically
intended for the petroleum industry: the HJ/T89-2003 standard and the HJ/T 349-
Part Four
[ 1 3 0 ] The difference sometimes evoked in OECD countries between public and private norms and standards is less 
relevant in China where environmental management remains primarily the responsibility of the government
(see Part 1). This is even more the case in the petroleum sector, where operators belong to public conglomerates.
[ 1 3 1 ] Guo Biao means “national standard”. 
[ 1 3 2 ] The old petroleum emission standards: GB 3 550-1983, “Effluent standard for pollutants from the petroleum 
exploitation industry”; GB 3 551-1983, “Effluent standard for pollutants from petroleum refining industry”; 
GB 4 281-1984, “Effluent standard for pollutants from petroleum and chemical industry”; GB 4914-1985, 
“Effluent standard for oil-bearing waste from offshore petroleum development industry.”
[ 1 3 3 ] Integrated emission standards are: GB 16 297-1996, “Integrated emission standard of air pollutants”; GB 8 978-
1996, “Integrated wastewater discharge standard”.
[ 1 3 4 ] Huan Jing means the “environment”.
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2007 standard provide technical guidelines for EIAs on petrochemical and on-shore oil
exploration and production projects. Table 1 gives a list of environmental standards
for the petroleum industry.
Part Four
1Table Basic environmental standards regulating 
the Chinese petroleum industry (partial list)
PHJ/T 2.1-1993 Technical guidelines for environmental impact assessment: 
General principles
HJ/T 2.2-2008 Technical guidelines for environmental impact assessment: 
Atmospheric Environment
HJ/T 2.3-1993 Technical guidelines for environmental impact assessment: 
Surface water environment
HJ/T 2.4-1995 Technical guidelines for noise impact assessment
GB 16297-1996 Integrated emission standard of air pollutants
GB 8978-1996 Integrated wastewater discharge standard
HJ/T 19-1997 Technical guidelines for environmental impact assessment: 
Ecological environment of nature resource development
HJ/T 125-2003 Cleaner production standard Petroleum refinery industry
HJ/T 89-2003 Technical guidelines for environmental impact assessment: 
Constructional project of petrochemicals
HJ/T 349-2007 Technical guidelines for environmental impact assessment: 
Constructional project of petroleum and natural gas 
development on land
HJ/T 405—2007 Technical guideline for environmental Protection 
in Petroleum Refinery industry project for Check 
and Accept of Completed Construction Project
HJ 443-2008 Cleaner production standard Petroleum refinery industry 
(semi-asphaltic flux)
General
Petroleum
Title in EnglishNo.
Source: Compiled by Lin, Liang, Wang and Yang on the basis of an analysis of standards (China Environmental Standard,
http://www.es.org.cn; MEP, 2009).
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The technical committees for the standardisation of the petroleum and gas sectors
are in charge of establishing Shi You (SY, “oil" in Chinese) standards. Experts belonging
to the three state-owned oil companies (CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC) sit on these
committees. Among the industrial standards for the oil and gas sector, two standards
apply to the environment: the HSE management system and the recommended
practice for environmental protection (cf. Table 2). Standard SY/T 6276-1997 (the
equivalent of ISO CD 14 690: 1996 [ 135 ] ) serves as a reference framework for HSE
management in the sector. The adoption of this standard indicates the commitment to
align Chinese standards with those of large Western companies. Moreover, the NDRC’s
energy bureau has issued several best practice standards to ensure environmental
protection which are based on standards equivalent to those issued by the American
Petroleum Institute (API).
Part Four
[ 1 3 5 ] SY/T 6 276-1997 “Petroleum and natural gas industries – Health, safety and environmental management systems”; 
ISO/CD 14690: 1996 “Petroleum and natural gas industries – Safety and environmental management system”.
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Part Four
2Table Chinese petroleum industry standards 
for the environment (partial list)
SY/T 6276-1997 Petroleum and natural gas industries – eqv. ISO/CD 
Health, safety and environmental 14690:1996
management systems
SY/T 6609-2004 Model environmental, health and safety API Publ. 
(EHS) management system 9100A:1998, 
MOD
SY/T 6048-2007 Health, safe and environmental 
management rules for gravity, 
magnetic and electrical (GME) crew
SY/T 6280-2006 Health, safety and environment management
specification for seismic crew
SY/T 6283-1997 Health, safe and environmental management
system guideline for oil and gas drilling
SY/T 6361-1998 Oil and gas production, water injection 
lease – Health, safety and environmental 
management systems guideline
SY/T 6362-1998 Health, safety and environmental 
management systems guideline for oil 
and gas workover
SY/T 6606-2004 Engineering and environmental basic 
requirements on petroleum industry
SY/T 6513-2001 Recommended practice for development eqv. API RP 
of a safety and environmental management 75:1998 
program for outer continental shelf 
operations and facilities
SY/T 6628-2005 Onshore oil and gas production practices mod. API RP 
for protection of the environment 51:2001
SY/T 6629-2005 Land drilling practices for protection mod. API RP 
of the environment 52:1995
SY/T 6672-2006 Natural gas processing plant practices APIRP50:
for protection of the environment 1995 MOD
General
Sub-
sectoral
Title in English ReferenceNo.
Source: Compiled by Lin on the basis of an analysis of standards (China Petroleum Standard Information:
http://www.petrostd.com/).
NDRC
recommen- 
dations
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On the basis of this regulatory regime, companies set their own “corporate standards”
to ensure uniformity of practices between all subsidiary and sub-contractor companies
operating within the same group. In case of CNPC, these standards are termed
“Q/CNPC”, and “Q/SY”. [ 136 ] Each corporate standard is directly based on Chinese
national or sector-specific standards. In this way, CNPC indirectly adopts international
standards.
Part Four
[ 1 3 6 ] “Qiye" means “company".
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Part Four
3Table Some CNPC environmental norms and  standards 
and national and international references
Q/CNPC 104.1-2004
Health, safety and 
environment management 
systems – Requirements 
with guidance for use
GB/T 24001-1996
Environmental management 
systems: Requirements 
with guidance for use
ISO 14001: 1996
Environmental management 
systems - Specification 
with guidance for use
International ReferencesNational ReferenceCNPC Standards
Source: Compilation by Lin on the basis of an analysis of standards and norms (China Standard Service Network:
http://www.cssn.net.cn/; China Petroleum Standard Information: http://www.petrostd.com/).
Q/SY 1002.1-2007
Petroleum and natural gas 
industries – Health, safety 
and environmental 
management systems – 
Part 1: Specification
GB/T 24001-2004
Environmental management 
systems: Requirements 
with guidance for use
ISO 14000: 2004
Environmental management 
systems – Requirements 
with guidance for use
GB/T 28001-2001
Occupational health and 
safety management system – 
Guidance
OHSA 18001: 1999
Occupational health and 
safety management systems. 
Specification
SY/T 6276-1997
Petroleum and natural gas 
industries – Health, 
safety and environmental 
management systems
ISO/CD 14690: 1996
Petroleum and natural gas 
industries – Safety 
and environmental 
management system
Q/SY 1002.2-2008
Petroleum and natural gas 
industries – Health, safety 
and environmental 
management systems – 
Part 2: Implement guidance
Q/SY 1002.2-2008
Petroleum and natural gas 
industries – Health, safety 
and environmental 
management systems – 
Part 3: Auditing guidance
GB/T 28001-2001
Occupational health 
and safety management 
system - Guidance
OHSA 18001: 1999
Occupational health and 
safety management systems. 
Specification
GB/T 19001- 2000
Quality management systems: 
Requirement
ISO 9001: 2000
Quality control systems: 
Requirements
SY/T 6276-1997
Petroleum and natural gas 
industries – Health, safety 
and environmental 
management systems
ISO/CD 14690: 1996
Petroleum and natural gas 
industries – Safety 
and environmental 
management system
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CNPC developed the standard Q/CNPC 104.1-2004 “HSE management system – Part 1:
Specifications” by referring to standard SY/T 6 609-2004, which partly adopts the
American standard API 9 100A:1998, MOD (see Table 3). [ 137 ] After being awarded ISO
certification 14001-2004, CNPC revised Q/CNPC 104-2004 and replaced it with
standards Q/SY 1 002 ,[ 138 ] to which were added guidelines for implementation and
auditing. These are based on Chinese GB standards, which are the equivalent of ISO
standards (see Table 3). Figure 1 shows the relationship between CNPC’s environ-
mental management tools, Chinese norms and standards and all of the reference
standards used. 
Part Four
Source: Compiled by Lin, on the basis of the analysis of standards (China Standard Service Network: http://www.cssn.net.cn/;
China Petroleum Standard Information: http://www.petrostd.com/; CNPC, 2006; Du, 2005) and field interviews.
1Figure CNPC’s composite reference standards and norms used 
in Chad
[ 1 37 ] SY/T 6 609-2004 “Model environmental, health and safety (EHS) management system”. Publ. 9 100A:1998, 
MOD. “Model Environment, Health and Safety (EHS) Management System A Voluntary Tool for Companies 
Interested in Developing an EHS Management System or Enhancing an Existing System”.
[ 1 3 8 ] Q/SY 1002.1-2007 “Petroleum and natural gas industries – Health, safety and environmental management 
systems – Part 1: Specification”; Q/SY 1002.2-2008 “Petroleum and natural gas industries – Health, safety 
and environmental management systems- Part 2: Implement guidance”; Q/SY 1002.2-2008 “Petroleum and 
natural gas industries – Health, safety and environmental management systems – Part 3: Auditing guidance”.
InternationalChinese
National
Petroleum 
sector
Company
Subsidiary/
Project
Key:               1.      Document                 Reference            2.  National standard: document type      3.  GB: example
National standard:
GB
Environmental standards:
HJ
Petroleum standards:
SY
Local practices:
Doba project’s 
compensation plan
Company standards:
Q/CNPC or Q/SY
Specific HSE 
management tools:
EIA CNPC Chad
General HSE 
management systems:
HSE management manual , etc.
International 
standards:
ISO, API
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The left side of the figure shows Chinese standards at the national and sectoral level.
From a technical standpoint (sampling methods, emission standards, EIA guidelines,
etc.), CNPC adopts a priori Chinese standards. However, some of these standards
are based more or less directly on international standards issued by umbrella oil-
sector organisations or by the sector’s national standardisation institutes, such as
API. However, if local practices appear more suitable, CNPC is willing to retain them.
Reference standards adopted in Chad by CNPC are therefore composite in nature.
The  implementation process also relies on other reference standards, mainly due to
environmental obligations that were carried over with the purchase of the Encana
permit.[ 139 ]
4.3. The environment, an avowed priority for CNPC
We will first analyse the CNPC environmental management policy and principles,
focusing on the commitments made by CNODC. We will then describe the organi-
sational aspects and specific instruments envisaged. 
4.3.1. HSE policy and tools: an intricate interlinkage
The information available on the CNPC (CNPC, 2003, 2006, 2007, 2009) and CNODC
websites, as well as our exchanges with CNPC/CNODC managerial staff (in Beijing and
in N'Djamena) indicate the group’s clear commitment to an HSE policy with a long-
term objective of “zero accidents, zero injuries and zero pollution” (CNODC, 2006).
This commitment is reflected in CNODC’s HSE Management System Manual. [ 140 ]
The corporate HSE culture can be seen in the HSE management system, which includes
the following principles: (i) give priority to people and put prevention first; (ii) control
and prevent all accidents; (iii) ensure asset integrity; and (iv) ensure the protection of
the environment (CNODC, 2006). The CNODC’s HSE management system follows
the “Plan, Do, Check and Action" (PDCA) management model. The CNODC mana-
Part Four
[ 1 3 9 ] On repurchase of a petroleum permit, the buyer usually inherits the environmental obligations that the seller 
undertook at the time of obtaining its exploration and/or production permit. It is not certain however whether
this obligation is part of the contract between the Chadian government, the Chinese government and CNPC.
[ 1 4 0 ] CNODC is part of the CNPC group and formulates its commitment as follows: “CNODC takes very seriously 
its responsibilities to strictly comply with the laws and regulations of the host countries, ensure the safety of its 
employees, protect the environment and fulfil its social functions. We have thus made significant investments
to set up the administrative systems and emergency response mechanisms required to ensure health, safety 
and environment protection. Our ethics and philosophy in the area of corporate social responsibility create 
benefits for all (our partners and us) and we strive to attain our long-term objectives of zero accidents, zero 
injuries and zero pollution” (CNODC, 2006).
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gement views the HSE system as one of the seven key pillars (CNODC, 2006).[ 141 ]
Since June 2007, CNODC has been ISO 14001 and OHSAS 18001 certified (CNODC,
2007). [ 142 ] Closer examination of each of the seven key management components
shows that CNODC’s management system fully corresponds to the ISO 14001 standard
for environmental management systems. This is hardly surprising as the CNODC
operates overseas, often working in close partnership with Western companies, and
is thus judged against global best practices (Du, 2005; Qi, 2007). Moreover, an HSE
dimension is embedded into all management procedures and bodies as a result of
the constant reference to the “Three Synchronisations” policy. As a reminder, this policy
requires that development projects involving new construction work, renovation or
reconstruction provide for environmental protection systems at all stages of design,
construction and operation.
According to CNPC, the responsibility for HSE policy lies with all of the group’s decision
centres, supported by the HSE units or departments at each level. The Management
Manual for HSE Management System was first published in 1999, at the time the
SY/T 6276-1997 standard was adopted (Du, 2005). Over the past decade, this document
has been frequently revised to reflect changing HSE standards. Depending on their
activity or the specific project, the subsidiaries produce their own technical HSE
documents based on the CNPC group documentation. As the subsidiary in charge
of overseas investment operations, CNODC is responsible for HSE management in
the subsidiary, CNPC International Chad. 
Within CNODC, a hierarchy of rules governs the HSE documentation. For example, the
contents of the HSE management manual override all other procedures, which in
turn supersede the technical data sheets for all specific operations or tasks. At the same
time, CNPC provides guidelines and HSE management practices which, depending on
the context, may refer to OGP [ 143 ] or API international standards (Du, 2005). [ 144] The
CNODC’s internal HSE audit includes an annual audit of the HSE management system
to be conducted at the head office, an HSE management audit of subsidiary companies
and an internal evaluation conducted by the subsidiary companies (Qi, 2007). In addition
Part Four
[ 1 41 ] The other key elements are: leadership and commitments; planning; organisation, resources and documen-
tation; implementation and operation; inspection and correction; management review (CNODC, 2006).
[ 1 4 2 ] ISO 14000: 2004, Environmental management systems – Requirements with guidance for use; OHSA 18 001: 
1999, Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems Specification.
[ 1 4 3 ] International Association of Oil and Gas Producers.
[ 1 4 4 ] CNODC’s HSE standards documents comprise 13 procedure files (EIA management, environmental pollution
control, etc.) and 28 operational guidelines including environmental monitoring management (Du, 2005).
166
©AFD / November 2012 / The environmental challenges facing a Chinese oil company in Chad
to this arsenal of procedures and standards, EIA tools and practices are used. In spite of
all this, the legal frame of reference chosen for Chad raises several questions.
4.3.2. A legal grey area that creates confusion 
In fact, according to China’s EIA Law, an EIA must be carried out prior to works in
order to examine, anticipate and assess the potential environmental impacts of projects
involving land management and construction. The EIA must also propose preventive or
mitigation measures to counter adverse environmental impacts, as well as monitoring
methods (NPC, 2002). If the contract stipulates, without further clarification, that
Chinese law is the applicable reference, does this mean that Chinese legislation is
to be enforced in Chad as it is in China? This should logically be the case; however,
the same Chinese law explicitly states that it only applies to operations within Chinese
territory or seas under Chinese jurisdiction (Article 3). There seems to be a legal
contradiction in adopting as a reference standard (to be enforced in Chad) a Chinese
EIA law that limits itself territorially to China. [ 145 ] These are thorny questions for the
constitutional and oil law experts. Moreover, the Chadian Law No. 014/PR/1998 [ 146 ]
states that the EIA must be carried out prior to starting a project,[ 147 ] while the imple-
menting decree No. 630/PR/PM/MEERH/2010 on EIA regulation was issued only
in August 2010. The CNODC is committed to comply with the laws and regulations of
the countries in which it operates (CNODC, 2006). However, is it required to comply
with an implementing decree that was signed after the contract was signed? We
were unable to ascertain whether this 1998 Chadian law is explicitly mentioned as one
of reference standards stipulated under the contract between the government of
Chad, the government of the People’s Republic of China and CNPC. The 2002 Chinese
EIA Law also encourages the administrative authorities to seek the views of agencies,
experts and the general public, except in cases where the government considers
Part Four
[ 1 4 5 ] Article 3 of the Chinese EIA law (NPC, 2002) states that to work on any of the programmes as described in 
Article 9 of the present law or to build any project within the territory of the People’s Republic of China (or 
within other seas subject to the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China), EIAs must be conducted 
according to the present law. 
[ 1 4 6 ] Law No.014/PR/1998 stating the general principles for protection of the environment; Article 80: “when land
development, works or projects, due to their magnitude or impact on their natural environment, pose a 
threat to the environment, the administration may require that the petitioner or the contractor undertake 
beforehand an EIA study in order to assess whether the project complies with environmental protection 
requirements”.
[ 1 47 ] Law No. 014/PR/1998 stating the general principles for protection of the environment; Article 82: “Impact 
studies governed by the present law and by its implementing legislation are carried out prior to any admi-
nistrative declaration or authorisation required for operating the project. It is mandatory that these studies
be submitted together with the request for authorisation or be presented at the time of declaration…”.
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that the information must remain confidential (Article 21). We do not know whether
the Chinese government has decided that the information on the environmental
impacts of the Rônier project are to remain confidential .  Such ambiguities have
affected CNPC’s implementation of its HSE policy, especially concerning EIAs and
the associated documents.
4.4. From theory to practice: implementing CNPC’s 
HSE policy on the ground in Chad
How is it possible to study the way in which a corporate HSE management system is
implemented when the company involved barely communicates? [ 148 ] The CNPC’s HSE
management system is certainly highly developed, but it functions exclusively on an
in-company basis, precluding any understanding of actual on-the-ground practices
in the case of the Chadian project. Moreover the rare information available to the
public is too aggregated (at group or subsidiary level, rather than at site or project
level). As a result, obtaining first-hand information on the HSE management of CNPCI’s
Rônier project was a laborious task. Nonetheless, informal field visits and face-to-
face meetings did take place both in Chad and China. Given these circumstances, [ 149 ]
we will mainly address how the HSE system was set up and what processes were used
to carry out the EIA for the Chadian project.
4.4.1. An HSE team open to using other reference standards
A specialised HSE team, reporting directly to CNPCIC’s CEO, was set up as soon as
CNPC began operations in Chad in 2007. The HSE department monitors environ-
mental management and community relations and ensures internal follow-up for
these two aspects. Two Chinese executives (including the HSE department manager)
work at CNPCIC’s head-office in N'Djamena. Both have experience and expertise
in HSE management, gained in CNPC’s China-based projects; one executive had
Part Four
[ 1 4 8 ] Yet, we were aware of the difficulties concerning interactions between researchers and Western multinationals 
(see Coleval, 1977).
[ 1 4 9 ] Our research team did not have the necessary skills to verify whether the specific technical solutions adopted 
by the CNPC project (its components: oil field, pipeline, refinery) complied with Chinese standards, especially 
with regard to the objective of attaining cleaner production.  CNPC affirms that the materials selected for its 
facilities comply with international standards (meeting with CNPCIC’s President and CEO, June 2010). According
to CNPCIC technicians, the horizontal directional drilling technology, used on the pipeline crossing over the 
Chari River, meets the highest international standards and enables better environmental protection (meeting 
with the CNPCIC’s HSE department on September 2010); it allegedly has no impact on the living conditions 
of the local populations or on the river-based activities.(SHT, 2009a). These aspects, based on petroleum engi-
neering, warrant future partnership research projects.
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previously worked for a joint CNPC-Shell project in China and was endeavouring to
share the lessons learnt. [ 150 ] CNPC has also hired the entire Chadian environmental
team (including managers in charge of community relations) that had worked for
Encana, the company that sold them the permit for the Rônier project. Encana had
trained its HSE team in line with the Canadian standards. 
The recruitment of Chadian managerial staff, already trained by Encana, was a move
that enabled CNPC to benefit from their environmental and social expertise, their
field experience and their knowledge . [ 151 ] Among the ex-Encana employees, a few
people had previously been employed and trained by Exxon at the time of the Exxon-
Doba project’s construction phase. One such case was that of a Chadian community
relations executive who reports directly to the senior management in N'Djamena.
The CNPC’s HSE team thus draws upon a wide range of experiences and knowledge
and Chinese reference standards and practices dovetail with those inherited from
the Shell project in China or the Encana and Exxon projects in Chad. This composite
frame of reference is reflected in the EIA practices used.
4.4.2. Differences in EIA implementation for the two components 
of the Rônier project
In 2008, CNPC carried out an EIA on the Rônier project. We are unable to explain
the reasons behind this decision, as the lack of clear regulations together with strong
political pressures to implement the project swiftly could well have led to a different
choice. CNPC’s decision may partly be attributed to the company’s adoption of the
ISO 14001 standard, which recommends undertaking an EIA. It is also likely that CNPC
simply acted as it would have done In China, which is to say, perform an EIA. [ 152 ]
However, other factors also need to be taken into account. 
The EIA was carried out by the CNPC East China Design Institute (CEI) design office. [ 153 ]
The assessment was split into two parts: the first study on the refinery was to be
carried out entirely by the CEI; the second study on the oilfields and pipeline was
Part Four
[ 1 50 ] Shell has had a decisive influence on CNPC’s environmental management (Qi, 2007).
[ 1 5 1 ] Encana has carried out EIAs, as well as archeological studies and socio-economic impact studies.
[ 1 52 ] According to the 2002 Law’s rigorous requirements on environmental assessment.
[ 1 53 ] CEI is based in Qingdao, in China. Its subsidiary, China Petroleum CEI Safety & Environmental Protection Co. 
Ltd., is a CNPC research and technical support institution for HSE matters. It is involved in: safety technology, 
safety engineering , environmental sciences, EIAs, environmental engineering , etc. As often happens in 
conglomerates, all activities are carried out within the CNPC group. This is in sharp contrast with the 
extremely high level of outsourcing practiced by OGP companies, which finance the EIAs but subcontract their 
execution to specialised external consultancy firms.
169
©AFD / November 2012 / The environmental challenges facing a Chinese oil company in Chad
partly contracted out to ISM Consult. This Chadian engineering consultancy firm was
initially given the job of (i) describing the socio-economic aspects and the natural
environments, (ii) conducting an appraisal of the environmental and social impacts,
(iii) analysing major risks and (iv) proposing prevention and compensation measures
(including the compensation and resettlement programme). [ 154 ] Subsequently, after
seeing the results, the CEI asked ISM Consult to prepare the compensation and resettle-
ment programme for the refinery. 
The decision to handle these two components separately may come down to diffe-
rences in their levels of technological sophistication or in the structure of their
financing and property ownership. The refinery was owned by SRN, which is a joint
venture between CNPC and the Chadian government represented by SHT, whose
equity participation is financed by a loan from the China Eximbank. The investment
in the oilfields and pipeline, on the other hand, are directly financed and managed
by CNPC. The fact remains however that both these studies had different outcomes.
The EIA for Chad’s refinery project was commissioned in March 2008 and completed
in early 2009. As pointed out by the CEI, it was completed despite a lack of detailed
information on the initial conditions, especially with regard to meteorological and
hydrological data, which are crucial for a flood-prone area. According to the SHT
resource people we interviewed, the environmental impacts usually associated with
refineries were identified and preventive measures were recommended and integrated.
According to CNPC, the preventive measures taken were those required in China
(Lin, 2010). A day of public consultation on the compensation and resettlement
programme for the refinery zone was held at the Centre d’étude et de formation
pour le développement (CEFOD – Centre for Development Studies and Training) in
November 2009, with support from ISM Consult (Moctar, 2009). The EIA report for
the refinery was approved by the competent ministries that same month. Yet, by
October 2010, the full EIA report had still not been disclosed to the public. CNPC
attributed this delay to difficulties in translating the document from English and
Chinese into French. 
The final draft of the EIA oilfield and pipeline report (ISM Consult, 2009a and 2009b)
was completed at the beginning of 2010, when in fact the oilfield and pipeline
construction works were already well advanced (Ngaemague, 2010). Notably, the
Part Four
[ 1 5 4 ] ISM Consult mobilises experts who have worked directly or indirectly on the Doba project. ISM provides 
regular HSE support for CNPC’s Chad project, which has thus taken on certain practices and regulations 
developed during the Doba project. 
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Chari River crossing had already been completed using horizontal drilling technology
(SHT, 2009a). The EIA report (in French) for the oil field and pipeline was submitted
to the Ministries of Petroleum and Environment in August 2010. [ 155 ] However, in
October 2010, these ministries had still not rendered their opinion on the study and
the EIA report had not been made publicly available.[ 156 ]
Both EIA reports were indeed completed by the respective engineering and design
entities, but which frame of reference or directive guidelines had been used? Neither
of the documents has been fully disclosed to the public, which is at odds with
Chadian law but in compliance with the exception provided for by Article 21 of China’s
EIA Law. However, the fact that construction work on the oil field and along the
pipeline route was started even before the EIA report had been approved runs
counter to both Chinese and Chadian law. Only the EIA for the refinery had been
completed and approved by the competent ministries prior to the start of construc-
tion work. Much in the same way that the World Bank had played crucial role in
enforcing the Doba standards (as we pointed out in Part 2), could the greater degree
of compliance in the case of the refinery be explained by the role of the China
Eximbank?
In 2007, major economic cooperation agreements were signed between the govern-
ments of China and Chad (see Part 3). The Chadian government submitted a loan
application to China Eximbank to finance SHT’s equity investment in SRN, [ 157 ] but
the amount of the requested loan amount, its purpose and the environment-related
conditionalities were not disclosed. [ 158 ]
China Eximbank is the state export-import credit agency. It operates directly under
the State Council and provides a wide spectrum of financial services. [ 159 ] In 2007, it
became the world’s leading export-import bank. [ 160 ] Over the last decade, it has
Part Four
[ 1 5 5 ] Meeting with the Environment Ministry’s director of research, planning and monitoring , N’Djamena, 
26 August 2010.
[ 1 5 6 ] Nonetheless, the EIA seems to have partly fulfilled its role of providing guidance for the project even before 
the Chadian government had given its approval, as evidenced by the partial modification of the pipeline route, 
and the implementation of compensation in line with the report’s recommendations.  
[ 1 57 ] Meeting with Michel Boukar, SHT management advisor, 6 September 2010 at N’Djamena.
[ 1 5 8 ] A detailed questionnaire sent in May 2010 to the China Eximbank staff responsible for granting loans to Africa 
met with no response.
[ 1 5 9 ] Export credits for high added-value products; import credits for advanced technologies, equipment and 
resources; support loans to companies operating overseas; concessional loans to buyers of Chinese products, 
bridge loans for foreign organisations and governments.
[ 1 60 ] Interview with Li Ruogu, President of China Exim Bank, 6 May 2008, by Taimur Ahmad (Emerging Markets, 
http://www.emergingmarkets.org/Article/1935225/Interview-with-Li-Ruogu-President-of-China-Exim-Bank. 
html, accessed 11 April 2011).
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granted African countries loans worth over USD 6.5 billion, most of which are for
Chinese companies’ investments in infrastructure projects (Bosshard, 2007).
In the field, the Chinese financial agencies are increasingly exposed to internal and
external discussions on the environmental and social impacts of the projects they
have funded (Suzuki, 2007). Since negotiating its entry into the Asian Development
Bank in 2004, and then into the World Bank, the Chinese government has been
increasingly confronted with the “Equator principles”, [ 161 ] which have been adopted
by multilateral banks. These principles call on public and private financial institutions
to comply with a series of standards and good practices, particularly in the area of
environment. In 2007, without formally adhering to these principles (Suzuki, 2007),
Eximbank set up similar environmental assessment procedures covering the entire
loan cycle. [ 162] Project financing has thus now become conditional on a duly completed
and approved EIA. Eximbank’s environmental procedures seem to require that envi-
ronmental impacts be taken into account and monitored throughout the project
lifecycle, along with environmental monitoring of project implementation and an
ex-post environmental assessment. [ 163 ] Thus, a prior EIA should, theoretically, have
been one of the requirements for approval of the China Eximbank loan to finance
SHT’s equity investment in the refinery project. The conditionality imposed by
Eximbank may explain why the EIA for the refinery was completed and approved by
the government on time, before the work on the project started. However, the
Part Four
[ 1 6 1 ] See site: http://www.equator-principles.com/
[ 1 62 ] An excerpt from Eximbank’s environmental procedures states that “China Eximbank considers projects’ 
environmental impact assessment as one of the basic requirements and elements during the project 
review. We require the funded projects to conduct feasibility study of environmental impacts, and obtain 
endorsement or approval from the recipient country’s environmental administration. Those projects that 
are harmful to environment or do not gain endorsement or approval from environmental administration 
will not be funded” (“Exim Bank of China, Environmental Policy, translated English-language version: not for 
official use, section 6.1”), http://pacificenvironment.org/downloads/Chexim%20environmental%20 
policy%20Chinese%20and%20English.pdf (accessed on 11 April 2011). This text (see Pacific Environment, 
2007) was sent on 29 April 2007 to Mr Doug Norlen, director of the NGO, Pacific Environment, following 
his meeting with Mr Li Ruogu (President of China Eximbank), Friday 13 April 2007, during the US Export-
Import Bank’s annual meeting in Washington (see http://www.pacificenvironment.org/article.php?id=2362,
site visited on 11 April 2011).
[ 1 63 ] “In 2007, we issued The Guidance for Environment and Social Evaluation on Loan Project and The Regulations
on Loan Management and Operational Procedures for Energy Efficiency Financing Projects in Cooperation 
with the World Bank and other documents. By integrating the standards of energy saving and emission 
reduction into the credit granting system, the Bank has raised the threshold for loan application. Besides, we 
have set up the mechanism of withdrawing loans from projects with environmental risks, and have turned 
down projects that do not meet environmental standards. In addition, we built a project post-evaluation 
mechanism with a view to assessing the economic and social impact of the projects we have financed, so that 
we can constantly make improvement and give full play to our strength.” Interview with Li Ruogu, President 
of China Exim Bank, 6 May 2008, by Taimur Ahmad, Emerging Markets, http://www.emergingmarkets.org/ 
Article/1935225/Interview-with-Li-Ruogu-President-of-China-Exim-Bank.html, accessed on 11 April 2011.
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Eximbank loan processing procedure took longer than expected: by October 2010,
it had still not been approved although construction work was well underway and had
produced its initial impacts. Was this because Eximbank’s environmental requirements
were not entirely fulfilled? Or was it due to other financial or political reasons unknown
to us?  
4.5. The first observed impacts and how CNPC 
managed them 
Drawing on the available data, [ 164 ] we will attempt to analyse several types of impact [ 165 ]
observed during the construction phase and the responses provided by CNPC.
In 2009, a child accidentally drowned at Koud Alwa in an inadequately guarded
laterite quarry used by CNPC for its construction work. The family of the deceased
demanded CFAF 1.2 million in damages from CNPC (CPPN, 2009). The company
immediately assumed responsibility for the accident, paid the amount demanded
and stepped up safety measures around the quarries. 
Noise and air pollution were also reported (GRAMPTC, 2004). People complained
of coughing caused by dust emitted by CNPC truck convoys or trucks belonging to
Chadian or Chinese subcontractors. Local residents also complained of traffic noise.
We noticed that speed limit signs were erected along the CNPC-paved site access roads
at village entry and exit points. According to CNPC and the people we interviewed,
no trace of oil or chemical residue in the village wells was recorded in August 2010.
However, when local residents drew attention to a problem of untreated wastewater at
the company’s waste sorting plant near Koud Alwa, CNPC took corrective measures
to address this problem.
Part Four
[ 1 6 4 ] Especially the EIA for the oilfield and pipeline components (ISM Consult, 2009a and 2009b). Although the 
text had not been drafted prior to the start of work, it provided abundant information on environmental 
monitoring during the construction phase. 
[ 1 65 ] By “impact”, we understand any sort of disturbance of the human or natural environment, positive or negative,
significant or not, observable immediately or in the future (short, medium or long term), which is plausibly 
attributable, directly or indirectly, to a given activity. An impact can be managed through prevention and avoi-
dance, mitigation, corrective measures and/or compensation. Numerous factors affect impacts (the specific 
characteristics of the host country, the context and the nature of the project, the technologies and equipment 
used, the schedule, the sequence and duration of activities, etc.). The rapid construction of infrastructure, as 
in the case of the pipeline (24 to 36 months) is an added constraint to preventing and managing impacts 
(Goodland, 2005). The manufacturing cost has a direct bearing on the performance, maintenance and 
replacement costs and the lifecycle of equipment (Lubomirsky et al., 2010).
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Photo credits: Géraud Magrin (photographs 12 and 13); Romain Dittgen (photograph 14).
14 / Hand pump financed by the CNPC as compensation given 
to communities (August 2010)
12, 13 and 14Photos Strict HSE rules and responses
to issues encountered
12 / Prevent accidents by installing bilingual speed limit    
signboards in Chinese and in French (April 2009)
13 / CNPC quarry near Rônier oilfields: prevent drowning accidents 
caused by water collecting in quarry pits
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The project work site produces common impacts that nonetheless need to be dealt
with. Road traffic is one of them as it stirs up dust, frightens animals and is likely to
cause accidents and damage existing tracks (Photo 15). The land area taken over will be
limited, as the right-of-way areas will revert to their original use (agriculture, farming)
once the pipeline is buried underground (Photo 16). The impact on land, however, will
be greater at either end of the project: in the Rônier oil well zone and around the
Djermaya refinery.
4Box Managing impacts 
Photo credit: Romain Dittgen, July 2010.
Photo credit: Romain Dittgen, August 2010. 
15Photo Heavy goods vehicle traffic   
Underground pipe near Chari16Photo
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Land occupation appears to be under control. The pipeline crosses through inhabited
areas, hence farmlands, but few villages are directly affected .[ 166 ] There is a wide variety
of food and cash crops, such as pearl millet ,[ 167 ] sorghum, maize, peanuts, beans,
sesame, sorrel, gumbo and watermelon. In terms of occupied land area, 960 ha were
used for laying down the pipeline and constructing the connecting roads for trans-
porting the equipment. After the pipeline is buried underground, only 100 ha will be
permanently used to maintain and run the pipeline (ISM Consult, 2009a and 2009b). In
August 2010, a road supplying the pipeline construction site had caused water retention,
inconveniencing local residents. CNPC had to undertake the necessary repair work
when the neighbourhood residents blocked the area. 
So far, there have hardly been any impacts on biodiversity. This type of impact, initially
expected in the Rônier project, was similar to the impacts that occur in other
petroleum projects, especially the Doba project. The oilfields and pipeline are located in
sparsely populated forest land, where there is diverse wildlife such as ostriches, monkeys
and antelopes. The pipeline crosses the Chari River, where hippopotamuses are found.
At this stage of the project (December 2010), the wildlife and flora in the region have
not been significantly impacted.
Photo credit: Romain Dittgen, September 2010.
17Photo View of the Djermaya refinery under construction 
[ 1 6 6 ] By destroying homes.
[ 1 67 ] Pearl millet, suitable for sandy terrain and highly variable rainfall, is the most grown crop, especially in Baguirmi.
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During the observed construction phase, the economic spinoffs were few and far
between: business opportunities for local entrepreneurs and job creation for the local
population were rare. A limited number of Chadian businesses were contracted for
transport and construction activities. According to the local authorities, the local trade
distributors were bypassed by CNPC and Chinese subcontractors, who sent their
own staff to the local markets, thus creating a direct fresh food market benefiting
local farmers and herders. 
The recruitment policy practiced by CNPC and its subcontractors is not encouraging
for Chadian job-seekers (GRAMPTC, 2010). In the construction phase, only a limited
number of jobs were open to nationals, even jobs for the least-skilled (labourers).
On this point, Law No. 006/PR/07 relating to hydrocarbons is often cited by the
associations mediating between CNPC and local residents. This law stipulates that
“the contractor undertakes to recruit in priority Chadian personnel through public
tendering procedures”. It is uncertain whether this law is included as one of the refe-
rence standards under the contract between the Chadian government, the Chinese
government and CNPC. In response to questions about its recruitment policy,
CNPC points out that it has to keep to a very tight schedule imposed by the Chadian
authorities. 
According to the data collected, the working conditions of Chadian personnel differ
widely, depending on whether they have been directly recruited by CNPC or by sub-
contractors (Chinese or Chadian). Chadian workers hired by a Chinese subcontractor
work twelve hours a day for CFAF 2,000 (meals are at their own expense). Chadian
workers hired directly by CNPC are paid higher salaries and lodged on the construction
site. Few complaints have been registered against CNPC, but the company often
suffers from being wrongly identified with its Chinese subcontractors (lower wages, no
contracts, contested layoffs, etc.). Working conditions in contracted Chadian firms
are also a source of tension (GRAMPTC, 2010).
Any large-scale project gives rise to expectations and it is up to the oil company
involved to manage the resulting psychological impacts (Goodland, 2005). However,
in the case of CNPC, this type of impact has been virtually absent: local residents
seem to have interiorised and anticipated the fact that Chinese companies would
prefer to hire Chinese manpower and rarely call on the local labour market. CNPC
communications had made no mention of employment opportunities during the
construction phase. However, it did send over one hundred young Chadians to China
for training , with a view to their taking on positions of responsibility in the refinery.
They were convened and selected in N'Djamena. These factors explain why there
Part Four
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have been no large-scale migratory flows in the Rônier region. This was contrary to
what happened in the Doba region (Magrin, 2009), which saw a deterioration in living
conditions in towns such as Bébédjia (prostitution, HIV) that created, “a space under
pressure” (Médard and Ozias, 2007). This near-absence of migration could also be
attributed to factors such as the collective memory of job-seekers disappointed
with the Doba experience or the oilfields’ distance and remoteness. 
As foreseen in CNPC’s HSE approach, the company has set up a compensation system
for the material losses incurred during the construction and operation of its facilities.
The main difficulty, already experienced by other oil projects in sub-Saharan Africa,
is to adapt individual or community compensation programmes to a complex land
tenure system in which the State is the sole landowner, but where local populations
enjoy land use rights under customary laws. A given area of land or resource therefore
entails various duties and rights for multiple stakeholders. In this context, individual
compensation generally gives rise to more problems than it solves.  
Villagers are paid individual compensation based on the lands affected or the number
and type of trees destroyed due to the construction of the oil facilities. The prices
of trees and land are assessed and defined in the compensation programme. If the
pipeline crosses a field, the CNPC team measures the surface area taken up and
counts the number of trees in the field for compensation purposes. The “owner”
(i.e. the person working the field) then confirms the information recorded by CNPC.
Once the data have been collected, a meeting is held at the canton’s administrative
capital, where payment is made in the presence of the canton chief using a detailed
compensation form. [ 168 ] CNPC has adopted the compensation rates previously applied
by Encana (CFAF 73/m2 in August 2010).[ 169 ] According to the chief of the Koud Alwa
canton, the company limits compensation to cultivated land, which de facto excludes
lands that have been lying fallow for more than two years. However, in the regions
with low agricultural yields and low population densities, production systems depend
on extensive farming techniques in which the practice of keeping lands fallow is com-
mon. The fallow periods vary widely depending on the potential for cultivation and on
demographic pressures. For instance, in Bouram, a large village in the Baguirmi forest,
land is left fallow for three years, whereas in Sabangari, a small village further north in
Fellata Haoussa, land is kept fallow for between ten and fifteen years. Paradoxically,
although CNPC considers fallow land as having no value, the Chadian government,
[ 1 6 8 ] Meeting with Ismaël Moctar, ISM Consult, 26 August 2010, in N’Djamena; meeting with Nassingar Rimtebaye, 
CPPN coordinator on 25 August 2010, in N’Djamena..
[ 1 69 ] According to the information gathered during exchanges with the residents of the different villages and the 
Loug Chari local authorities.
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in order to curtail deforestation, has made it illegal to fell trees, even on fallow land,
for the purpose of charcoal production. Any offenders are threatened with dissuasive
fines. Associations demand that one hectare of fallow land occupied by the project
should at least match the state fine levied on the villagers who claim the right to use
the shrub vegetation growing on their fallow land. Furthermore, although the com-
pensation system seems to be the most suitable approach (based on experiences
with other similarly complex land situations), it has now come to a standstill. 
CNPC is seemingly planning to offer community compensation, which will require
larger budgets but only during the operations phase. This decision has apparently met
with the approval of the Chadian government, as it will ease the pressure on CNPC
and SRN liquidities for as long as no revenues are forthcoming. So far, only three
drinking water wells and five hundred school-bags have been offered to compensate
the inhabitants of Koud Alwa, a large village (nearly 2,000 inhabitants) close to the oil
wells. This approach, though financially sound, has triggered protests from the local
inhabitants, who are generally well aware of Exxon’s more generous practices in the
Doba zone. In the meantime, the demands of local residents have been transmitted
to the Chadian government and the Chinese company. If these demands are ignored,
they may jeopardise the company’s “social license to operate”. [ 170 ]
4 .6. Future environmental challenges
4.6.1. Developments requiring the assessment of cumulative impacts
An initial analysis of CNPC’s HSE management in Chad is globally positive: observable
impacts seem to be either absent or minimal and appropriately dealt with by the
company. However, would this view still hold true if “cumulative impacts” were taken
into account, especially those associated with the future activities already envisaged? [ 171 ]
As at December 2010, CNPC had not explicitly addressed these cumulative impacts.
The environmental study for the Rônier project had been divided into two separate
Part Four
[ 1 7 0 ] This expression refers to the legitimacy and acceptability needed for a company to carry on its business (see 
Donner, 2011).
[ 1 7 1 ] We understand “cumulative impact” to mean incremental effects over a certain period of time, which are 
plausibly attributable to a single activity or a group of activities. CNPC’s environmental experts are familiar 
with the idea of cumulative impact. In a recent paper, researchers at the CNPC Research Institute of Safety 
and Environment Technology write: “According to the recognition results of the layout’s environmental impact, 
we should forecast and analyze possible environment and resource impacts resulted from its implication 
(including indirect, cumulative and accident risk), and analyze the total pollutants emission and control level 
of resources consumption after layout, so as to find out measures to alleviate adverse environmental impacts”
(Xingchun et al., 2010:11).
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EIAs (one for the refinery and the other for the oilfield and pipeline), but it offered
no perspective on the potential cumulative impacts of these two parts of the project.
Moreover, the EIAs did not integrate the possible cumulative impacts of the activities
already planned. It is true that these substantial investments had been announced
little by little and only a trickle of information had been released. The investments will
finance the connection of the refinery’s power plant to N'Djamena’s electricity grid,
the construction of an industrial zone adjacent to the Djermaya refinery (a project
for an airport was added in April 2011), the drilling of new wells and the probable
link-up between the CNPC oilfield and the Exxon pipeline connecting Komé to the
Kribi offshore terminal.
CNPC agreed to the Chadian government’s request, relayed by the Chinese Embassy,
that the Rônier project include the construction of a refinery and an electric power
plant. The refinery will operate on fuel oil and consume only 20 of the 40 MW pro-
duced. The remaining 20 MW will be used to increase electricity supply on the
SNE’s N'Djamena grid (via a high voltage power line, under construction at the end of
2010, but no EIA has yet been carried out on this component). It will also feed the
industrial zone due to be built adjacent to the refinery.  
Apart from the positive economic effects expected from the industrial zone (see Part
3), its social impacts (volume and type of jobs) and environmental impacts (land-take,
emissions, noise, effluents, waste) have not been studied. As yet, little is known about
the activities to be developed. The construction of industrial facilities around Djermaya
will thus demand considerable efforts from the Chadian authorities in charge of regio-
nal and land-use planning and environmental management. In addition, the possible
connection of the CNPC oilfields with the Exxon pipeline will pose serious challenges. 
In fact, the refinery lacks the capacity to absorb all of the production envisaged.
Moreover, production levels will likely rise as new oil wells come on stream and an
export system is built to ensure the profitability of the satellite oil deposits around the
Rônier field. In a geographically landlocked setting , the question also arises of how
to ship the raw crude that is not processed on-site. Among the different scenarios (see
Part 3), [ 172 ] the most likely option would be to connect the Rônier oilfields with the
Chad-Cameroon pipeline operated by the Exxon-led consortium. 
[ 1 72 ] As a reminder, one of the options would be to the north-west, via Niger, by connecting to the pipelines of 
the West African countries where the CNPC is already operating. A second option would be eastwards, by 
constructing over 1,300 km of pipeline to join the already operational pipelines in Sudan (but unexpected 
competition has emerged between CNPC and Sinopec; cf.  “The Sudan incident” analysed by Liou, 2009). 
The third option, via the south, is to construct a pipeline nearly 150 km long linking up to the Komé (Chad)-
Kribi (Cameroon) export pipeline managed by the Exxon-led consortium (SHT, 2009b). This seems to be 
the most technically and financially viable option  (despite a great number of difficulties and challenges).
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Many factors seem to indicate that, in effect, this last option is under consideration
(if not already finalised [ 173 ]). According to the former Petroleum Minister, Mr Mahamat
Nasser Hassane, “The CNPCI-SHT consortium has already contacted Esso consortium
with a view to starting discussions on the pipeline connecting to the Komé-Kribi
export pipeline” (SHT, 2009b). According to a Stratfor Global Intelligence report dated
14 January 2011, CNPC executives have held three meetings with the COTCO directors
responsible for supervising the Cameroon side of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline project.
It is likely that a negotiated solution will be forthcoming and an agreement [ 174 ] will
herald in peaceful Sino-American cooperation. However, the decision to ship the
Rônier production via the south-west through the Komé-Kribi export pipeline will
have two major implications for the parties involved: firstly, technologies will need
to be made compatible and technical solutions found in order to alternately ship
different types and compositions of crude (difficulties that are easily surmountable,
according to the engineers of both firms, interviewed from June to December 2010).
And secondly – this being a far more complex challenge – the HSE approaches of
both companies must be aligned with each other. 
An important point, of interest to all parties, is whether Section 4.10 of the Loan Agree-
ment of 29 March 2001 between the World Bank and Chad within the Doba project
framework remains valid, for which parties and for how long (Maoundonodji, 2010).
According to this section, “The Borrower shall ensure that any oil developed outside
the Doba Basin Oil Fields which is proposed to be transported through any part of the
Transportation System in Chad is developed in accordance with the principles set forth
in the EMP with respect to environmental analysis and protection, consultation, infor-
mation disclosure, resettlement and compensation and with the equivalent legal and
administrative approval processes and information disclosure as applied with respect
to the oil developed in the Doba Basin Oil Fields” (quoted in Maoundonodji, 2010).
Yet, even if this clause no longer applies, the parties will remain subject to rigorous
internal and external requirements and will be confronted with the need to agree on
reference standards and environmental practices. The prospect of connecting pipelines
has more serious environmental and geostrategic consequences than those foreseen in
the preliminary EIA draft, which we were able to study. This indicates the need for a
better understanding of the similarities and differences between the HSE approaches
and practices of both projects. 
[ 1 73 ] It is possible that this option had already been envisaged by the parties at the time CNPC negotiated its entry 
into Chad. However, the Rônier production estimates were only upgraded after the drilling operations in 2009.
[ 1 74 ] At this stage, cooperation between CNPC and Exxon appears likely, but other options cannot be dismissed. 
The risk for CNPC is that this would reduce the rich institutional legacy of the Doba project to nothing more 
than a pipeline (see van Vliet et al., 2011).
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4.6.2. Comparison between the HSE approaches used in the CNPC 
and Exxon projects
The Exxon-Doba and CNPC-Rônier projects have much in common in the area of
HSE. In fact, although the technical standards used by the two companies remain
the industry standards of their home country, the HSE management norms and
standards tend to converge. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Chinese
oil companies (such as the CNPC group) have mostly adopted or adapted the HSE
standards of Western companies. Export-Import banks (Eximbank) of both coun-
tries (China and the United States) are involved in the projects and have ensured
compliance with standards, notably environmental standards, (Suzuki, 2007; [ 175 ]
Pacific Environment, 2007). Both companies manage different but clearly drawn up
and well-developed HSE systems. Both projects have experienced relatively similar
non-compliances during the construction phase (relating to dust, noise, quarries,
waste material, road accidents, compensation, etc.) and both firms have addressed
these issues swiftly. Both companies have faced the same problem of choosing an
appropriate approach to compensation in situations of complex land tenure rights
and heavy demands from the local communities near to their project sites.  
However, deep differences do exist. These stem from the context in which the two
projects were set up, the history of each company and their conceptions of the
importance of communicating with external stakeholders. 
The Exxon-Doba project has been deeply marked by the conditionalities imposed
by the World Bank, a multilateral aid agency which itself has come under criticism
from Chadian and international civil society. As a result, Exxon does not view HSE as
simply an internal technical process for reducing the number of incidents. The company
has also made information on non-compliances publicly available, especially the cases
brought to light by the project’s external monitoring mechanism (ECMG, 2003, 2005;
IAG, 2009; cf. Part 2). The main environmental management documents have been
disclosed; the company, the Chadian government and the independent external
agencies all monitor the implementation of the HSE systems. Exxon is also used to
handling difficult environmental negotiations with American federal agencies, as
well as with local authorities and NGOs. Some employees have been trained to
communicate and engage in dialogue with stakeholders. Moreover, HSE communi-
cation and dialogue are an integral part of the management tools that bolster the
[ 1 7 5 ] “The Export-Import Bank of the United States itself has applied strict environmental guidelines to the US 
exporters since 1995” (Suzuki, 2007:130).
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company’s “licence to operate”, and periods for dialogue and consultation with
external stakeholders are explicitly included in the HSE procedures. At Exxon, although
access to production sites is strictly controlled and limited, external interested parties
(government officials, NGOs media, researchers, etc.) can meet with the company’s
management via the Communication and Public Relations Department, community
development managers or the HSE department. While any company understandably
needs to prohibit public access to certain areas, CNPC has set up extremely restricted
procedures and opportunities for communication with external stakeholders.   
4.6.3. The challenges of communication and dialogue
Communication and dialogue represent a real challenge for CNPC in Chad, not only
with respect to its internal relations (between Chinese and Chadian employees), but
also to its ties with external actors (ministry officials or territorial administration offi-
cials, Exxon HSE staff, associations, NGOs, experts and researchers). Occasionally,
the company has channelled its messages through SHT Magazine. A few inaugural
ceremonies have provided the opportunity to discover a scale model of the refinery
and the plan for horizontal drilling under the River Chari. [ 176 ] Apart from the days of
consultation organised by ISM Consult to discuss the refinery and the compensation
programme for pipeline works, we noted that the company structure does not enable
it to communicate (in both directions), share information and engage in dialogue
with its various stakeholders, despite the fact that Chinese laws provide for dialogue
and consultation (SEPA, 2006).
Part Four
[ 1 76 ] An inaugural ceremony for the horizontal drilling operations under the Chari was held on 16 December 2009. 
Attendees included Chadian government officials, Chinese embassy officials in Chad, and Chadian civil society 
representatives. A presentation of the drilling process and its technical aspects was handed out to the guests 
(meeting with Djube Nadjilengar, CROSCAP LC coordinator, 13 August 2010, Bousso.)
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CNPC has put various mechanisms in place to reduce the language barrier separat-
ing the company’s Chadian employees from their Chinese colleagues. The company
explained that French or English could be used to communicate, with the help of an
interpreter. The problem is less serious for executives as they communicate in English.
On site, Chadian workers, who are often low-skilled and speak very little French, are
given instructions through an interpreter or a Chadian worker able to translate. This
Photo credit: Géraud Magrin (April 2009).
18 and 19Photos Opening for dialogue still too rare
18 / Public meeting at Daradja Bousso for the preparation    
of the EIA
Photo credit: Romain Dittgen (September 2010).
19 / Meeting between CNPC Chad HSE department and the research team 
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gives rise to frequent misunderstandings. Language training programmes for both sides
will certainly partly solve the problem, although the problem is not only a linguistic
one (Feng and Mu, 2010).
The terms of the contract between the Chadian government, the Chinese government
and CNPC have not been disclosed; even the environmental clauses have not been
published. According to the preliminary EIA draft that was circulated, Chinese norms and
standards were set as the frame of reference, but these were not communicated or
explained to the stakeholders in Chad (environment officials, local residents, NGOs and
Exxon HSE staff). On several occasions, our contacts expressed doubts as to whether
Chinese environmental standards actually existed. [ 177 ] Although the EIA report for the
refinery was presented at a public meeting , it is still unavailable even though approved.
The Environmental Management Plans (EMP) and Accidental Spill Prevention Plans
(ASPP) have not been disclosed to the public and are unavailable at the Ministry of
Environment. Local residents and local authorities were unaware of their role in the
project, even in case of accidental spills. Even more serious is the fact that Exxon’s
HSE officials still had no access to these plans in October 2010, whereas the usual
practice for oil companies operating in the same country is to agree on a course of
action in case of a Level 2 incident, which requires a concerted response involving all
of the industry’s resources available countrywide. The Exxon and CNPC HSE managers
are not used to meeting together, which is an additional factor that feeds rumour and
stereotyping. Under these circumstances, the project’s environmental regulation
cannot be externally monitored by State representatives, local authorities, NGOs, local
residents or researchers. 
For CNPC, the sole interlocutor is the Ministry of Petroleum. Chinese executives
working on the project rarely meet with local authorities (prefectural and sub-
prefectural officials or sultans). [ 178 ] In this case, field visits are carried out by the
Chadian HSE staff, who are experienced and well acquainted with the local custo-
mary modes of communication and have thus managed to gain the villagers’ trust.
Nonetheless, during our interviews, many locals living near the oil facilities complained
that their discussions were always with Chadians, never the Chinese. This criticism
reveals that in the eyes of the local population, Chadian employees are not the true
representatives of CNPC [ 179 ] or, at least, they are not the decision-makers and do no
Part Four
[ 1 7 7 ] Various meetings in Chad from June to December 2010.
[ 1 78 ] Meeting with a prefect, 13 August 2010.
[ 17 9 ] The local residents living near the facilities wish to meet “the Chinese” and establish regular contacts and 
meetings with them. This wish was expressed during village “focus groups” and in meetings with local NGOs, 
13-15 August 2010, Rônier oil zone.
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more than transmit information. [ 180 ] This situation engenders mistrust and misun-
derstandings between the company, the local authorities and local residents, which
impair the corporate image. 
What can explain this low propensity to engage in dialogue? In Western countries,
environmental management is a process involving multiple stakeholders with diverse
interests, and companies have learnt to communicate and cooperate with them; Shi and
Zhang consider that this is not yet the case in China, where the State traditionally has a
monopoly of environmental governance (Shi and Zhang , 2006). Rowe and his team
agree with this analysis, pointing out that corporate environmental management in
China is mainly influenced by state institutions (Rowe and Guthrie, 2009). However,
since Hu Jintao’s presidency, civil society participation in environmental matters has
increased perceptibly (Shi and Zhang , 2006) and new EIA standards on participation
have introduced new practices (see Part 1). CNPC’s approach to dialogue will be unable
to develop as long as its HSE procedures remain unchanged. 
In a company as highly organised as CNPC, this lack of dialogue with outside stake-
holders certainly stems from the fact that the company has no procedures to deal
with this aspect.  The HSE procedures are basically technical, intended for in-company
use in view of achieving the corporate goal to reduce incidents – this is important
and necessary, but not enough. Company organisation charts show a proliferation
of closed-loop procedures between HSE high committee appraisals and review
and management appraisals, HSE monitoring , inspection and evaluation, actions and
monitoring , etc. (CNPC, 2007). But no diagram or chart shows any space for commu-
nication or dialogue with outside stakeholders, or indicates how such spaces could
enhance the quality of the HSE processes. 
CNPC’s charts and HSE manuals could take greater account of stakeholders operating
outside the company, in which case its procedures and technical documents would
need to be reviewed accordingly.
4.7. Conclusion
In this chapter, we have attempted to answer the following questions: what environ-
mental norms and standards regulate CNPC’s operations in Chad within the Rônier
project? Are these clearly stated and complied with in practice? How are the impacts,
notably cumulative ones, anticipated and dealt with? What are CNPC’s major challenges
[ 1 8 0 ] They express dissatisfaction that they are only dealing with the “shell” of the organisation as opposed to its 
“core” (made up of Chinese staff) where all the important decisions are made (van Vliet and Magrin, 2007).
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regarding its interactions with the host environment in Chad and its future interactions
with the Exxon-Doba project? Despite the difficulty of accessing information, we are
able to provide the following answers. 
In China, there is a growing interest in environmental issues, which is reflected in the
development of environmental regulation. This has had a direct impact on companies,
where environmental management has genuinely taken root.   
CNPC, a major Chinese oil company operating on an international scale, has upgraded
its system of environmental management. It intervenes, however, in very diverse settings
and has thus to deal with different expectations. The fact that it has adopted as a
reference standard to be applied in Chad a Chinese EIA law that limits itself to Chinese
territory gives rise to a legal problem.
The EIA was split into two parts in order to integrate the particularities of each project
component, particularly the financing structure. China Eximbank seems to have played
a decisive role in ensuring that the EIA for the refinery was completed swiftly. The
EIA report for the oil field and pipeline was submitted to the Chadian authorities in
August 2009 and the  opinion of the Chadian authorities was still pending in December
2010, but this did not prevent the construction work from starting. Although consul-
tation processes were set up, notably for the compensation programmes, the full EIA
documents have not been made public. Yet, the EIA seems to have fulfilled its role as far
as the internal steering of the project is concerned (rerouting the pipeline, additional
preventive measures for safety around the refinery, etc.). Thus far, the environmental
management plans and accidental spill prevention plans have not been made public. 
The impacts noted in December 2010 are on the whole either non-existent or mode-
rate, and adequately managed by CNPC. Although the impacts mentioned by each
EAI seem relatively weak, it should be noted that the cumulative impacts have been
given little consideration. These impacts may come to light when the combined effects
of the components covered by the EIAs are studied. Likewise, they may be linked to
the combined effects of other activities, which have been announced but for which
information disclosure has not been regular.
The likely connection between the CNPC-Rônier oilfield and the Chad-Cameroon
pipeline thus poses major problems. If it is to go ahead, the effective legal scope of
the commitments made by the Chadian government and the World Bank needs to
be more closely scrutinised, and a careful analysis of all of the clauses of the contract
signed in 2001 will require expertise in constitutional and petroleum law. This possible
pipeline connection will also raise the problem of compatibility between the CNPC
and Exxon HSE approaches.
Part Four
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The comparative study of the two projects sheds light on the contexts and standards
of both companies, their relative responsiveness to signals from outside and the
implementation of their HSE management systems. Yet, a comparison of the role
given to the HSE function reveals significant differences. 
Thanks to fact that the Doba project (under the much disparaged aegis of the World
Bank) served as an experimental laboratory, Exxon’s HSE department is not only an
internal technical tool for preventing or reducing incidents: it has also become a key
interface for external stakeholders. This transparency reinforces the impression that the
firm takes its HSE functions seriously and has fully internalised them. This impression is
confirmed by the size of the HSE department and its position within the corporate
hierarchy, as it has the authority and the duty “to sound the alarm”. Exxon’s target
audience stretches beyond its employees and subcontractors to include its external
stakeholders, who closely monitor the firm’s compliance with the environmental
rules of the game. 
CNPC has a well-developed HSE system deeply embedded within its management
structure, which thus encourages the internalisation of HSE concepts and procedures.
However, this entrenchment may come at a cost to the HSE department’s relative
autonomy, as greater independence is necessary if it is to fulfil its “whistle-blowing"
function for projects under strong political and economic pressure. For want of available
information, we were unable to conduct an in-depth study of the internal functioning
and effectiveness of the HSE system. On the other hand, we were able to observe
the setting-up and implementation of EIA procedures.  
The HSE system in CNPC is technically oriented and inward-looking. Its main focus
is the prevention of incidents and accidents, and its main target the employees working
in the company and its Chinese subcontractors. The HSE procedures do not explicitly
define any spaces or roles to engage in dialogue with stakeholders outside of the
company. This shortcoming may mean that CNPC will be unable to participate in
formulating new HSE standards, even though it proposes ways forward in terms of
content. However, the recent adoption by CNODC of two new HSE principles
would seem to herald a new approach. [ 181 ]
[ 1 8 1 ] The page “Society and environment” on the CNODC website has been updated to include the following 
principle: “Maintain public confidence in the integrity of our operations by openly reporting our performance
and consult with people outside the company to improve our understanding of external and internal HSE issues
associated with our operations”. Another principle emphasises the need for communication: “Communicating 
with the public and making CNODC's HSE performance popular;”
http://www.cnpcint.com/societyandenvironment/hse/hsestrategies.html site CNODC, accessed on12 April 2011.
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5.1. Introduction
The rise in China's energy requirements has led to a mushrooming of oil projects in
Africa. As a net importer of oil since 1993, this emerging power has seen its external
demand grow at an exponential rate, up from 25 million tonnes in 1995 to over 300
million today (Sanjuan and Trolliet, 2010: 123–124). Its late arrival on the international
stage, combined with the desire to avoid being overly dependent, has pushed the
Chinese government to adopt a strategy of diversifying its oil supply sources. At the
same time, the appearance of Chinese transnational enterprises has begun to trans-
form the global economic and political landscape (Alden and Davies, 2006:83). The
growth of these firms has been favoured by bilateral relations that frame active
cooperation. China has thus very rapidly become a petroleum giant. [ 182 ]
For Chinese firms,  Africa is seen as a laboratory or a testing ground, which at the
same time offers them some favourable opportunities for integration (Bosshard, 2008).
In the extractive sector, a few Chinese firms such as CNPC have thus been able to deve-
lop huge projects with the backing of the State. The African continent is home to
one third of the overseas missions undertaken by CNPC (9 out of 27 countries).
Although Angola today is currently the leading African oil supplier for China, it was
the context in Sudan at the end of the 1990s that initially helped Chinese oil firms to
5. The CNPC 
in Central Africa: 
a comparison of experiences 
in environmental management
in Sudan, Niger and Chad
Romain DITTGEN
[ 1 8 2 ] This success was symbolised by the market capitalisation of the Petrochina group, a CNPC subsidiary.
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move into the continent. CNPC has been in Sudan for the last fifteen years and still
holds a very strong position there today. With the development of new projects, in
Chad and Niger for example, this Chinese transnational has very clearly indicated its
intention to play a prominent role on the international scene (Paone, 2007:236). [ 183 ]
This growing presence in Africa raises the question of how the company is organised
with respect to environmental management. In the Sahel region, three projects of
different sizes and at different stages of advancement provide an opportunity to
study the management and evolution of CNPC's environmental regulation.
In this chapter, we will attempt to answer the following question: in the environmental
field, have the lessons learnt in Sudan been applied to other more recent CNPC projects
operating in the same geographical area? Can one speak of a regional environmental
management approach adapted to the Sahel region? Or is its environmental policy
defined on a case-by-case basis in line with the rules set by the head office in Beijing?
In this chapter we will test the following hypotheses:
l Interaction and exchange between the various operational sites in Africa has
led to the creation of a common frame of reference that influences the
implementation of new projects.
l Despite some similarities across the three countries, CNPC operates on a case-
by-case basis for environmental management.
l CNPC's long experience in Sudan has enabled it to gradually improve its envi-
ronmental regulations as well as its community relations.
l Under growing international pressure, CNPC has transferred the capacity for
dialogue that it developed in Sudan to Chad and Niger.
By comparing a project already in the production phase (Sudan, since 1995) and two
projects in the construction phase (Chad and Niger, 2009–2011), we will examine
the different timeframes in the context of a broader oil cycle. The difference in the
maturity of these three projects will allow us to test the validity of the hypotheses
concerning the mining cycle (van Vliet, 1998). More specifically, we will examine how
CNPC adapts to realities on the ground.
Part Five
[ 1 8 3 ] In 2003, the former chairman of CNPC had insisted on the goal of becoming a globally competitive, multi-
national firm.
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The literature on China's extractive activities in Africa is increasingly abundant and
diversified (Alden and Alves, 2009; Ennes Ferreira, 2008; Downs, 2007; Large, 2008;
Li, 2010; Soares de Oliveira, 2008; Taylor, 2006). However, very few studies specifically
address the environmental stakes of China’s presence on the continent (cf. Bosshard,
2008). Similarly, cross-country research on environmental issues for the purpose of
regional comparison  is still embryonic.
For Chad, data was collected during a three-month research trip (June to September
2010). For Sudan and Niger, our data was drawn mainly from various NGO reports as
well as scientific papers and the press. The comparative analysis enables us to examine
a phenomenon that can be observed in different contexts and use different study
scales to compare two or more objects and identify their points of similarity and
difference, and then attempt to explain these (Bloch, 1928; Detienne, 2000). The aim
here is to compare oil operations deployed by CNPC in Sudan, Chad and Niger in
order to understand the rationales underlying the company’s choice of location and
the way in which it has integrated the environmental dimension into the management
of the different sites.
All three countries show similarities in the ecological and socioeconomic domains. On
the basis of these observations, one could assume that CNPC has implemented
similar environmental practices (5.2). However, the specific political contexts in each
locality have impacted these practices differently. The players’ organisational capacities
and margin of manoeuvre are greatly influenced by the national setting (5.3). Finally,
although a few key moments have helped to drive environmental regulation in the
three countries, efforts to improve practices have often proved difficult and come
up against a series of different obstacles (5.4).
5.2. Similar challenges and contexts for environmental
management 
CNPC's operations in all three countries allow us to draw several parallels in terms
of the host environments, the role of the extractive sector in the national economies
and the recent consolidation of environmental regulation.
5.2.1. The oil projects and their environments
The oil exploitation areas in Sudan, Chad and Niger are located in similar ecological
zones; they are also facing to a certain extent the same socio-political challenges.
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CNPC has been present in Sudan since 1996 and operates several oilfields. Since the
end of the 1990s, it has headed the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company
(GNPOC) consortium [ 184 ] and, as the operator, is exploiting blocks 1, 2 and 4. These
Heglig fields, connected to Port Sudan by a 1,650 km oil pipeline since 1999, account
for more than half of the Sudanese production. To open up oil production in this
zone, a refinery was constructed near Khartoum and an oil terminal at Port Sudan.
In 2000, CNPC won a tender for blocks 3 and 7 and operates these as Petrodar's
majority shareholder. [ 185 ] The discovery of large-scale deposits [ 186 ] in these blocks
Source: design by R. Dittgen; produced by J. F.Cuenot based on data from CNPC (Sudan and Niger) 
and the Ministry of Petroleum (Chad).
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[ 1 84 ] This consortium comprises the Chinese firm, CNPC (40%), the Malaysian firm, Petronas (30%), the Indian firm, 
ONGC (25%) and the Sudanese firm, Sudapet (5%).
[ 1 85 ] The Petrodar consortium comprises CNPC (41%), Petronas (40%), Sudapet (8%) another Chinese firm, Sinopec, 
(6%) and the Al Thani Corporation, U.A.E.(5%).
[ 1 86 ] According to CNPC data.
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justified the construction of a second 1,385 km pipeline routed in the direction of
Port Sudan to connect up with the first pipeline close to Khartoum. CNPC is the sole
shareholder of block 6 located west of the Heglig fields. Initially, production levels in
this block were relatively low (10,600 barrels/day). However, in 2006, following a series
of drillings in the Fula field, output increased and has since reached over 40,000
barrels/day. More recently, CNPC began drilling in two other blocks (13 and 15) in the
north-east of the country close to Port Sudan (Total, 2009), which involves offshore
oil operations. This overview of CNPC projects underlines the intensity of Chinese
oil activities in Sudan. It also shows the diversity of ecological environments affected
by the impacts of these operations (cf. Map 6).
The geographical and geopolitical location of the oil projects has a strong impact on
the degree of environmental sensitivity (cf. Map 6).
l In Chad, the pipeline crosses moderately populated areas but these are close to
the country’s demographic and economic hub; however, the geopolitical context
here is less sensitive than in the south, in the Doba project zone (cf. Parts 2
and 3).
l In Niger, oil activities are being developed in a remote fringe area. In addition
to the expected oil rent, one of the stakes in developing economic activities
in this area may be a more effective integration (and control) of the eastern
part of the country
Depending on the distances covered by the various pipelines, the range of ecological
zones is more or less limited, and biodiversity has different degrees of variety and
vulnerability. 
In Sudan, moving from the oilfields to the oil port, the climate gradually changes from
the edge of a humid tropical zone (800–1,000 mm annual rainfall), into the Sahelo-
Sudanian zone (600-800 mm) and finally into the arid zone (100 mm). The vegetation
adapts to the respective climates: wooded savannah in the south, followed by savannah
shrubland and desert flora in the north (Ben Yahmed et al., 2009:209). In the south,
the natural habitat is fragile and would need environmental management if extractive
operations are developed. It harbours one of the world’s largest freshwater reserves
with floodplains covering up to 100,000 km2. The region includes several oil concessions:
block 4 and a large part of blocks 5a, 5b and 5. These blocks are entirely located in
the western, eastern and northern Upper Nile states, as well as in Abyei. The south
is home to a particularly rich flora and fauna mainly comprising zebras, crocodiles,
giraffes, elephants and various species of migratory birds, which depend on the
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region’s vast water resources (Tutdel, 2010:12-13). If the aquifer and surface water
were contaminated, the impact on the local populations and wildlife would be
considerable. The Chinese pipelines cross the vital River Nile axis, which poses specific
environmental challenges. The pipeline of the Petrodar-led project crosses the marsh-
lands of “Marchar" and follows the banks of the White Nile. Crossing these marshy
areas heightens risks in the case of an oil spill, particularly with respect to the local
communities and animals that use the river water, and this would have dramatic
impacts both for Sudan and Egypt.
In Chad and Niger, a Chinese presence in the oil sector is recent (2007) and production
will not go on stream until late 2011 or in 2012. CNPC has invested simultaneously in
oil projects that share similarities in terms of size, contractual arrangements and the
challenges to be addressed.
In Chad, the oilfields are located in the centre-south region, more specifically in the
Bongor Basin, in the transition area between the Sahelo-Sudanian and Sahel zones.
Production in the first phase is estimated at 20,000 barrels/day. A 311 km pipeline
links the oilfields to the Djermaya refinery, 40 km north of N'Djamena (cf. Maps 4
and 5). It crosses the River Chari, which ensures the livelihood of numerous fishermen
and the water supply for N'Djamena (1 million inhabitants), before flowing into Lake
Chad. The lake harbours abundant natural resources (fisheries and others) that are
nonetheless fragile due to their location in an endorheic basin (i.e. not connected to
the sea). Depending on the latitude, the soil and land clearance, the steppe plant
formations in the north gradually give way southwards to forest, wooded or shrub
savannah. The Chinese oil project is located on terrain with little topographical
variation, at an altitude of 300 m and a denivelation of less than 30 m. The pipeline
crossings over the River Chari in Chad, and the Nile in Sudan, are particularly sensitive
points.
In Niger, the Chinese project is located to the south-east of the country in a low
rainfall area (100-300 mm per year), at the changing point between the Sahara and the
Sahelian steppes, at the very heart of a future project for the protection of flora and
fauna (Niger diaspora, 2008). This area is characterised by very specific biodiversity,
harbouring in particular the last populations of wild addax [ 187 ] and subspecies of
dama gazelles. The small-scale oil project – which may be extended – involves a refinery
situated close to a large urban centre (Zinder, Niger’s second largest city). The refinery’s
future electricity production is intended to solve, or at least reduce, the country’s
[ 1 87 ] The addax is an antelope, now very rare, that lives in the more remote areas of the Sahara.
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energy problems. [ 188 ] On the whole, the region affected by oil operations has a low
population density: sparsely populated around Zinder (close to the refinery) and
very sparsely populated around the oilfields (Agadem).
All three countries are marked by alternate dry and wet seasons of variable length
(from May to October or June to September). Rainfall (very irregular from one year
to the next) varies according to the latitude and the region. This mainly impacts the
harvests, making it very difficult for much of the population to bridge the hunger
gap. Irregular rainfall, fragile soils and soil erosion are characteristic of the entire
region studied. Population density remains low, ranging from 9 inhabitants per
square kilometre in Chad, to 12 in Niger, and 17 in Sudan (Bost et al., 2009:346-357).
If the very sparsely populated Saharan regions are excluded, these figures jump up
but are still moderate overall. In all three countries, population density along the
pipeline routes is low. In Sudan, however, massive population displacements have
been associated with the oil operations, in a context that is plagued by geopolitical
issues. In the Melut Basin, for example, a study revealed that 168 villages were impac-
ted by such displacements (ECOS, 2006:19) (cf. infra).
The fact that oil facilities exist alongside mobile activities such as herding also creates
problems, particularly in Sudan where certain pipeline sections are above ground. In
Sudan, the oilfields straddle the north and south of the country, which creates a
highly sensitive geopolitical situation. Oilfield geography played an important role in
the civil war, as well as  in the process that led to the creation of the new Republic of
South Sudan following the January 2011 referendum. Environmental stakes played
an important role in these events, particularly with respect to the future of the
marshland or to population displacements (see for example, Prunier, 2009).
In all three countries, there is a clear geographical separation between upstream
and downstream petroleum activities. In both Chad and Sudan, oil processing and
upgrading activities are concentrated in the “North", whereas the extraction zones are
in the “South". Here, the notion of “north” and “south” is not confined to a geogra-
phical location, but also encompasses the representation of a national territory (Magrin,
2001). Put very schematically, a distinction is often drawn between the areas with a
mostly Muslim population in the North and the mainly Christian or animist populations
in the South. After long years of turbulence, [ 189 ] this has led to a greatly asymmetric
[ 1 8 8 ] A. Idrissa, « Suite à la pose de la pierre de la raffinerie de pétrole de Zinder (Niger) » (October 27, 2008), 
National Organisations Coordination Bureau for Transparency and Budgetary Analysis; « L’ambassadeur de 
Chine vante la coopération entre son pays et le Niger », (April 6, 2010), afriqueavenir.org; « Raffinerie de 
pétrole pour le Niger et le Tchad » (October 28, 2008), Voa News.
[ 1 8 9 ] On Sudan read: Lavergne, 1989; Prunier et al., 2003; Johnson, 2006; on Chad: Buijtenhuis, 1987; Magrin, 2001.
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access to the national, political stage. Most of the oilfields, now the keystone of
the Sudanese economy, are located in the centre South, whereas all  the refining
and petrochemical activities are concentrated around Khartoum or Port Sudan.
In Sudan, this sort of distribution gave rise to opposing interpretations. For the govern-
ment in Khartoum, it represented a means of integration and national interdependence.
For the opposition in the South, it was again a reflection of the North-South domi-
nation. Niamey, the capital of Niger, is not directly involved in oil activities; a pipeline
connects the oilfields to Zinder. Here, the layout of the pipeline tends to follow an East
West direction, while socio-political cleavages tend to reflect opposition between river
people and desert people. The petroleum project, therefore, is far from being part and
parcel of simple ethnic geopolitics: the area covered, has long been home to a mix
of populations comprising Arabs, Toubous, Tuaregs, Haoussas and Peuls.
The oil projects in all three countries have another point in common: the oil exploita-
tion zones are remote and difficult to access. [ 190 ] In general, the oilfield infrastructure
has been strictly limited to what is required for the construction phase or for access
to pumping facilities and transport once a field is operational. In Chad, the town of
Bousso is still hoping to  benefit from the construction of a bridge over the River
Chari. [ 191 ] Pipelines are somewhat more easily accessible: during the dry season access
poses no problems, but during the rainy season some tracks are very difficult to access.
Dirt tracks and asphalted roads have been built by the different projects and this
has greatly disenclaved some areas and encouraged trade.
In all three countries, the refineries have been sited on the outskirts of large urban
centres already endowed with some infrastructure.
The Human Development Index (HDI) shows a low level of development for the three
countries studied. [ 192 ] All three display the same pattern of a two-speed economy
split between a primary agricultural sector and a high-growth extractive sector –
which further aggravates the imbalances typical of rentier economies (Magrin, 2011).
Farming, herding and fishing are still the main sources of employment for large swathes
[ 1 9 0 ] The development of an oil project naturally depends on the location of the exploitable deposits, but 
also on the rules governing their access. Thereafter, the routing or location chosen for transport, storage 
and refining facilities will depend not only on flows and existing markets, but also on the forward-looking 
development policies that countries want, and are able, to negotiate with the oil companies. Many 
LDCs lack the autonomy required to develop such regulatory frameworks and policies.
[ 1 9 1 ] Interview with the Chief Administrative Officer of Bousso, in August 2010.
[ 1 92 ] With HDIs of 0.261 and 0.295 respectively in 2010, Niger and Chad are virtually at the bottom of the country 
list (167th and 163rd).  Sudan has a slightly higher HDI ranking at 0.379 (154th), but this indicator masks very 
uneven development in the country (UNDP official site, accessed on 17 November 2010).
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of the population in Sudan, Chad and Niger. At the start of this decade, herding
accounted for 42% of Chad’s primary sector production, and 15% of GDP. Before
the advent of oil, farming provided 50% of primary sector production and 16% of
GDP (ISM Consult, 2009a). The start-up of the Doba oil project raised high hopes
for development at national level as well as in the oil-producing region (cf. Part 2),
but results have been mixed. State investments further exacerbate the dysfunctions
often seen at the beginning of extractive booms (Soares de Oliveira, 2007) and typi-
cally focus excessively on infrastructure and the capital city (Magrin, 2011).
In Niger, the oil adventure has only just begun with the CNPC project, but the country
has already experienced the effects of this type of dual economy. Now the world’s sixth
largest producer of uranium, the country has essentially been living off its uranium
rent since the 1950s. The rest of its economy is largely dominated by the primary sector,
particularly extensive transhumant pastoralism. Groundnuts, millet and sorghum provide
the staple diet. For a country that has not been self-sufficient since 1975, the economic
prospects are gloomy and the trade balance remains largely negative.
In Sudan the concession of numerous oil blocks, mostly operated by China, have
enabled the country to limit inflation and maintain a stable currency in a difficult
global economic environment (Bost et al., 2009; AFP, 2010). Although characterised
by the same dual economy, Sudan stands out due to the extent of its oil activities
(Fawzy-Rossano, 2006). Agricultural production, which is vulnerable to unpredictable
weather conditions and insufficient to feed all of the population, nonetheless remains
one of the country’s main resources.
Thus, overall, the three countries are characterised by an agro-pastoral economy at
the mercy of unpredictable weather conditions and by a background of poverty and
conflict (past or present). Periods of drought in the 1970s and 1980s, together with
the implementation of structural adjustment programmes, only added to their vul-
nerability. At the same time, dependency on foreign aid and/or on the price of raw
materials (cotton and more recently oil in Chad, uranium in Niger, cotton and oil in
Sudan) are very much a reality in these countries. Despite the many similarities, there
are also a number of inherent differences that influence the role of environmental
regulation in these three case studies.
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5.2.2. The recent emergence of local environmental legislation
All three countries face a challenge in environmental management with the deve-
lopment of oil activities. Firstly, the multiplication of oil wells is in competition with
agriculture and livestock farming for the use of land; and, secondly, pipelines are
exposed to the risk of oil spills particularly when they cross humid areas or rivers.
Managing these risks becomes potentially more challenging due to the uncertainty
caused by a lack of security: in Sudan, despite an apparent end of the conflict, certain
areas through which the pipeline runs remain unstable and make monitoring on the
spot more difficult. In Niger, intermittent Tuareg rebellions and more recently action
taken by the AQMI (Al Qaeda for Islamic Maghreb) group on the potential threat
for oil activity; in Chad, the pipeline runs through areas which in the light of history
do not appear to be politically unstable, but the country on the whole, has a rocky
foundation.
In all  three countries, the emergence of environmental legislation targeting the
extractive industries has more or less kept pace with the development of projects in this
sector.
In Sudan, while efforts were made to preserve the environment and natural resources
prior to independence in 1956, progress in this field admittedly only occurred in the
1990s and early 2000s. Thus the Environment and Natural Resources Supreme Council
for Environment, ENSCE, was set up in 1991 to supervise coordination of all questions
related to the environment and natural resources. With the launch of the new national
development policy (1992-2002), the environmental portfolio was promoted up to
ministerial level in 1994 (Osman Mirghani, 2007:71). In Niger, the 1998 legislation made
an EIE [ 193 ] mandatory for any firm wishing to operate in the extractive sector (Meynier,
2009:32). [ 194 ] In theory, an implementing decree specifies that the EIA should be
carried out at the beginning of operations. During the exploratory phase, measures
for managing the environment and local populations must be taken. In addition, Article
57 of Law No. 98-56 stipulates that extractive activities must be conducted in such a
way as to ensure the protection of the environment as well as a rational use of natural
resources. In Niger, the Bureau d’évaluation environnementale et des études d’impact
(BEEEI – Environmental Assessment and Impact Studies Bureau) oversees regulation
[ 1 9 3 ] In the 1960s, no EIA was required for uranium exploitation either in Niger or in France.
[ 1 94 ] “activities, development projects or programmes, which by their magnitude or by their occurrences on 
the natural and human environment, can harm the latter, should be given prior permission by the Ministry 
of Environment. This permission is granted on the basis of (…) an environmental impact study carried out 
by the promoter”, (Rural Code, Article 4, order 97-001). 
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in this field. A study is mandatory for all operations that extract or process energy-
producing resources, as well as for the construction of oil or gas pipelines.[ 195 ] In Chad,
the current legislative framework is governed principally by the 1998 Law No. 14
defining the general principles for the protection of the environment, and by Law
No. 6 of 2 February 2007 on fossil fuels (see Maoundonodji, 2009; and Part 2). As in
Niger, Chad's environmental legislation requires that an impact study be carried
out prior to the start of any extractive project.
The first EIA in Sudan [ 196 ] dates back to the colonial period. In 1978, the Institute of
Environmental Studies was set up and based at Khartoum University. As a result,
Sudan has a scientific legacy conducive to reflection on the environmental impact
of development projects. In the 1980s, Khartoum University conducted studies focu-
sing on water projects and road construction.The frequency of EIAs increased mainly
due to the advent of petroleum activities and their connected projects (1998-2006).
Despite the vast array of sectoral laws on environmental conservation, EIAs were
not mandatory at the beginning of the oil era, and only became so in 2001, when the
Sudanese president finally signed an environmental protection act (Osman Mirghani,
2007:71). [ 197 ] In the oil sector, several studies were conducted by the Institute of
Environmental Studies. The GNPOC commissioned the Institute to carry out a series
of assessments: two in 1998 (one on the El-Muglad production facilities and one on the
El-Muglad-Bashayer pipeline), and another study in 2002 on the Munga and Bamboo
oilfields. In 2004 and 2005, two studies were carried out on behalf of the Petrodar
Operating Company (PDOC) Sudan and concerned the development of oil operations
in the Melut Basin and on the Bashayer 2 oil terminal.
With the coming of the oil era in Sudan, Chad and Niger, EIAs were gradually imposed
by the different national laws and regulations. The impact assessment implies (i) a study
of the initial state of the site and its human and physical environment, (ii) a description
of the project and its foreseeable impact, (iii) a risk analysis along with appropriate
[ 1 95 ] Decree No. 2000-398/PRN/ME/LCD, Article 33 (Law No. 98-56).
[ 1 96 ] Although it was not officially designated as such, Moghraby states that this was the first EIA to be implemented
in a developing country. Sudan was almost ahead of France on this count. On the other hand, the Jongleï canal 
project was so highly debatable with respect to its geopolitical ambitions, and proved such a failure (cf. Prunier, 
2009), that questions could be raised as to the sense of the EIA carried out at the time.
[ 1 97 ] “Notwithstanding, the Environmental Protection Act was passed in 2001. This is a policy-oriented frame-
work legislation for the protection of the environment and natural resources. Article 17, Chapter III states 
‘Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, with respect to permit by the competent authority for 
projects or programmes every person who desires to enter into any such project, as may probably affect 
the present environment and natural resources negatively, shall present an environmental feasibility study, 
signed on the part of the evaluation and follow-up committee, which is constituted by the Council 
(ENRSC)’", (Article 17, Chapter 3, “Environmental Protection Act").
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responses (prevention, mitigation), and (iv) an environmental management and com-
pensation programme (ISM Consult, 2009a:86–112). Whereas, in the area of environ-
mental legislation, procedures have been instituted fairly recently in all of the three
countries (particularly under pressure from donors, the World Bank or Eximbank),
slight national differences  have influenced the implementation of CNPC’s projects.
5.3. Have country settings influenced the CNPC’s 
environmental management?
In its 2009 annual report, CNPC presents the various actions it has taken in the area
of environmental management. The “Environment and Society" chapter sets out
nine key principles and describes the organisation of its HSE department (CNPC,
2009:16–20). In addition to environmental protection, the other points mentioned
include operational safety, quality control, overseas community development, energy
efficiency, public welfare undertakings, etc. Only a very general description of protective
measures taken is given, without any precise examples outside of China. According
to the report, progress has been made in emissions reduction, wastewater management
and the discharge of oil-related pollutants and residues. At the same time, the company
has explored certain aspects of the circular economy and cleaner production. Efforts
were made to extend the industrial value chain of oilfield and refinery operations and
to recycle and reuse wastewater. In the section on overseas community development,
Sudan and Niger are cited as two examples. The stated goal is to establish a long-term
partnership with host countries and local communities. This section refers to the
creation of additional jobs, ongoing training for employees, improvement in people’s
living conditions and the contribution towards local socio-economic development
(Osman Mirghani 2007:20). In Sudan, CNPC funded a project centred on education,
poverty reduction and improved living conditions. [ 198 ] In Niger, the company mentions
that it has made special efforts to preserve the environment during oilfield operations,
particularly to protect vegetation and soils. It has also launched a project to plant diffe-
rent species of trees to extend the green area in the Agadem oilfield, in the hinterland
of the Sahara.
The section of the report on oil operations in Africa only briefly mentions the progress
of CNPC’s current projects on the continent (particularly in Niger, Chad and Sudan).
In Sudan, CNPC has begun an environmental protection project whose current phase
aims to reduce atmospheric oil-related pollution and to build a treatment plant for
[ 1 98 ] Although CNPC presents a series of initiatives in the section on community development, the report does 
not specify either the area of intervention or the scale of these projects.
Part Five
207
©AFD / November 2012 / The environmental challenges facing a Chinese oil company in Chad
wastewater from the Khartoum refinery. Once treated, this water will be reused for
agricultural purposes. The company also highlights its success in laying an underground
rather than an aerial pipeline (using horizontal drilling) to cross the River Chari in Chad,
which thus minimises the impact on the river and its valley. For CNPC, this example is
an illustration of its responsible attitude towards environmental protection (Osman
Mirghani, 2007:52).
Apart from CNPC’s annual report, it is only in Sudan – where the CNPC has fifteen
years of experience behind it – that the company has published a specific document
on its activities. The document affirms CNPC’s commitment to limit and reduce the
environmental impact of its operations. This includes the production process and the
use of new technologies in order to attain clean production. In 2009, all discharges
of gas, wastewater and solid waste material were compliant with international and
Sudanese standards. According to the report, all exploration and production operations
in blocks 1/2/4, 3/7 and 6 comply with ISO 14001 standards. The biggest biode-
gradable wastewater treatment plant was built in the Heglig fields and the treated
water will be recycled for irrigation. This plant, which received ISO 9001 certification, is
considered by CNPC as a model of environmental protection (CNPC, 2010b:16). At the
Khartoum refinery, USD 27 million have been invested in environmental protection
during its ten years of operation. The refinery is described as “A Pearl of the African
Continent" (CNPC, 2009: 16–20) and an example for other countries to follow. CNPC
says that it has complied with Sudanese standards on atmospheric and noise pollution.
The company has also gradually invested in a vast tree plantation project in order to
create a green belt around the refinery.
These documents give the impression that environmental regulation is dealt with in
a similar way in all three countries. Yet, the operational context and the specific legacy
of each country in terms of environmental rules and mechanisms have certainly
influenced project implementation.
In Niger, the CNPC project lies within a zone that is currently being classified as a
protected area. The difficulty here thus involves reconciling oil activities and the
conservation of the rich biodiversity found in this climatic transition zone. Though
both of these projects affirm that their goal is to fight poverty, they do not have the
same challenges or timescales. On the one hand, oil fuels hopes for national economic
and social development; the country expects to resolve its present energy crisis with
the help of this integrated Chinese project. On the other hand, the direct economic
benefits of conserving a natural area are very limited in the short run, which raises
the question of immediate priorities (Meynier, 2009). So far, Niger has had no prior
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experience in oil, but it could well draw on its long experience of uranium mining.
Certainly, the fact that the sensitive issues raised by extractive activities are similar
could help the national stakeholders, whether these are acting on behalf of the State or
civil society, to manage relations with the Chinese company.
In Chad, an entire system for environmental and social risk management (EIA, EMP)
was set up within the framework of the Exxon-Doba project. The press coverage, the
scale of the project and the various stakeholders all helped to deepen the different
learning experiences (cf. Part 2) at a national level. The withdrawal of the World Bank
hastened the collapse of the State's environmental monitoring capability, but the
project nevertheless enabled civil society, consultants, government officials and Exxon
executives to gain a great deal of experience. The Doba project established a very high
level of regulation and continues to leave its imprint on the popular imagination of
Chadian society. People trained under the Doba project were subsequently recruited as
environmental consultants by CNPC (cf. Part 4). While the Rônier project does not
involve the same stakeholders as the Doba project, it does impose an implicit reference
for all the key players involved in Chad’s oil sector.
In Sudan, recent decades have been marked by conflict and lasting instability in certain
regions of the country. Chevron discovered oil at the end of the 1970s and early 1980s,
but interrupted its activities on the outbreak of the second Sudanese civil war in
1983. The departure of the Western majors opened the way for CNPC's arrival in the
following decade, in 1996. In this conflict situation, implementing EIAs and assessing oil
operation impacts became an arduous task. In 2005, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement
was signed between the Khartoum government and the South of the country (CPA,
2005). [ 199 ] This was intended to respond to concerns about the impact of the oil
industry on the environment and the South Sudan communities (Tudtel, 2010:6).
One of the main aims was to set up a National Petroleum Commission in order to
manage the oil industry. Directives pertaining to oil resource sharing and environ-
mental protection were issued. Jointly chaired by the president of the Government
of National Unity (the Sudanese president Omar El-Béchir) and the president of South
Sudan, the commission is responsible for drawing up and enforcing rules for the
development and management of the oil sector. In theory, the agreement stipulates
that communities neighbouring the oil zones be consulted and included in all contract
negotiations and compensation processes.
[ 1 9 9 ] The agreement was signed at the end of the second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005). It set an interim  
period of six years to be followed by a referendum organised for January 2011. It was then that the South 
Sudan population chose to separate from Sudan to create an independent State.
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Until now, responsibilities for enforcing and overseeing environmental legislation
have not been clearly assigned. Despite uncertainties, the signing of the CPA triggered
a change in Sudan's approach to the environment. The environmental management
efforts made under the various CNPC projects could usefully be consolidated within
the new setting of a Sudan split into two separate States following the referendum
in January 2011.
5.4. Implementation: limits and lessons learnt
5.4.1. Environmental issues overshadowed by economic 
and political concerns
In so-called “normal" conditions, it is no easy matter to develop and enforce environ-
mental regulation; difficulties are further aggravated when the context is marked by
conflict and instability (cf. Van Vliet, 1997:11-25). CNPC's arrival in Sudan, in the midst of
conflict, was not conducive to compliance with environmental standards. Following
the withdrawal of different Western companies such as Chevron, Shell or indepen-
dent companies like Arakis Energy Corporation or Talisman, CNPC very quickly became
the foremost player in the Sudanese oil sector and still maintains a leading position.
Negotiations between the Chinese company and the government are most often
handled by a single representative from each side. For Sudan, this is the Secretary
General of the Ministry of Petroleum, who has been delegated full authority to act. [ 200 ]
According to various reports, exploration and production contracts have ignored
environmental protection and community rights (ECOS, 2006; Tutdel, 2010; Coalition
for International Justice, 2006; UNEP, 2006a; USAID, 2007). While Chinese firms claim
that they have carried out an EIA for some of the blocks, these documents have not
been made publically available (Meynier, 2009), and public debate is theoretically
one of the key principles of EIA processes. At the same time, confidentiality reigns
over all contract negotiations thus making verification of the related clauses impossible.
Concerning oil projects, the lack of transparency in these three countries is the same
as in most countries of the world. In fact, transparency is the core demand of civil
society, as it wishes to be cognisant of the exact terms of contracts (Sani, 2010; VOA
News, 2008). Most of the time, political agendas overrule all else and lead to the hasty
completion of the construction phase to the detriment of a prior environmental
assessment. Such is the case in Chad, for example, where the Rônier project is conside-
rably advanced (end 2010) even though the EIA has not yet been fully approved by
[ 2 0 0 ] Interview with Ismaël Moctar (independent consultant) in N'Djamena, August 2010.
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the Ministry of Environment (cf. Part 4). [ 201 ] The upcoming elections might explain
why the government is pushing CNPC into a tight schedule. All three countries show
the same tipping of the scales towards economic and political interests rather than
towards environmental concerns. 
Whereas the media coverage of the Doba project helped Chadian civil society to
organise itself, the discreet profile of the Rônier project makes advocacy work all
the more difficult. In addition, the remoteness of oil zones does not make matters
easier for local NGOs, which are embryonic and of limited number in the Chinese
exploitation zone in Chad (GRAMPTC, 2010: 31), and even non-existent in the oil
zones in Niger (Meynier, 2009). In Sudan, particularly in the Melut Basin, difficult
access and lack of infrastructure in certain areas heighten the dangers facing the
NGOs. During periods of conflict, these were often directly threatened and thus
unable to continuously monitor environmental issues and the rights of the local
population (ECOS, 2006:7,23).
Whatever the circumstances, CNPC’s main communication channel is with the central
government. Neither the territorial administrations nor the customary authorities
are able to ensure effective environmental monitoring , and local civil society even
less so (ECOS, 2006; Tutdel, 2010; Coalition for International Justice, 2006; UNEP, 2006;
USAID, 2007), which is a sign of the privileged ties that this Chinese state-owned
company has forged with the central power in the three countries studied.
In Sudan, against a backdrop of war, compensation and population displacement
have led to serious problems; in Niger and Chad, the situation seems manageable
despite various misunderstandings. According to diverse sources, the arguments of
the local communities affected by the various oil projects in Sudan went unheard
during the negotiating phase. As for displacement, the inhabitants of several villages
located in the Chinese oil exploitation zone in the Melut Basin were forcibly evicted
by the government army or militias during the oilfield development phase between
1999 and 2002 (ECOS, 2006:19). In Chad and Niger, the oil projects are located in
relatively uninhabited areas and the main issue is thus compensation for loss of
cropland. Most often, the local communities complain about the compensation
rates and criteria as well as late payments. The Sudanese government had promised
that these communities would be relocated to sites equipped with basic services and
housing but, according to ECOS, this never happened (ECOS, 2006:19). Since the
Part Five
[ 2 0 1 ] The EIA for the refinery was authorised, while the EIA for the oilfields and pipeline were forwarded to the 
Ministry of Environment in October 2010.
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signing of the CPA, some of the villagers who had found refuge in regional centres
began to return to their former villages. As this area is extremely marshy in the rainy
season, the inhabitants usually build their villages on slightly elevated sandy ridges. In
the meantime, however, most of these easily accessible locations had been occupied
by Petrodar to build roads used by the consortium (Reeves, 2003).
The Petroleum Commission set up in 2005 under the CPA has a very narrow margin
of manoeuvre. The Government of National Unity and the Government of South
Sudan have very different legal systems and neither has the mandate to handle envi-
ronmental problems that predate the signing of the agreement. Also, the Commission
has no mechanism to compensate the populations affected by oil operations. Given
the confusion reigning at jurisdictional level in Sudan, national environmental moni-
toring is proving very complicated and consequently the CPA is no more than a dead
letter. In both Chad and Niger, the State’s supervisory bodies are a recent phenomenon
and not sufficiently well established to make their presence felt in an institutional
landscape dominated by the petroleum ministries. The financial and human resources
they are allocated are still not sufficient for them to carry out satisfactory monitoring
of oil activities.
5.4.2. Divergences and prospects in the environmental field
At first sight, the Sudanese experience appears to have had no tangible impact on
the recent projects in Chad and Niger. Moreover, the comparison between CNPC's
arrival in Sudan in 1996 and the launch of new operations is a difficult exercise.
Depending on the country, the size and scale of projects vary and CNPC disposes of
different margins of manoeuvre.
The Sudanese case may not have directly helped CNPC to manage the environmental
challenges in the other two countries, but the company may have drawn some general
lessons from this experience. For the moment, CNPC’s major challenge is to reduce
the technical lag compared to Western majors and to project the image of a competent
and environment-friendly company. Due to strong international pressure in Sudan,
CNPC does appear to have developed its capacity for dialogue at both the political
and environmental level. In Chad, on the other hand, in a somewhat more peaceful
setting , it seems that this know-how, and particularly regular contacts with civil
society, have still not been put in place. 
According to the CNPC report, a certain number of measures were taken to encourage
and increase local employment in Sudan. At the end of 2009, the proportion of
Sudanese workers employed on oil projects exceeded 95%, with 75% in engineering ,
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construction and other oilfield services. In total, the number of jobs created is over
80,000 (CNPC, 2009:20). CNPC also provides training programmes for young graduates
in electronics, civil engineering , welding , etc. Selected candidates receive training
at a local unit of CNPC’s Engineering and Construction Company (CPECC, a CNPC
subsidiary). Successful students have the opportunity of signing a work contract.
Since 2005, workshops have been organised in cooperation with the Sudanese
exploration and oil production authority in order to train Sudanese technicians.
The Khartoum refinery provides training opportunities not only for its employees
but also for students from universities and other institutions. At the same time,
promising directors and technicians are sent to China or third countries for additional
training (VOA News, 2008). One might have thought that the size and duration of
the Sudanese operations would have facilitated technical training and exchanges
between the Chad and Niger sites, but this is restricted to the technical personnel,
with the transfer of engineers from one CNPC project to another. The HSE staff
are sourced from China or from previous Chad-based projects run by other firms
with local staff (cf. Part 4). [ 202 ] Thus, fifty young Chadians from the Chad refinery
were trained in China and not in the neighbouring country.
In Sudan, the results of the 2011 referendum have posed a challenge for environmental
regulation. For CNPC the task is daunting as several of its oil blocks are located in
South Sudan (for example, the Heglig and Muglad fields among others). In the centre
of Sudan, a very small area has been explored with only a few wells now on stream.
Prior to the 2005 agreement, exploration was restricted to the fringes of the North-
South border, under military control (UNEP, 2006b:144). Now that some degree of
stability has been restored, exploration has been extended to the rest of South
Sudan and south Darfur. Most of the large unexplored areas lie in the southern part
of the country and it is quite likely that sizeable oil projects will start up over the
next ten years. Furthermore, the CPA made no mention of how the oil sector was to
be governed if the result of the referendum did not match the outcome desired by the
government (Tutdel, 2010:18-19). But this is exactly what happened. In the field of
environmental oil regulation, as in other fields, the implications of an independent
South Sudan State is a subject that requires further research.
Until 2011, environmental management has thus followed a case-by-case logic. Yet, if
the oil projects in the different Central African countries were interlinked, then CNPC
would be more likely to adopt a more regional approach. Niger’s oil deposits are in
[ 2 0 2 ] In Chad, most of the HSE staff is from the HSE Department of the Canadian company Encana, some people
from China and former Chadian executives from Exxon.
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scattered enclaves and to make production viable multiple oil wells would need to
be drilled (ECOS, May 2006; Tutdel, 2010; Coalition for International Justice, 2006;
UNEP, 2006; USAID, 2007) and the investment required would make it necessary to
export the crude. As the country is landlocked, the company has several options:
exportation via Nigeria, Benin, Algeria or through an eventual connection with the
Exxon Mobil pipeline in Chad (cf. Map 6).
In Chad, it may be advantageous for the Chinese to connect their oil fields to the
pipeline built and operated by Exxon. Shipping conditions are being negotiated with
the Chad government and the Doba consortium. At the same time, other options,
albeit more costly and riskier, are being negotiated with a French company. The idea
would be to connect the CNPC pipeline in Chad with the transport system in Sudan.
Although the environmental standards for Doba are defined in the IFC loan agreement,
the question is how and at what level these would be applicable to Chinese operations
in case of a link-up between the CNPC and Exxon Mobil pipelines (cf. Parts 3 and 4).
A comparison of the Chinese oil operations at different stages of production raises
questions for van Vliet´s set of hypotheses on van Vliet’s hypotheses on mining
cycles (1998). These show how the operators’ strategies, the state of the facilities
and the negotiating capacities of affected local communities evolve over time. In prin-
ciple, at the outset of all extractive operations, job creation is at its highest level and the
negative social and environmental impacts are not (yet) visible. As the production cycle
advances, firms are less and less inclined to pay indemnities and to respond to the
demands of the local population. At a same time, NGOs and other organisations need
time to organise themselves and develop the requisite skills to defend the interests
of local communities. Plotted on a chart, this temporal mismatch shows two opposing
curves; one rising and one falling. The difference between these two curves expresses
the population’s unexploited potential at the beginning of the cycle and the heigh-
tened tensions towards the end of the cycle due to the companies’ reluctance to
engage in dialogue (van Vliet, 1998). So far, these hypotheses have mainly been tested
using extractive projects led by Western companies. But are they also applicable to
Chinese companies?
An analysis of CNPC oil operations in Sudan, Chad and Niger reveals certain traits
that diverge from the model. In all three cases, oil contracts were negotiated directly
with the country's central authority. Due to the special relationship with the host
country’s central government and the strategic importance of extractive projects
for China, CNPC is little inclined at the outset to interact with the local populations.
Compared to Western majors, Chinese oil firms are still in a learning phase and their
public relations departments are taking more of a backseat. CNPC’s initial imple-
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mentation of its operations in Sudan, in a context of conflict, illustrates the secondary
importance it attaches to cooperation with civil society and local communities. For
the time being , the two projects in Chad and Niger, still in the construction phase,
convey the image of company that sets priority on respecting the technical schedule
and on relations with the host government, but not on engaging in dialogue with
local community representatives.
In Sudan, however, under pressure from international opinion and after securing its
investment, CNPC has gradually shown itself to be more amenable to interaction with
local communities and is making efforts to project a positive image of its activities. In
Figure 2 (update of van Vliet’s initial hypotheses, 1998), we have attempted to illustrate
the salient features of the interaction between Chinese oil companies and national and
local players (affected populations, government), by comparing them with the behaviour
typical of Western firms. At the beginning of the cycle, the Chinese oil company seems
prepared to offer only very low amounts of compensation (compared to Western
firms), as the legitimisation it needs at the start of the cycle is already secured by
China’s bilateral cooperation (this type of practice is no longer accepted by Western
countries, but western firms have now learnt to mobilise multilateral aid, as in the case of
Exxon in Chad). However, the willingness of the Chinese firm to grant higher compensa-
tion gradually increases in response to growing demands. We advance the hypothesis
that, over a long time-scale, the strategies of Western firms and of Chinese firms will
slowly converge, leading notably to an increased propensity to grant compensation
(consolidating SER practice) and a common mobilisation of multilateral aid to manage or
prevent adverse impacts and their consequences (conflict). Heightened competition
between Chinese and Western operators in the production of new environmental
standards cannot be ruled out.[ 203 ]
[ 2 03 ] In Sudan, the oil cycle is indeed more advanced but persistent conflict has made it a very special case.
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2Figure Strategies of Western and Chinese oil companies'
in Central Africa: towards convergence?
Source: van Vliet, Dittgen and Magrin, 2011 (update of initial  hypotheses made by van Vliet, 1998).
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5.5. Conclusion
China's energy needs and the increasing presence of Chinese firms on the world
stage are clearly visible in the ramping up of CNPC’s oil operations in Africa. CNPC is
involved in three onshore projects in the Sahel region of Central Africa. The company
has a composite but firm presence in Sudan alongside two smaller projects operating
in Chad and Niger.
Beyond the requirement of profitability, environmental regulation in the oil sector is
becoming a growing challenge for companies. With the emergence of environmental
awareness in China and the profusion of increasingly complex environmental standards
for the extractive sector, the question arises of how CNPC is operating in the different
African countries. At first glance, the evidence seems to point to environmental
practices mainly inspired by the Sudanese experience and which can be transferred
to Chad and Niger. However, when CNPC first arrived in Sudan, conflict was rife and
the times hardly conducive to regulation, which did not encourage a high level of
regulation at the outset.
The ecological and geopolitical environments of all CNPC projects bear a certain
resemblance, even though country-specific political trajectories and environmental
backgrounds have influenced the national styles of environmental regulation. In
Chad, CNPC has to deal with the firmly rooted environmental legacy of the Doba
project. In Niger, the Chinese oil project has to take into account its overlap with a
protected area. In Sudan, CNPC's reputation was first exposed to international criticism
in a context of conflict. Thereafter, the peace treaty between the North and South
has allowed environmental regulation to make headway and with the independence
of South Sudan a whole gamut of new opportunities has opened up.
Consequently, CNPC does not have the same margin of manoeuvre in all  three
countries. The fact that the projects in Sudan are large-scale and longstanding has
given the Chinese company greater independence in environmental management.
The company’s subsidiaries in Niger and Chad have a more limited independence as
most decisions are made at the head office in Beijing. Despite national regulations,
political agendas tend to take precedence over environmental monitoring. Generally
speaking , the resources allocated to the monitoring and oversight of environmental
concerns still seem to be lower when compared with those of the Western majors.
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We began this study after realising , during a first attempt at dialogue with CNPC in
2008, that we knew virtually nothing about the way in which Chinese state-owned
oil firms developed and managed the environmental side of their activities, particularly
when these were located outside China, and more specifically in Africa.
Today we still cannot claim to know much more. The subject is vast and will require
a great deal of further research work, which will need relentless efforts to overcome
the difficulties involved, particularly in the area of communication. Nevertheless, we
would like to share some of the conclusions that we have drawn as a result of our study
approach, which took us from Beijing to N'Djamena via the Rônier project oilfields
and the neighbouring villages. 
We started out with the following question: do Chinese state-owned oil firms take
advantage of their less stringent social and environmental requirements to gain a foot-
hold in territory thus far occupied by the Western majors? Or, on the contrary, does
CNPC use SER concepts to improve its global competitiveness? What environmental
rules does CNPC effectively follow outside of China? How do these influence inter-
actions with host country governments and Western firms? 
In China, the gap between demand and supply of environmental regulation has been
greatly reduced: norms and standards have advanced and environmental management
practices are now widespread. This trend has received further impetus from the
combined pressure of citizens facing the environmental impacts of growth, from
companies’ demands for greater autonomy (which implies greater self-regulation)
and due to the country’s increasing participation in world trade – the corollary to
this being China’s exposure to international practices in private and public environ-
mental management. In response to the still perceptible difficulties in implementing
environmental standards, China adapted its system by setting up the State Environment
Protection Agency (SEPA), later to become the Ministry of Environmental Protection.
This current trend towards the fleshing out of norms and standards should continue,
but any real improvement in environmental indicators would undoubtedly require
closer scrutiny of the actual model that China has chosen to steer its environmental
issues. In this respect, new prospects have opened up with the recent provisions in
General conclusions
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Chinese legislation for the creation of independent monitoring mechanisms, the
participation of universities, and the encouragement of greater participation by
environmental NGOs and various non-governmental sources of expertise.
Over the last decade, the Chinese oil and gas sector has seen an improvement in
environmental regulation driven by the dual influence of internal demands and external
needs. The current rules of the game provide a basis for stimulating environmental
management practices within the petroleum sector. CNPC, in particular, has met the
growing challenges of environmental regulation by building on the frame of refe-
rence it has acquired through its own experience in China and overseas. The gradual
implementation of standards and more specific private and public procedures will
further strengthen this practice of environmental regulation. As in the Western world,
the growing complexity of oil technology will very quickly overtake the capacities of
a national agency responsible for environmental regulation, however official it may
be. Apart from the need to set up an independent monitoring body endowed with
the relevant regulatory procedures, material and human resources and requisite
authority, respect for the environment in the oil sector will depend not only on the
progress companies make in the area self-responsibility but also on their ability to
open up new spaces for dialogue with civil society.
Environmental regulation in Chad was in a state of crisis well before the advent of the
petroleum era. The launch of the World Bank-backed Exxon-Doba project helped to
create a rich heritage of rules of the game for the oil industry, particularly in the
environmental sphere. These rules added to the layers of earlier environmental regu-
lations (customary laws and state regulation prior to the oil era). The weakness of
the Chadian State put the Exxon-led consortium under additional and constant
pressure to adopt the practice of self-regulation, honed by the watchful eye of civil
society. Despite the more controversial aspects of the Doba experience, the project
charted a relatively promising course for environmental regulation. But is this sufficient
to trace a virtuous trajectory?
Observations made midway through the construction phase of the Chad-based Rônier
project (2009–2010) shed light on the encounter between the environmental regu-
lation dynamics at work in China and Chad, as well as on the nature of the project in
question. In its current phase, the Rônier project is a relatively small-scale industrial
project (with a production capacity of 20,000 barrels/day and connected to a refinery
by a 300 km pipeline) geared towards Chad's domestic market and facing the envi-
ronmental challenges commonly found in the oil industry. It is based on a composite
frame of reference for environmental regulation, which draws on Chinese standards,
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themselves influenced by the international and Chadian rules crafted at the time of
the Doba project. The negative and positive impacts seem less pronounced than those
produced by the Doba project. This can be explained by the fact that the Rônier
project is less sensitive in socio-political terms, by the different scales of the two
projects and by the host country’s demand for environmental regulation. However,
the cumulative effects of the activities already studied and those that are planned
(power plant, industrial zone, additional drilling , the Komé-Kribi pipeline connection)
have not been adequately taken into account. The lessons learnt from the Doba
project by the Chadian State and its people have helped to improve the level of envi-
ronmental regulation implemented: in Chad, CNPC does not seem to have the leeway –
had it so intended – to adopt the classic double-standard approach. When CNPC
arrived in Chad in 2007, its environmental management was framed by Chinese
environmental regulations, monitored by senior-level HSE bodies within CNPC, the
State Council and China Eximbank. In the course of our research on CNPC in Chad, we
found no evidence to confirm Soarez de Oliveira’s (2008) claim that Chinese companies
use the argument of less stringent environmental standards to gain access to markets.
The major difference between the two projects brings us back to our initial question
regarding the specificity of the environmental regulation implemented by Chinese firms.
From an empirical point of view, we found that communication on environmental
issues was relatively limited. The EIA, which is often used by Western firms as a key tool
to ensure communication between a project and its host environment, was mainly
used here as an in-company steering tool. This explains notably [ 204 ] why the EIA
process failed to comply with the schedule recommended by Chadian legislation, which
stipulates that the EIA process is to be completed before the start of construction works.
The specific role of communication in the implementation of the project is worth
putting in perspective.
Western firms have developed their legitimisation function, or “shell" function, by
skilfully leveraging multilateral cooperation operations to their advantage (World Bank
or regional bank projects); it legitimises the fact that the firms from participating
countries have access to the goods and services markets created by grants or loans.
On the basis of our earlier work carried out in settings dominated by Western firms,
we had assumed that, as CNPC was in the initial phase of its oil cycle in Chad, it would
be open to researchers, NGOs and the affected population and that it would have
General conclusions
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a well-staffed HSE department to facilitate these contacts (including a large team in
charge of communication and community relations). In other words, we assumed that
CNPC had set up a mechanism akin to the legitimisation function found in Western
firms. 
However, in CNPC’s Rônier project, the role and size of the department responsible
for building up this legitimacy seemed restricted, even at the outset of the oil cycle.
Although the “production" and “legitimisation" functions in CNPC are clearly separate,
the “legitimisation" function, especially in environmental matters, plays a limited and
barely visible role in the organisation. In our view, CNPC’s “legitimisation" function is
part and parcel of the Chinese bilateral cooperation programme with Chad, much
on the lines of the tried-and-tested model that underpinned Western bilateral
cooperation until the 1980s. This function is thus ensured by the Embassy in the
shape of infrastructure grants or the promotion of industrial partnerships as in the case
of the Chad refinery. This will likely be the case in the future unless CNPC develops
its own “legitimisation” mechanism. This could emerge from a new context in which
China would get the multilateral organisations (of which it is now a member) to
assume the role of legitimising its access to industrial and trade operations, much
like the role these organisations now play for the sole benefit of Western countries.
So far, only a few Western majors or OGP member companies have been capable
of introducing new technologies, new approaches and internationally recognised
procedures. These companies know how to handle their relations with the media and
national or supranational regulatory authorities, and also find their way around the
maze of self-regulated umbrella organisations within the oil sector. They have thus
seen their efforts as producers of new “best practices" rewarded. However, attaining
this level of recognition requires more than just “best practice": it also requires the
ability to communicate, convince and win acceptance and this is a know-how that
CNPC has still to acquire. If it fails to open up to communication and dialogue, which
today constitute a key dimension of the HSE function for oil majors, CNPC will be
unable to move from its present role of consumer of international standards and norms
to that of producer. The immediate challenges facing CNPC would be to develop
approaches and procedures conducive to dialogue with the surrounding stakeholders,
and to rethink the status that HSE departments are given within its hierarchy at
company and group level (particularly sufficient autonomy for them to give early
warnings and satisfactorily complete the required consultation processes). 
These hypotheses will naturally need to be tested against the company’s prospects
for its Chad-based oil operations, which are still highly uncertain. The Rônier project,
General conclusions
229
©AFD / November 2012 / The environmental challenges facing a Chinese oil company in Chad
as it stood when we carried out our research in 2009–2010, will most probably be
extended, with the CNPC increasing its oil production for export. Among the different
scenarios, the most realistic will likely involve linking up CNPC production facilities with
the Exxon-Doba pipeline. A physical connection of this kind would pose a major
challenge in terms of dovetailing the different regulatory systems. It would require a
global understanding that encompasses knowledge about the history of both projects
and the American, Chinese and Chadian frames of reference for environmental
regulation.
These perspectives call for a different approach to the questions raised by the relations
between Chinese and Western firms in Africa. The initial prevailing analyses reduce
them to no more than fierce competition that mainly leads to environmental dumping
harmful to the host countries. However, the dynamics that we observed do not confirm
this conception. On the contrary, it seems that they are furthering another form of
integration that opens up the global playing field to Chinese extractive firms, as
evidenced by the possible connection between the Rônier project and the Exxon-
Doba pipeline, by the co-operation already underway between CNPC and Total in
Mauritania and China, and by the possible partnership between Areva and a Chinese
firm to exploit the Imouraren mine in Niger. These partnerships could help to reinforce
environmental regulation. Quietly and in its own way, the Rônier project may well
have opened the door to other major projects.
General conclusions
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Appendix/Questions
At their request, questions were sent in writing via e-mail to the officers of the
China Development Bank, Eximbank and CNPC. We did not receive a formal reply
to these questions. We have included them below as they provide an insight on our
approach and the queries that arose in the course of this research.
Questions sent to China Development Bank 
and Eximbank China
1. Introduction. Could you provide basic information on types of financial instruments
(equity participation, loans); conditions and rates; repayment periods; specifically in
the oil and gas sector; specifically in Africa; and more specifically in Chad? If not
directly involved in loans for oil, gas, or mining activities, is your institution involved
in infrastructure projects in support to these extractive activities?
2. Which are the environmental standards and regulations applied in your institution,
specifically in the extractive industries, specifically regarding the oil and gas sector,
or regarding related infrastructure or other related investments? Access to these
documents would be more than welcomed (in Chinese or in English).
3. Relations of the environmental standards and regulations in your institution with
other standards and regulations:
– with standards and regulations proposed by multilateral organizations of which
China is a member (IMF, IFC, World Bank) or with Regional development banks like
the African Development Bank. Are there striking similarities or differences?
– with standards and regulations proposed by private organisation like the Inter-
national Association of Oil and Gas producers (OGP, of which CNPC is not yet a
member).
How do you deal with the co-financing of operations of Chinese companies working
within consortia composed of firms that are member of the OGP? How do you
deal with these multiple standards in those cases?
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4. What are your experiences with the enforcement of environmental regulations
within the operations of your Institution, specifically in the oil and gas sector in
Africa? When is it more easy to enforce environmental regulations: during iden-
tification, appraisal, or upon implementation of the loan or investment? What
are the main lessons from your experience?
5. As Eximbank has been involved with a loan to the Chadian government in order
to allow for its participation in the refinery project (joint venture between CNPC
and SHT), could we have access to publicly available information regarding the
following aspects: objectives and components of the project, amount of the
loan, repayment schedule and conditions? 
6. Could you provide us with publicly available information regarding the environ-
mental regulations Eximbank has requested for this loan, in particular regarding the
environmental impact evaluation, environmental management plan and oil spill
prevention plan? 
7. Could you confirm whether Eximbank has adhered to, or otherwise follows the
Equator principles?
Elements for a dialogue between CNPC and the study team
(sent to CNPC, N'Djamena, Beijing, 2010)
Project description
Based on publicly available information, could you provide a description of the Rônier
project: related to the refinery (in partnership with SHT), the pipeline and the oilfields? 
Based on publicly available information, could you inform us which firms are involved in
the Rônier project? Is this a consortium similar to the case of the Doba project?
Based on publicly available information, could you inform whether the Eximbank or
other Chinese financial institutions have been involved in the project? 
Based on publicly available information, could you provide basic information on the
planning of the building and operation schedule or the Ronier project?
Based on publicly available information, what are the respective roles and responsibilities
of CNPC and Chadian government in the Ronier project regarding environmental
management (monitoring , control, oil spill management)?
Appendix/Questions
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Based on publicly available information, what is the allocation of tasks and roles between
CNPC and SHT regarding the management of environmental issues in and around the
refinery? 
Based on publicly available information, which contractual obligations regarding
environmental management did the CNPC inherit when it acquired the exploration
and production rights from ENCANA?
Could we have access to the Environmental Impact Assessment for the different
components of the Ronier project?
Could we have access to the Environmental Management Plan?
Could we have access to the Accidental Oil Spill Prevention Plan?
HSE rules and proceedings (intentions and practice)
Formal intentions regarding environmental regulation:
Which environmental norms and standards does CNPC apply in Chad? Which references
(Chinese, Chadian, others) have been chosen for the different aspects of the project
(industrial norms, environmental norms, social norms)? 
What factors do influence the choice of Chinese, Chadian or international standards? 
Did Eximbank or other involved financial agencies influence the choice of environ-
mental standards implemented by CNPC (if yes, in what sense)?
Are there differences between HSE policies and procedures for HSE in Chad with
respect what CNPC usually does in China? From your point of view, what is the role
of HSE rules and procedures in the operations of CNPC in Chad? 
Are there certain points where Chadian laws (Petroleum code, environmental code)
differentiate from CNPC standards? Could you give an example? 
Are there cases where Chadian environmental or social laws are stricter than Chinese
laws?
How do you operate if the Chadian laws are less strict than CNPC standards?
What is the approach of the CNPC regarding the elaboration of EIA, EMP, and other
environmental instruments? (The CNPC appears to have elaborated very concise
EIA and EMP, compared to the voluminous texts realised by Exxon)?
Appendix/Questions
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Practice of implementation/enforcement of environmental regulation
Who is in charge of taking care of environmental issues regarding the Ronier project?
What are the different roles?
How are the EIE, EMP and other basic documents translated into practical operational
procedures? Can we have access to examples of operational procedures for field staff?
Who is in charge of monitoring and control of all environmental related procedures?
If confronted to a new situation and not foreseen within the EIA or EMP what standard
would you apply?
Internal organisation/HSE staff
How is the HSE staff organised? How many people are working in this department?
How do you divide up your work?
In regards to environmental awareness campaign, in what way does the internal com-
munication work (training course, experience)? In which language?
From your point of view, does the HSE department have sufficient influence in terms
of regulation and management within the CNPC operations in Chad? In general, HSE
staffs in OECD firms do complain that HSE procedures (particularly the Environmental
dimension in HSE) are considered a burden for the “engineers". Can you tell me
more about your experience as HSE staff? In which way do you manage to convince
overall staff of the importance of HSE policies and procedures?
Are there any awareness campaigns for local population in terms of environment?
Are there safety instructions for them during the construction phase of the project?
In which way are these instructions carried out (panels and/or village meetings)?
Do you think the rules in terms of environment and pollution in Chad are clear?
Applicable? Applied?
Is there any evolution regarding the intentions and practice of environmental regulation
within CNPC? What are the milestones that marked the changes in terms of mana-
gement of environmental issues within the organisation?
How does CNPC adjust itself to environmental problems encountered in Chad and
in Africa?
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Does the host environment influence the application of environmental standards
(regional approach for standard application or influenced by national context)? Do
home standards always prevail?
In terms of environmental management are the decisions centralized in Beijing , or is
there a certain independence of operational subsidiaries from headquarter?
Management of social impacts
What is CNPC´s approach to employment?
Recruitment policies? Role and perspectives of local labour?
Wage policies?
How is the work on CNPC’s activity sites in Chad organized? (Interactions between
Chadian and Chinese employees?)
How does CNPC manage the migration dynamics, the question of resettlement? In
which way are compensation policies (individual compensation and community
compensation) carried out?
What is CNPC’s policy regarding the involvement of local population and authorities
in the surroundings of the project?
Oil operations are complex. In which way are the different actors involved (CNPC,
Chadian government, civil society) adapting to difficulties? Could you provide examples
of learning?
Comparison and perspectives
Does the company intend to apply lessons (in terms of HSE) learned in Chad to other
operation fields? Otherwise, are there solutions that were applied in a similar context
mobilized in Chad in order to answer potential problems?
Is Exxon Mobil’s experience in Doba and the heritage of Encana’s former Rônier
project in any way influencing CNPC’s activities in Chad? How would you describe
the interactions between CNPC International Chad and other petroleum companies
(meetings, workshops, etc)?
How does CNPC’s experience in other operation sites in Africa influence the imple-
mentation of the Rônier project?
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In the annual report of CNPC Sudan, the Khartoum refinery is described as “the
pearl of the continent”. How important is this experience for the implementation of
the Djermaya refinery?
What are the relations and interactions (workshops, meetings, general policies, engineer
exchange) between different operation sites of CNPC in Africa?
Appendix/Questions
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List of acronyms 
AFD Agence Française de Développement
ANSI American National Standards Institute
API American Petroleum Institute
AQIM Al Quaeda In the Islamic Maghreb
AQSI Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection
and Quarantine (China)
ARC Africa Rice Center
ART Dev Acteurs, ressources et territoires dans le développement (UMR)
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials
BEEEI Bureau d’évaluation environnementale et des études d’impacts (Niger)
BELACD Bureau d’études, de liaison des actions caritatives et de développement
(Chad)
CBCSD China Business Council for Sustainable Development
CBRC China Banking Regulatory Commission
CCSRP Collège de contrôle et de surveillance des ressources pétrolières (Chad)
CEFOD Centre d’études et de formation pour le développement (Chad)
CEI CNPC East China Design Institute
CERDI Centre d’études et de recherches sur le développement international 
(France)
CILSS Comité inter-états de lutte contre la sécheresse au Sahel
CIRAD Centre de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique 
pour le développement (France)
CIRC China Insurance Regulatory Commission
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CITES Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
COTCO Cameroon Oil Transportation Company
CMS Convention on Migratory Species
CNODC China National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Corporation
CNOOC China National Offshore Oil Corporation
CNPC China National Petroleum Corporation
CNPCI China National Petroleum Corporation International
CNPP Coordination nationale du projet pétrole (Chad)
CNY Yuan, Chinese currency
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Sudan)
CPECC CNPC China Petroleum Engineering and Construction Corporation
CPPL Commission permanente pétrole locale (Chad)
CPPN Commission permanente pétrole nationale (Chad)
CROSCAP LC Collectif des réseaux et organisations de la société civile 
en appui aux populations locales du Loug Chari
CTNSC Comité technique national de suivi et de contrôle des aspects
environnementaux des projets pétroliers (Chad)
DRC Development Research Center of the State Council (China)
ECMG External Compliance Monitoring Group
ECOS European Coalition on Oil in Sudan
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment
EITI Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative
EMP Environmental Management Plan
EMS Environmental Management System
ENSCE Environment and Natural Resources Supreme Council
for Environment (Sudan)
List of acronyms 
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EPB Environmental Protection Bureau (China)
EPC Environment Protection Comittee (China)
EPDs Environmental Protection Division (China)
EPL Environmental Protection Law (China)
EPOZOP Entente des populations de la zone pétrolière (Chad)
ESR Environmental and Social Responsibility
EXIMBANK Export-Import Bank (China)
FACIL Fonds d’action concertée d’initiatives locales (Chad)
FDI Foreign Direct
FGEG Facts Global Energy Group
FROLINAT Front de libération nationale du Tchad
FYP Five-year Plan
GB Guo Biao (National Standards), (China)
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GIS Geographic Information System
GME Gravity, Magnetic and Electrical
GNPOC Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (Sudan)
GNP Gross National Product
GRAMPTC Groupe de recherches alternatives et de monitoring 
du projet pétrole Tchad-Cameroon (Chad)
GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
HDI Human Development Index
HJ Environmental Standards (China) 
HSE Health Safety and Environment
IAG International Advisory Group (Chad, Cameroon)
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IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICG International Crisis Group
IDA International Development Association
IDREC Institut de recherches sur l’économie de la Chine (France)
IFC International Finance Corporation
IMF International Monetary Fund
ITRAD Institut tchadien de recherches agronomiques pour le développement
IUCN International Union for the Conservation of Nature
ISO International Organization for Standardization 
LDC Least Developed Country
LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas
LUMAP Land Use Mitigation Action Plan (Chad)
MEP Ministry of Environmental Protection (China)
MOFCOM Ministry of Commerce (China)
MWR Ministry of Water Resources (China)
NARMA Network for Applied Research on Mining , Oil and Gas Activities
NDRC National Development and Reform Commission (China)
NEA National Energy Administration (China)
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NPA National Popular Assembly (China)
NPC National People’s Congress (China)
OD Operational Directive
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OGP International Association of Oil and Gas Producers
OHSA Occupational Health and Safety Management System Specification
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OIMS Operations Integrity Management System
ONDR Office national de développement rural (Chad) 
PBC People’s Bank of China
PDCA Plan, Do, Check and Action (Management model, China)
PDOC Petrodar Operating Company (Sudan)
PRODIG Pôle de recherche pour l’organisation et la diffusion 
de l’information géographique
RDP Regional Development Plan
RESAP Réseau de suivi des activités pétrolières (Chad)
SAC Standardization Administration of the People's Republic of China
SAIIA South African Institute of International Affairs
SASAC State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
of State council (China)
SEA Strategic Environment Assessment
SEPA State Environmental Protection Administration (China)
SER Social and Environmental responsibility
SFA State Forestry Administration (China)
SHT Société des hydrocarbures du Tchad
SINOPEC China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation
SITE School of International Trade and Economics (Beijing , China)
SME Small and Medium Enterprises
SNE Société nationale d'électricité (Chad)
SOA State Oceanic Administration (China)
SOE State-owned enterprise
SRN Société de raffinage de N'Djamena
STE Société tchadienne des eaux
List of acronyms 
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STEE Société tchadienne d'eau et d'électricité
STT Société tchadienne des textiles
SY Shi You (Petroleum Standards) (China)
TETIS Territoires, environnement, télédétection et information spatiale (UMR)
TOTCO Tchad Oil Transportation Company
UIBE University for International Business and Economics (Beijing , China)
UMR Unité mixte de recherche (Joint Research Unit)
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
USAID United States Agency for International Development
VOA Voice of America (News)
WHO World Health Organisation
3S “Three Synchronisations” Programme
List of acronyms 
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health, support for farmers and small businesses, water supply, tropical forest
preservation, fight against climate change, among other concerns. 
In 2011, AFD approved nearly €6.9 billion to finance activities in developing countries
and the French Overseas Communities. The funds will help get 4 million children into
primary school and 2 million into secondary school; they will also improve drinking
water supply for 1.53 million people. Energy efficiency projects financed by AFD in
2011 will save nearly 3,8 million tons of carbon dioxide emissions annually.
www.afd.fr
What is AFD?
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The environmental challenges
facing a Chinese oil company in Chad 
The surge in Chinese investments in Africa has brought about a flurry of questions
expressing concern over their ecological impact in the host countries. Still, the principles
and implementation of environmental management by Chinese firms remains largely
unknown.This work, born of a unique partnership between European, Chadian and Chinese
researchers, is an attempt to provide some insight on this subject, based on a  case study
in Chad, on a project that was initiated in 2009 by the leading Chinese petroleum firm,
the CNPC. 
For an understanding of the way in which the firm deals with the environmental challenges
in this country, this book first focuses on the recent progress made in China in the field of
public and private environmental regulation (including the petroleum sector), then describes
how this influences environmental management  as put into effect by the CNPC, in Chad,
during the construction phase. An analysis of the influence of the World Bank- backed
Exxon project sheds light on the interaction between Chinese, Chadian and Western
approaches to environmental issues. The authors have also highlighted the role of impro-
ved communications and transparency between the project proponents and other
stakeholders (local communities, civil society, national media).
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